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ABSTRACT 
This manuscript is a study the political, social, and administrative past of the 
Kazaks who became independent at the last decade of this century, shouldering all the 
burdens and problems of being a subject people first to the Russian Tsarist order and later 
to the Soviet rule. It is a search to find solutions to the present-day problems by focusing 
to the historical roots of the matters. This study attempted to focus on issues vital for the 
very survival of the Kazaks who are now only a part of the population in the land called 
Kazakstan. 
The need to launch such a study stemmed from the fact of seeking an answer to 
the problem,.s of the present-day Kazakstan. Thus a historical account of the roots of the 
issues, such as land, population change, political participation, and dilemma of the native 
language were choosen as the topics of the work. Kazak economic and military 
dependence to its former center, Moscow, was another dimension of the difficulties, this 
new state face in its path towards an independent survival. 
Kazak native elite and intellectuals became the symbols of a new nationalist trend 
m Kazakstan. Thus short biographies of some fifty most prominent Kazak political, 
military, intellectual and administrative elite provided an important contribution. It is 
hoped that this work will help to draw the attention of the academic and political world to 
one important dimension, reactions of the native part of the society, during the last three 
centuries, in the actions, ideas, and activities of the native elite. It is believed that the 
future ethnic stability need such a focus if there is going to be a stable social and ethnic 
order in Kazakstan. Thus it is an attempt to fill the gap in western literature with the most 
needed native account of the facts. 
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OZET 
Bu ara§tmna, asnm1zm son on yilmda bag1ms1zhg1m alm1§ bir i.ilke olan ve son ii<;: 
asir zarfmda, once Rus <;arhk idaresi, onun akabinde Sovyet idaresi altmda 
bulundugundan dolay1, bugiin problemlerle kar§I kar~1ya olan Kazakistan'm siyasi, 
askeri ve ekonomik gec;mi§ine ait problemleri konu edinmi§tir. Bu c;ah§ma Kazakistan'm 
bugiinkii problemlerine c;ozi.im aramak ic;in, olaylann tarihi kokenini ara§tmnay1 da konu 
edinmi§tir. Bu ara§ttrma, Kazakistan olarak adlandmlan bir i.ilkede, ni.ifusun sadece bir 
k1sm1m te§kil eden Kazaklann varolma ve yokolmas1yla c;ok yakmdan ilgili birc;ok 
konunun irdelenmesini amac; edinmi§tir. 
Boyle bir 9ah§maya ba~lamak, Kazakistan'm halihazirdaki problemlerine 
c;ozi.imler aramak ihtiyacmdan dogdu. Kazakistan' daki toprak, niifus problemi, siyasi 
kat1hm, Kazak dilinin meseleleri gibi birc;ok konulann ge9mi§te hangi §artlarda olu~tugu 
tarihi perspektifle irdelenmeye 9ah§1ldt. Kazakistan'1, eski merkez, Moskova'ya askeri ve 
ekonomik yonden baglayan konular da onu bag1ms1zhglfil engelleyen maseleleri te~kil 
ediyor. 
Kazak aydm ve elit tabakas1, bu i.ilkede yeniden kuvvetlenen milliyetc;i bir aktmm 
sembollerine doni.i§i.iyorlar. Bu yi.izden son ii<;: astrda ya§amt§ ve halen ya§amakta olan en 
onemli Kazak liderlerinin ve Kazak aydmlanmn elli kadanmn c;ok kisa biyografileri bu 
tezin sonuna eklenmi§tir. Bu tezin gayesi, akademik ve siyasi di.inyanm dikkatini, onemli 
bir konuya 9ekmektir. Bu da, son iic; asirda (Kazakistan'da vukuu bulan olaylara) Kazak 
aydm ve elit tabakasmm gorii~i.inii yans1tmak ve onlann hareket, fikir ve aktivitelerinin 
I§tgmda Kazakistan'daki yerli Kazak tepkilerini goz oni.ine sermektir. Kazakistan'da 
saglanacak etnik ve sosyal istikrann temelini olu§turmak ic;in olaylara bu ac;1dan bakmak 
gerektigine inamlmt§ttr. Bu ama9la, bat1 literatiiri.inde, Kazak yerli gorii§i.ine yer 
veilmemesinden kaynaklanan bo§lugun bu tezle dolduruldugu inancm1 ta§1maktay1z. 
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INTRODUCTION: 
This study is an attempt to find the roots of Kazak nationalism and the 
struggle of their elite, as the most important decision-making group, particularly 
during the last three centuries, to help the Kazaks exist as an independent entity. 
This study originated in a search to understand the native voice and concern 
regarding the future of the Kazaks. Thus, as the title of the study indicates, the 
Kazak history in the last three centuries, will be analyzed, taking the ideas, actions 
and activities of the Kazak elite into account. Understanding the problems of the 
natives in Kazakstan offers the hope of finding the correct solution in evaluating 
the true picture of this newly independent former Soviet Republic. This necessity 
stems from the following developments as well. 
The last two decades of the twentieth century have been very different 
from the previous decades. The post-Cold war international system arrived with 
the collapse of the bipolar world and with the disintegration of the Soviet Union. 
The old system with its competing two alliances presented a strategic balance of 
power. States interacted within a discipline of bloc politics. The roles, actions, 
and interests of the states on both sides of the world were usually defined within 
the boundaries of bloc interests. However, the disintegration of the Soviet Union 
brought new realities to international politics. Within less than three years in the 
early 1990s, more than ten republics became independent new entities carved out 
of the remnants of the Soviet Union. 
The emergence of these newly independent states and their place in the 
post-Cold war international system set new puzzles for academics all over the 
world. Some of these newly independent, former Soviet republics became 
independent thanks to changes and forces beyond their reach, strength or will. 
Some of these republics were not even ready to accept and adapt themselves to 
any kind of change. The post-Soviet nations and their new states, willingly or 
unwillingly, found themselves as the key actors in the midst of an era of 
transformation in the USSR. Developments in that part of the world are bound to 
affect not only Europe, Asia, and the Middle East, but the whole world. Political 
realignments, new policies and the national interests of each new state will have a 
significant impact on contemporary international affairs. 
The emergence of the new states from the remnants of the Soviet Union 
brought with it the beginning of another process, which we may call the Soviet 
de-colonization process. Analyses of the common characteristics of post-colonial 
societies indicates many similarities with the characteristics of the movements and 
factors in the former Soviet land. According to the Soviet perspective, it was only 
the former Tsarist system that used the principles of colonial regimes. However, 
the present situation and conditions, unarguably support the proposition that 
"Soviet practice was blatantly colonialist, in the classic sense of the word," 1 and in 
some instances it went further than the classical colonialist practices enslaving the 
1 Shireen Hunter, Transcaucasia in Transition, Washington, D.C. : Center for Strategic and 
International Studies, 1994. Author has presented a meticulous comparative analysis of the 
classical colonization with that of the Soviet de-colonization encountered presently by the 
Transcaucasian states. 
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regions to the center. The counter argument assesses the Soviet rule "as not quite 
colonial" taking account of the fact that the Soviet metropol collapsed together 
with its periphery. However, a major portion of the gains seized from the Soviet 
periphery were invested to support Soviet military ambition. The Soviet periphery 
was deprived of their share earned from many branches of the economy-
agriculture, mining and other areas- to support such ambition. If the Soviet 
metropol seemed to have gained nothing from their seven decades old empire, it 
was because of their maladministration in investing the gains in the military arms 
race. The major portion of Soviet profits was spent to improve the Soviet military 
and on the nuclear arms race. After the demise of the Soviet Union, military 
power and the former Soviet military capability wasted away in the hands of the 
representatives of the former center, in Moscow. 
When the Soviet Union disintegrated, most of the periphery, and in 
particular, Kazakstan presented most of the common features encountered by third 
world ex-colonies. Kazakstan had been under the total military control of 
Moscow, the center, with Russian troops present in the area. The natives had not 
been given equal opportunity in the most important branches of the military 
structure. In other words, the natives had been denied the military training 
necessary to maintain the security of an independent country. The highly 
interdependent economy in Kazakstan lacked self-sufficiency. Not powerful elite 
had emerged except only the old party 'nomenklatura,' loyal and responsive to the 
center's interests. Kazakstan was under the cultural and social domination of the 
3 
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center. The native language and its development was at its lowest level of 
survival. Kazakstan's vast natural resources lacked enough financial backing to 
restore the economy which would be vital for the maintenance of nation-building. 
Kazakstan needed huge amounts of foreign capital to recover from economic 
decline and maintain a decent survival. The 'Soviet' de-colonization process can 
be identified by the following fact: there were no armed struggles in the ex-Soviet 
republics to achieve independence. However, in the classical de-colonization 
process, armed struggle against the imperial power helped colonial peoples to 
forge a sense of unity and purpose. Kazak native intellectuals, aware of this fact, 
began to look back into history to recover native struggles against the colonizing 
power, first against Tsarist colonialism and then Soviet colonialism. The armed 
struggle of the classical de-colonization process provided the natives with the 
creation of leadership cadres who were popularly accepted and whose legitimacy 
was recognized. In the classical de-colonization struggle, towering figures such as 
Nehru, Gandhi, Jinnah, Nkrumah and Sukarno, with diplomatic skills and 
inexhaustible commitment, led their people towards independence. Kazakstan 
lacked such a strong personality to represent the grievances of the colonized 
people in opposition to the center and against those loyalists of the center inside 
the republic. The division between the natives and those representing the colonial 
power was not as sharp as it was in the classical colonies. Thus, the nation-
building process in Kazakstan faces tremendous internal and external difficulties. 
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Many of the difficulties Kazakstan has faced on its way towards the 
maintenance of the free statehood stem from the policies previously imposed upon 
it, first by the Tsarist and later by the Soviet administrations. One of them is the 
presence of ethnic Slavs in Kazakstan, committed to Russia and to Russian 
political, military, and economic interests, more than they are committed to the 
Kazak state they are presently living in. Another fact is the emergence of extreme 
nationalist inclinations in Russia-the policies of the current Russian 
administration variously referred to as the Russian Monroe Doctrine, the Near 
Abroad, etc. The current dilemma of the Kazak people is not only a struggle of 
de-colonization, but also a struggle against the remnants of Soviet power which 
poses a bigger challenge to Kazakstan. 
On the one hand, many changes need to be studied with reference to 
tendencies in the global political environment. Soviet area studies, on the other 
hand, require the study of the regional situation as well. Studying the Kazak case 
involves matters such as nation-building and nationalism, «ethno-nationalism" 
and "ethno-territorialism." The above subjects were largely a product of an 
imposed Soviet system of administration. The transition from Communism and 
the building of a new political-economic system have their unique challenges. 
Coupled with this, there is a lack of institutional foundations necessary for a 
successful establishment of democracy. The present territorial and inter-ethnic 
disputes, as well as the very high-level of economic dependency of this republic to 
its former center, Moscow, import particular difficulty to the process of nation-
5 
building, democratization, and a successful integration of Kazakstan into the 
global economy. 
Studying the statehood in transition to democracy in the newly 
independent Kazakstan, with a specific emphasis on the roots of many matters 
(such as ethnic, religious, and political identity) are important for the definition of 
the future path of this new entity. In order to define the place of Kazakstan 
politically among the states of the world, and the probable causes of further 
instability in the republic, it is necessary to include the past, by studying the 
Russian colonization movement, pre-Revolutionary times, religious and 
nationalist tendencies among the Kazaks before the Soviet period and the legacy 
of the Soviet period which has left such a strong mark on the history of the now-
independent Kazakstan. It is hoped that this analysis of the above matters will 
shed some light on predictions about the future of Kazak politics. 
Recent political developments within the Commonwealth of Independent 
States and in the Muslim-majority republics of Central Asia and the Caucasus 
who are strengthening their ties with the countries of the Middle East (Iran, 
Turkey, Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, etc.) are also a factor prompting 
scholars to study linkages between Islam and national consciousness. 
Discussion of the soviet de-colonization, the systemic tendencies of 
transition to democracy and the market economy, integration of the former 
communist countries into the global economy, the formation of statehood and 
nation-building will be discussed. In order to avoid excessive length in discussing 
6 
all of the above matters, our concentration will be on Kazakstan particularly. A 
general discussion of all the above matters will be made only to clarify the related 
situation in Kazakstan. It is also a unique chance for any scholar-sociologist, 
economist and political scientist-to observe and live through all of these changes. 
Studying the post-Soviet nations is also important for social scientists to enable 
them to test their basic theories of political change and development. 
The future path of this republic, its history, its complicated problems, 
whether economic, political, military, ethnic, cultural or religious, have been the 
topics of a number of studies. There have also been a vast number of studies, 
articles, surveys, reports and observations about the current problems of this 
newly independent country. However, there seems to be a gap between these two 
forms of study. There is a lack of a comprehensive work which, by taking into 
account the past, looks at the roots of the problems and the current situation in the 
republic. In other words, the transition from past to present and how foundations 
of the past have served as a prelude to the future will be an additional focus of this 
work. 
My contention is that first Tsarist colonial rule and later Soviet rule 
brought about the hardship and dilemmas of today's Kazakstan. All of the present 
problems, in their political, economic, military, cultural and ethnic dimensions are 
the results of the policies carried out by the outside power, Russia, and their 
forceful imposition on the native people. In order to overcome the difficulties 
faced by the young independent state, native intellectuals are seeking a solution 
7 
by invoking the native past. Ignoring the native history and native past will 
deprive future scientists of a healthy and correct judgment of the situation in the 
republic. The strength of native concerns and grievances are important. I hope 
that the analysis of the past will bring clarity to the origin of the problems to be 
solved by the current administration. At the same time, it is important to know 
whether "the Soviet era succeeded in destroying the pre-Leninist past of the 
Kazaks and robbed Kazaks of their ability to resurrect precommunist identities, 
parties, and institutions"2 or not. Despite the claims that the emergence of 
Kazakstan as an independent entity "is an accident never intended to happen,"3 
Kazakstan is a reality. It is a country which is experiencing the most problematic 
aspects of de-colonization and its population still struggles to maintain a genuine 
Kazak identity. Thus, understanding the past of Kazak society will define the 
future of the new Kazakstan, in which a process of nation-building, already started 
in pre-Revolutionary times, led by native intellectuals. Reactions to the Russian 
colonial movement on the Kazak steppe found supporters that felt the threat of the 
Russians towards their traditional way of life. The role of the Kazak intellectuals 
as some of the most influential actors in the society, both prior to the Bolshevik 
Revolution, and during the seventy years of Soviet rule and after the demise of 
the empire, is one of the subjects of this study. We believe that shedding light on 
2 Karen Dawisha, "Democratization and Political part1c1pation: Research Concepts and 
Methodologies," Conflict, Cleavage, and Change in Central Asia and the Caucasus, edited by 
Karen Dawisha and Bruce Parrot, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997., p. 47. 
3 Martha Brill Olcott, "Democratization and the Growth of Political Participation in Kazakstan.'' in 
ibid., p. 20 I. 
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their activities will greatly help in understanding the behavior of present day 
Kazak society and its socio-political reactions. The nationalist intellectuals of 
Kazak society, before Bolshevik power, were the leaders of political movements. 
If that process had not been brutally, interrupted by the Soviet regime, state-
building and the transition to democracy would not have been so difficult as it is 
today. 
The first chapter of this work will focus on a brief history of the Kazak 
lands, its administrative, military and political elite in the traditional sense, an 
assessment of the statesmanship of the traditional leaders in defense of their 
territory and the conditions leading to the Russian occupation of the Kazak lands. 
The main idea in including the history of the early emergence of a Kazak identity 
is to display the roots of present Kazak identity, roots which survived in spite of 
many forceful measures. 
The second chapter will lead the readers to a discussion of many aspects of 
life in Kazak society and their gradual submersion under Russian domination. It is 
also an attempt to define the outcome of changes inflicted upon the nomadic 
Kazaks by the new administrators, the Tsarist colonial administration. The 
confiscation of Kazak land, the beginning of environmental degradation; changes 
in the traditional economy, the decline of the traditional way of life, nomadism, 
and interactions between native society and its overlords, the occupying power, 
will be the subjects of this chapter. At the same time, an attempt is also made to 
explain the native backlash against the politically, socially, religiously and 
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culturally repressive Tsarist regime in the Kazak lands. A quick review of the 
decisive first quarter of this century is necessary in order to understand the scope 
of the problems of today's Kazakstan, which is now at another crossroads. 
The third chapter deals with the seventy-year long Soviet overlordship and 
the developments during this period. It is an account of the Soviet measures 
attempting to tum Kazakstan into a 'socialist' society by brutally suppressing, and 
silencing every form of free survival, starting from free-thinking and evaluating 
the changes objectively to improve the indigenous cultures according to the native 
need. Collectivization, industrialization, land confiscation, the end of the nomadic 
tradition, native population decline, alterations in demography, the mass 
execution of native intellectuals, artificial famine and the much-exaggerated 
achievements of the Soviet regime in the east of the Union concerning education 
and the development of this nation coincide with this period. The Virgin Land 
Campaign and the mass settlement of Slavic population in the Republic are also 
among the issues included in this part. Although marked by considerable 
stagnation, particularly in economic fields, the Brejnev era and the leadership 
under Kunayev helped to some degree to improve the native situation and 
supported an environment enabling natives to participate in administrative work. 
The fourth chapter deals with the military, political, social and 
environmental problems of Kazakstan. The Soviet era altogether was for the 
Kazaks an era of many sorrowful practices. Thus this chapter is an attempt to 
examine the results of some Soviet administrative practices that left negative 
10 
traces which endured beyond the actual demise of the Soviet empire. Answers to 
such questions as what will be the result of the growing national consciousness of 
the Kazaks and the strengthening nationalist inclinations of the ethnic Russians in 
the republic within a globalizing world will also be investigated. An attempt to 
look deeper into the matters related to political and economic independence, the 
formation of a national army, the revival and reinterpretation of national heritage 
and the forces behind the ethnic nationalism of the Kazaks and the Russians in the 
republic are among the matters that will be discussed. In this chapter, questions 
such as the following will give the reader a better understanding of the problems 
in the Kazak republic. Will the "post-industrialism, rather than rendering 
nationalism obsolete, furnish new bases for ethnic movements and cultures?"4 
There will be an inescapable overlapping between domestic matters and those 
associated with foreign policy issues in this chapter. 
The last chapter deals with matters related to the modifications of relations 
between independent Kazakstan and the former Soviet republics led by Russia. 
Russian policy towards this newly independent state also has important 
dimensions for Kazakstan in its formation of foreign ties. Kazak entrance to the 
international community is another vital milestone in the history of this state. 
The concluding part will evaluate the problems faced by Kazakstan. The 
experiences of the native past, former attempts towards establishing an 
~Nationalism, John Hutchinson and Anthony Smith, eds., Oxford: Oxford University Press, I 994, 
p. 287. 
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independent existence, the negative outcomes of the Tsarist and Soviet colonial 
regimes, and most important of all, the native activities, and the targets and 
desires of independent Kazakstan will be questioned. 
The appendix will include a chronology of the Kazak Hans and of 
important events in the history of the Kazaks. Short biographies of Kazak elite 
including political, military, administrative, intellectual personalities as well as 
the Soviet era partocrats who left their mark in recent history of this nation will be 
included. This part will particularly be striking to display the ties between 
generations who followed one after another, and how they bridged the gap 
between generations in becoming the voice of their people. A historical map of 
the Kazak land as well as a current map of the Republic of Kazakstan will be 
provided as an additional help to the reader. 
Russian scholars of Tsarist times, as well as Soviet and later Western 
researchers, have considered the Kazaks as a nomadic people without a written 
heritage. This conclusion has led many Russian, Soviet and Western researchers 
to ignore the work of earlier Muslim scholars. It has led many to disregard the 
ancient and medieval ties and roots of Kazak tribes within the Central Asian, 
Turkic, Muslim and even Mongol world. Tribes composing the present day Kazak 
people have had a long, complicated and intimate relationship with the Muslim 
world through various confederations and unification in Central Asia (the 
Karahanid, Gaznavid, Timurid, etc.) and in the northern Caucasus (the Golden 
Horde). The inability to read the oriental languages, as well as the indigenous 
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tongues, have also led many contemporary western scholars to omit if not ignore 
the use of native sources. It seems a serious failure to disregard the native material 
in analyzing the past, present and future of the region. For Central Asia, Russian 
was the language of the colonizing power and continued to perform the same role 
even during the Soviet period due to the fact that the majority of natives were 
using it as their only language of formal and informal communication. This fact, 
most logically, led many scholars to ignore the indigenous language. 
Nevertheless, it led many to ignore the arguments of the natives which are 
becoming ever stronger again. 
Responsibility for this first goes to the practice of the Soviet 
administration in overassessing the role of the Russian language as "the" language 
of the so-called "international Soviet community." The Soviet assigned v·alue of 
the ideas of some nineteenth century native Kazak intellectuals "pointing to the 
Russian language and culture as the only means to enlighten the nomadic Kazaks 
of the steppe" 5 also made its negative contribution to the exaggeration of the 
usage of Russian sources. At the same time, the successful Russian advance and 
settlement on the Kazak steppe, that created a Russian dominated society, forced 
those natives to bury their nationalistic ideas between the lines during the Soviet 
times. Thus, some Kazak language sources play a different tune that only native 
speakers are able to understand regarding national matters. In this context, native 
5 The well-known Kazak scholar Soqan Valihanov, the much publicized Kazak poet Abay 
Qunanbayev and the educator lb1ray Altmsann are examples of the practice that justified the 
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language sources, particularly the works of the native intellectuals, are heavily 
used in this dissertation. Kazak intellectuals, who played an important role in the 
attempt to win an independent existence for the Kazaks and for their relations, 
particularly as against the Russians, were important. Nevertheless, as a result of 
the brutal Stalinist killings almost none of the native Kazaks intellectuals were 
able to leave their memoirs. It is one of the most unfortunate cases in history. 
Except for Mustafa <;okay who left his country in the 1920s, all of the Ala~ 
activists departed from this life without memoirs. Many important articles written 
by the Ala~ intellectuals in the pages of pre-Revolutionary periodicals, and recent 
publications of the transliterated form of many works from their original forms, 
were used to fill this gap. This problem might be eased in the future due to the 
continuos search of present-day Kazak scholars to find alternative sources, 
~roviding additional accounts of events related to the first half of this century. 
In this context, two books by the outstanding Ba~qurt scholar, the late Zeki 
Velidi Togan, which were published in istanbul and Egypt-his Hatzralar, 'The 
~emoirs' and his Turkzstan-are particularly important. He was a painstaking 
scholar and researcher of many unknown details of the pre-Bolshevik and Soviet 
eras, using his very intimate contact with almost all of the political activists in the 
Kazak lands, particularly for the period of pre-Soviet and early Soviet power in 
Central Asia. Covering all the subjects in Validov's(Velidi) works and memoirs 
goes beyond the scope of this thesis. An attempt was made to deal only with the 
impo11ance of the Russian language by many Soviet-era native and non-native writers of 
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matters related to Kazaks. The English language books and articles, generally 
dated after the independence period, were not included due to the fact that all of 
these are widely known to the scholarly world and offer nothing new. The Kazak 
language sources are also selected to reflect the changing practice and views 
towards the native past thanks to the changes that have taken place since the 
Gorbachov years and in the era of independence. Another innovative change in 
Kazakstan is the reinterpretation of history and a new attitude towards the past. 
Scrutinizing the new trends in native publications will reveal the preferences of 
the native element in Kazakstan. Besides, the ability of native intellectuals to 
reach Kazak society and their influence in the decision making bodies of the new 
Kazak state will also be tested. 
An additional point concerns the transliteration of Kazak and Turkic 
words, names, terms and toponyms. Western research materials without 
exception take into consideration the Russian language in transliterating all Kazak 
and Turkic words. This practice has led to many misunderstandings and to 
mispronunciation of the original terms, leaving aside the destruction of the 
historical heritage of the people contained in the original term. Thus it seems an 
apt decision to use the transliteration of the original indigenous languages 
according to the Turkish rather than the Russian or English version of Russian 
transliteration. Thus, 'Kenesary' will appear as 'Kenesan,' 'Alash Orda' will 
appear as 'Ala~ Orda,' 'Buke1hanov' will appear as 'Bokeyhanov,' 'Kipchak' 
Kazakstan and of the Soviet Union. 
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will appear as 'Q1p~aq,' 'Bahit Kirey Kulmanov' as 'Baq1t Kerey Qulmanov' 
and 'Tynyshpayev' as 'Tm1~payev.' This system will also be extended to the 
transliteration of toponyms reflecting another remnant of foreign rule in the 
history of Kazakstan. Starting from Tsarist times till the end of the Soviet era, a 
ceaseless activity of replacing indigenous toponymic terms with Slavic ones has 
brought present day Kazakstan face to face with the danger of toponymic 
illiteracy and the destruction of the historical heritage of the Kazak people. Thus 
Semirechie will appear as Jetisuv, Semipalatinsk as Semey or Jetitam, 
Petropavlovsk as Q1ziljar, Perovsk as Akme~it or Q1Z1lorda (for the present-day). 
Nevertheless, there will be one exception, Kazakstan will be used instead of 
Qazaqstan because of its wide publication and as a result of the official acceptance 
of this form by the present independent state organs. 
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CHAPTER ONE : KAZAKSTAN BEFORE RUSSIAN OCCUPATION 
The sixteenth century marks the emergence of the Kazaks as an 
independent entity whose population, by their own free will, separated themselves 
from the rest of the inhabitants of Central Asia. In brief, they had their own state, 
established according to the unique characteristics of the people named Kazaks 
until the eighteenth century. The third decade of the eighteenth century marks the 
gradual beginning of colonialist Russian penetration into their life. Together with 
tens of millions of other Turko-Muslim people, Kazaks were forced to accept 
another form of Russian overlordship under the name of the socialist system at the 
beginning of this century in the early 1920s. Kazakstan declared its independence 
as the last of the new Soviet Central Asian republics on 16th December 1991, 
after the demise of the Soviet Empire. 
The aim of this chapter is to provide the reader with background 
information to support an understanding of the ages long struggle of the Kazaks to 
exist as an independent realm. Thus a brief history of this people, the formation of 
their Khanate separate from their ethnic and religious brothers in Central Asia, the 
political and military structure of early Kazak society, and the successes and 
failures of their political/military elite before the Russian occupation will be 
discussed in this chapter. The traditional state structure of the Kazaks was formed 
mainly with regard to the needs of their nomadic society. The main occupations of 
traditional Kazak society were closely related to the well-being of their livestock. 
Thus tribal ownership of pastureland or grazing land was very important for 
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Kazak survival. At the end of this chapter, the last part will thus be devoted to 
analyzing the failure of their nomadic society to maintain unity and to form a 
militarily strong state to defend their land from outside forces. The political and 
military events surrounding the Kazak lands and the clash of internal power 
centers within Kazak society prepared the ground for Russian occupation. The 
Kazak lands fell to Russia's lot as a result of conditions stemming from the Jongar 
invasion, despite the courageous resistance of Kazak society against the enemy in 
the east for two-centuries. A consequential development was the maintenance of 
the Bolshevik power in the region at the beginning of this century. This led 
Kazakstan to be one of the fifteen republics of the Soviet Empire for seven 
decades in the twentieth century. 
A BRIEF HISTORY OF THE KAZAKS 
There are two key terms in explaining the origin of the Kazaks. The first 
one is the term "Kazak," which has been explained by some as a social label 
describing a man who has left his group, tribe or state and been obliged to seek 
trouble.6 Other sources reveal the word "Kazak" as a term coming from various 
origins. A first speculation was that the term was derived from qaz (to wander) 
and a second speculation was that it was derived from a Mongol word Khasaq (a 
Mongol cart used by the Kazaks to transport their yurts). A third explanation was 
given as aq qaz (white goose), deriving from a Kazak legendary tale of a white 
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goose turning into a princess and giving birth to the first Kazak. 7 At the same 
time, there is a term in Turkey, "kazak erkek," to describe a despotic spouse. 
"Ala.;'' is the second term mentioned in describing the origins of the 
Kazaks, representing the legendary forefather of the Kazaks. However, present-
day Kazak intellectuals point to a Kazak term "Altz Ala/'8 depicting the six tribes 
among them; the Great, Middle and Lesser Hordes as well as Qaraqalpaq (who 
joined the Kazaks after the decline of the Noghay Horde), Kirg1z (who joined the 
Kazaks during the time of Qas1m Han), and Qurama9 ; each being a son of Ala$. 10 
At the same time, the war cry of all the Kazaks is also the same word Ala$. 11 
The ethnic origin of the Kazaks comprised a mixture of all those different 
tribes and groups of tribes that composed various states existing at different 
~ Qazaqstan Tariyhz, Almat1: Davir, 1994, p.148. 
- Martha Brill Olcott, in The Kazakhs, Stanford: Hoover Institution Press, 1987, in page 4, quoted 
~oqan Valihanov, Sobraniye Soc;ineniy, 5 Yols.(Alma Ata, 1961-1968), Vol. I., p. 207., and N. I. 
Grodekov, Kirgizy I Karakirgiz1 Syr '-darinskoy oblasti, Vol. I., p. I. Late Prof. N1gmet 
Mmgjanuh, a Kazak from the so-called Sinkiang(East Turkestan) Uygur Autonomous Region, 
"-Tote that the te1m Qazaq as an etnonym appeared very early in history. Please see, N1gmet 
Mmgjanuh, Qazaq Halq111111g Qzsqa$a Tariyhz, Urum(fi, 1987. Please also see, Qoy~1qara 
Salgarauh, Qazaqtmg Qzylz Tariyhz, Almat1: Jahn, 1992. 
• Zeki Velidi Togan, in his Turkzstan mentions Alh Alas as the Kazak and Kirg1z people when he 
was depicting a fight between BaNurts and Kazaks in 1750. Please see, Zeki Velidi Togan, 
Bugiinkii Tiirldli Turkzstan ve Yakzn Tarihi, istanbul, 1981, p. 24 7. 
9 Qurama is the term to describe group of people whose ongm comes from different 
indistinguishable tribes. A contemporary Kazak historian Muhtar Magavin described Qurama as a 
group of people settled in Maveraiinnehr and engaged in agriculture and felt themselves closer to 
the Kazaks. See, Muhtar Magavin, "Esim Han jane Onmg Zamam," Qazaq Tariyhznzng Alippesi, 
Almat1: Qazaqstan, 1995, p. 42. 
1cQoy~1qara Salgarauh, "Bizding Jilnamam1z-~ejire: Uh Jiiz, Orta Jiiz, Ki~i Jiiz," Qazaqtzng Q1yl1 
Tariyhz, Almah: Jahn, 1992, pp. 137-267. 
11 The word Ala~ was also mentioned as a war-cry in the poems of Mirjaq1p Duvlat in Oyan 
Qazaq, Ufa, 1909, as : 
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periods in the history of Central Asia since time immemorial. These were the 
Scythians (Saqtar), Uysin, Qangh, Hun, Turge~, Qarhq (Kaduk), Oguz as well as 
Q1pc;aq (Kipchak), Q1ymaq, Nayman, Argm, Kerayit, Qong1rat, Jalayir, and 
Duvlat. 12 Many of these states and tribes have led tribal groupings or 
confederations at different times. They all made their contribution in shaping the 
ethnic and linguistic characteristics of the Kazaks. Turkic-speaking tribes emerged 
with their own unique social and political organizations and their own material 
civilization and art. Turkic rule during the time of the A vars, the Western Turkish 
Khanate, the Karahanid dynasty and the Karah1tay era have also made significant 
contributions to the origins of the Kazak nation. Earlier Mongol elements in the 
origin of large Kazak tribes such as Nayman and Kerayit, as well as Duvlat, 
Qangh, Dysin, and Barlas, also prove the close contact between the Mongol and 
Turkic peoples and their civilizations in sharing Central Asian territory. The 
emergence of the Great Silk Road and the establishment of medieval towns in 
Central Asia also played an important role in the history of the people living on 
present-day Kazak territory. However, the Q1p~aq (Kipchak) influence was the 
greatest among the people of Central Asia, particularly during the tenth and 
eleventh centuries. 13 During the later periods, Q1pc;aq tribes lived mainly among 
the Kazaks. However, some parts of them also entered the ranks of the Uzbek, 
Ala~ dep uran estilse, kim bunlmas qanma, 
Fahimle dep aytamm, ferasattmmg barine! 
12 Qazaqstan Tariyh1, Almah: Davir, 1994., p.136. 
13 "Qazaq", Qazaq-Sovet Ensiklopediyas1., Vol. 6., Almah, 1975., p. 219-220. 
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Qaraqalpaq, Ba~qurt and Kirg1z of today. During the eleventh and twelfth 
centuries, unified nomadic peoples in Central Asia gradually attempted to settle 
down and to establish economic relations with sedentary people who improved 
their farming techniques. 
The ethnic mixture of the Timurid, the Golden Horde (Altm Orda) and the 
\Vhite Horde(Aq Orda), as well as of the Saybanid dynasty was complex and 
many different tribes accepted their rule. All those tribes were called by the same 
ethnic-political term the Uzbeks from the end of the fourteenth to the middle of 
the fifteenth century. During the first half of the fifteenth century, the political-
ethnic mixture of the Uzbek Khanate was completed and the distinct 
characteristics of Mongol and Turkic tribes were homogenized. Many of these 
were Turkified tribes of Mongol stock and they inhabited the De~t-i Q1p~aq (the 
Kipchak desert) and the southern Kazakstan region from medieval times onwards. 
Later, when the Kazak Khanate was established in the sixteenth century, many of 
these tribes entered the ranks of the Middle Horde of the Kazak people. 
According to Tarih-i Ra~idi, 14 tribes led by the Janibek and Kerey Sultans were 
first called Uzbek-Kazak and later Kazak. However, the term Kazak or Uzbek did 
not have any ethnic meaning in the fifteenth century. Only later, with the gradual 
formation of the Kazaks as a group, did the term acquire an ethnic meaning. The 
term began to be used as the established label to describe the Turkic peoples 
~ Mirza Haydar Dughlat, Tarikh-1 Rashidi: A History of the Hans of Moghulistan, Sources of 
Oriental Languages and Literatures: 38, English Translation and Annotation by W. M. Thackston, 
~inasi Tekin and Goniil Alpay Tekin, eds., Massachusetts: Harvard University, 1996. 
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inhabiting the De~t-i Q1p9aq steppes and Jetisuv as well as the southern regions of 
present-day Kazakstan. 
One should also accept the fact that there was not a distinct Kazak 
ethnicity at this stage. The term Kazak seem rather a name for nomads in Central 
Asia before the establishment of the Kazak Khanate later in the sixteenth century. 
The political character of the Kazak people gave the group (who were from the 
mixture of many tribes mentioned above) a unique character which the present-
day scholars tend to call it as an ethnic group. 
The territory of todays Kazakstan was home to many ancient tribes. 
However, the land of the Kazaks, inhabited by the above tribes, changed 
according to the alliances and unification of groups and states. By the mid-
thirteenth century, the whole territory of today's Kazakstan came under the rule of 
the Golden Horde. 15 Around the 1350s, the Aq Orda (White Horde)16 emerged 
and achieved its independence from the Golden Horde in the 1360s. 17 "The Aq 
Orda state emerged on the eastern De~t-i Q1p~aq (the Q1p9aq desert) 18 during the 
mid-thirteenth century and survived until the first quarter of the fifteenth 
15 "Altm Orda," Qazaq-Sovet Entsiklopediyas1, vol., p. 301-302, and particularly the map provided 
in the encyclopedia (p. 303) cover the whole area of today's Kazakstan. 
1 ~ "Aq Orda," Qazaq-Sovet Entsiklopediyas1. Vol.I. p. 214. 
17 According to Qazaqstan Tariyh1, p.104., "Between 1357 and 1380, some 25 hans ruled the 
Golden Horde." 
18 According to the RedHouse Turkish-English Dictionary, De~t-i Q1pi;aq, 1s given as the 
Sa1matian Steppe, the country of the Golden Horde. 
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century." 19 The White Horde occupied the east of the territory of the (:op's 
(<;:mg1s's son) Ulus (nation), the Golden Horde, the end of which came after the 
defeat of the Golden Horde's Han, Toqtam1~, by Emir Timur in the 1370s and 
1380s. As a result of the weakening central control of the Golden Horde Khanate, 
the Aq Orda began to emerge. The center of the Aq Orda was located on the banks 
of the Ertis river around Alakol. Later in the fourteenth century, the rulers of the 
Aq Orda established their control over the whole territory of present day 
Kazakstan. Thus the political center of the Aq Orda moved to the South, to the 
city of S1gnaq. With the coming of Timur and in the course of his fight with the 
Toktam1~ of the Golden Horde, the territories of today's Kazakstan, the Caucasus 
and the southern regions of the medieval Russian state suffered from this turmoil. 
Thus the rule of the Aq Orda began to weaken as a result of the Timurid power 
struggles in this territory. 20 As a result of the decline of the Aq Orda and of the 
internal struggles among the descendants of the <;:091 Han, the Saybanid dynasty 
emerged as the strongest among the successors fighting on the Kazak steppe. It 
was known as the nomadic Uzbek Khanate or simply as the Uzbek Khanate. 
During the reign of Ebulhayir of the Saybanids, for about forty years, the Kazak 
steppe was under his strong control, stretching from the Jay1q river in the west to 
Lake Balqa~ in the east, and from the Sir Darya region in the south to the lower 
and middle-Tobtl and the river Ertis in the north. 
!'9 Quzaqstan Tariyhc, p.109. 
3 Qazaqstan Tariyh1, p. I 09-111. 
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As has been stated above, the Kazak territory has been defined by various 
late medieval scholars according to the land occupied by various Kazak hans in 
the course of the period between the fifteenth and seventeenth centuries. For 
example, during the time of the rule of Janibek and Kerey, the Kazak territory was 
described as the region in the south-western portion of the Jetisuv region, namely 
the area around (:u and Talas rivers. However, later, historians indicated an area 
further west, by stating that the area inhabited by the Kazaks was between the Edil 
(idil) and Sir (Darya) rivers. Russian sources indicate Kazak territory as the lower 
Sir Darya region namely the Sansuv, Ulutav and Sanarqa areas. 
During the time of Ulug Bek (1394-1449), Baraq Han21 fought against 
Ebulhayir who was supported by Ulug Bek. From Ebulhayir came the emergence 
of the $aybanid dynasty with which the descendants of Baraq Han fought to 
control the territory of the then declining Aq Orda. In other words, Baraq's son 
Janibek Han, and Janibek's once-removed cousin Kerey Han, were fighting 
against $aybanid rule and formed the Kazak union in the mid-1460s. By the end 
of the 1450s and the beginning of the 1460s, a considerable portion of the tribes 
under the rule of Ebulhayir of the Saybanids had moved close to the western 
border of Mongolia to the Jetisuv area from eastern De~t-i Q1p9aq under the 
leadership of Janibek and the Kerey sultans. Ebulhayir died on his way to fighting 
:i Baraq is the great grandson of Urns Han who is great grandson of <;0<;:1 by <;0<;:1's son Orda. 
Georgiy Vladimirovi9 Vernadskiy, lstoriya Rossiyi: Mongoly I Rusy, Moskva: Agraf, 1997., p. 
469 and 470. Chingiz - <;0<;:1 - Orda - Urus Han -Qayir9aq - Baraq Han -Kerey and Janibek. 
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with those tribes that had left his rule in 1468. This date also mark the beginning 
for the Kazaks as a political group in the Central Asian region. 
The Kazak union quickly attracted groups of Noghay, Uzbek and Mongol 
tribes who were eager to use the immense territory of the Betpaq Dala, 22 the 
De~t-i Q1p<;aq the land of the old Aq Orda, as their flocks of animals needed 
pasturelands. Starting from the 1460s onwards, for about a century, the Kazak 
union on the steppe grew both in numbers as well as in territory acquired for tribal 
needs. During this time, the nomadic forces united under Kazak leadership grew 
increasingly military to defend their still-growing territory of new pasturelands. In 
the meantime, the first Kazak Han, Janibek died in 1480 and Buyunduq, Kerey's 
son, led the Kazak tribes and fought against Muhammed $aybani, the founder of 
the Uzbek Khanate. 
The formation of the Kazak Khanate is closely associated with the names 
of Janibek and Kerey of the fifteenth century. The well-known chronicler-
historian Dughlati wrote the following about the root of the formation of the 
Kazak Khanate;23 
Abu'l-Khayr (EbulhayJr) Han dominated the entire Qipchaq Steppe. Any prince 
of Jochid lineage he suspected of having seditious thoughts he wanted to reduce to 
nothing. A group of Giray(Kerey) Han's and Jani-Beg(Janibek) Han's princes, as well as 
a few of Abu'l-Khayr Han's own men, took flight and went to Moghulistan. At that time 
the Khanate of Moghulistan was held by Esan-Buqa Han, who welcomed them and 
assigned them a comer of Moghulistan. They found it to be a secure spot and passed their 
days free ofwony. 
22 Betpaq means damned, please see, Qazaq Tilining Tiisindirme Sozdigi, Volume [, Edited by 
ismet Kengesbayev, Almat1: Qazaq SSR G1hm Akademiyasmmg Baspas1, 1959. 
23 Dughlati, ibid, p.177. 
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After the death of Abu'l-Khayr Han, contention broke out in the Uzbek nation, 
and everyone who could sought refuge for safety and security with Giray Han and Jani-
Beg Han, and this gave them great power. Since they had first separated from the larger 
people and were wandering aimlessly without equipment, they were called 
qazaqs(Kazakhs). And the name stuck. 
Their moves towards establishing a rule independent from the Saybanids 
was supported by the aristocratic leaders of various Kazak tribes. Kazaks in the 
Qaratav and Sirdarya as well as in part of the region of Turkestan began to 
support this separation started by Janibek and Kerey in the 1540s and 1550s.24 
Thus, the Qaratav region and towns like Sozaq, S1gnaq, and Savran in the 
Sirdarya region were controlled by the twin hans, Janibek and Kerey. Controlling 
the towns of the Sirdarya region played a key role in maintaining the separation of 
Kazak tribes from the rest of the Central Asian people. The Kazak separation from 
Saybanid rule was a long process that continued for decades, even after the death 
of Ebulhayir of the Saybanids in 1468. According to the Tarih-i Ra#di25 the 
number of Kazaks that had accepted the rule of Janibek and Kerey reached 
200,000 in 1468. The famous Central Asian historian Muhammed Haydar 
Dughlati gives the date of the formation of the Kazak Khanate as Hicri-Hijra 
870, that is 1465 or 1466 on the current calendar. 
During the time of Qas1m Han, in the 1520s, the population of the Kazak 
Khanate reached one million. 26 When the descendants of Muhammed Saybani 
24 Quzaqstan Tariyh1, p.153. 
25Mirza Haydar Dughlati, ibid, p. 177, and also Qazaqstan Tariyh1, p. 154. 
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Han entered a power struggle with Muhammed Babur Sah in the South, Qas1m 
Han established his control in the middle and upper Sirdarya region. At the same 
time, in the North of the then Kazak territory, tribes and clans that had left the 
Noghay Horde also joined the Kazak Khanate. 
With the coming of Qas1m Han to power in the early sixteenth century, the 
clear division between Kazak and Uzbek started. With this, the military potential 
of the united Kazaks improved and their division into three hordes emerged the 
Ulu (Great), the Orta (Middle) and the Ki~i (Lesser) Jiiz. Present day Kazak 
historians explain the emergence of the hordes as a system created to protect and 
administer the enlarging pasturelands and the population on it during the time of 
Qas1m Han.27 Qas1m Han was also famous for his introduction of a new set of 
laws named the Qas1m Hannmg Qasqa Joh (the Straight Custom of Qas1m 
Han), which consisted of matters related to property, crime, military, diplomatic 
representation and community life. 28 
Despite being the subjects of different rulers, the peoples of the lands of 
Kazak Khanate, in the fourteenth and the fifteenth centuries had a unity in 
26 According to Dughlati; "Qas1m Han brought the entire Qipchaq Steppe under his control in a 
way no one had since fochi Han. His army numbered upward of a million." Dughlati, ibid, p. 177. 
27 Qoy~1qara Salgarauh, Qazaqtzng Qcylz Tariyhc, p. 137. 
2R Qas1m Han's Custom law was related to the following principles: 
a) Property Law(land, livestock, and other properties), 
b) Crime and Punishment Law(stealing, murder, robbery, and assaulting), 
c) Military law (citizenship responsibility, formation of military units, etc.), 
d) Diplomatic representation law( unweariness, eloquence, courtesy.), 
e) Community law( customs on generosity, funeral banquet, wedding and other ceremonial 
festivities as well as responsibilities of every kind of guardsmen and postal patrol.) 
27 
language. This can be seen from the oral literature of the people, namely from the 
epics, myths and lyrical heritage of those times. Each Kazak horde had their 
routes, pasturelands and regions according to the above mentioned different rules 
on present day Kazak territory. The Great Horde inhabited the Sirdarya and 
Jetisuv region. The Uysin, Qangh, Duvlat, Alban, Suan, Sirgeli, Ist1, O$aqt1, 
Sap1ra$tI and Jalayir tribes comprised this Horde. The l\.liddle Horde inhabited 
the central and south-eastern region of Kazakstan with its Q1p9aq, Argm, 
Nayman, Qongirat, Kerey (Kerayit) and Qarluk tribes. The lower Sirdarya region, 
the banks of the Aral sea, and the area north of the Caspian Sea were inhabited by 
the Lesser Horde, which consisted of Al$m, Aday, Ala$a, BaybaqtI, Jappas, 
Tazdar, Qarasaqal and Qarakesek (Alimuh) tribes.29 
During the 1530s, the political activities of the Kazak rulers were 
concentrated in the east of their territory. There they fought against the Mongols 
and Oyrat in alliance with the Kirg1z of the East. During the time of Haqnazar 
Han (1538-1580), the Kazaks entered a struggle with the Noghays, Ba$qurts, and 
Tatars to the North. According to Zeki Velidi Togan, Haqnazar Han was trying to 
extend the influence of the Kazaks towards the West. 30 Haqnazar Han established 
his control even on the left bank of the Jay1q river. However, an enlargement of 
K.azak territory further to the East was not possible. Following Haqnazar's death, 
-"Qas1m Hanmng Qasqa Joh," Abay Ensiktlopediya, Almat1; "Qazaq Entsiktlopediyasmmg Bas 
Redaktsiyas1, Atamura Baspas1, 1995, p. 358. 
:?9 Qazaqstan Tariyh1, p.146. 
311 Zeki Velidi Togan, Bugiinkii Tiirkili Turkistan ve Yahn Tarihi, istanbul, 1981, p.151. 
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S1gay Han came to power. Yet his son Esim Han (1598-1628) was more 
successful in establishing his control in the Sirdarya region and over the town of 
Ta~kent. During the following two centuries, this area and Ta~kent were under 
Kazak control. The town of Turkestan became the capital of the Kazak Khanate 
during the reign of Esim Han. Nevertheless, the seventeenth century did not bring 
firm unity to the Kazaks, but rather the gradual separation of Kazak Hordes began 
under the ambitious aristocratic leadership of each tribe. With the death of Esim 
Han, his son Jengir (Cihangir) took power in 1628. It is in this century that 
Jungar soldiers led by Galdan invaded Jetisuv, the southern region of Kazakstan 
and the towns of Sayram, Mankent, Qaraaspan, S1mkent, and Ta~kent. 
During the time of Tavke Han (1680-1718), Kazak agreement with the 
Kirg1z and Qaraqalpaqs hindered the Jungar invasion of Kazak territory for some 
time. The most important achievement of the time of Tavke Han was his work in 
collecting the Jeti Jarg1, the Seven Pillars, which were the collection oflaws and 
principles essential in administering the Kazak land. 31 The Jeti Jarg1 consisted of 
both the Adat (customary judicial principles aimed at regulating the social 
relations of Kazak society) and rules of administration on the steppe, and 
included judiciary rules, taxes and religious principles.32 The Seven Pillars 
consisted of principles concerning the sharing of pastureland, the problems of 
levirate and sororate Uesir dav1), laws on murder or other kinds of unlawful acts 
11 
.. Jeti Jarg1, "Abay Entsiklopediyasz, p. 251. 
lZ Saken Sozaqbayev, Tavke Han-Jeti Jarg1, Almat1: Sanat, 1994, p. 24. 
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and its punishment. The present-day scholars claim that it also contained rules 
regarding the education of children and marriage laws, disagreements among 
different tribes, and the defense of the people or the nation.33 At the same time, 
during the time of Han Tavke, an advisory council (biyler kengesi) was formed34 
and the Kazak Han was not able to put into practice his decisions without the 
approval of this body. 
Kazak emergence and the continuous enlargement of its territory began to 
press on neighboring lands. Starting from the time of Qas1m Han 1520s until the 
mid-eighteenth century. The Kazak Khanate fought with its neighbor, the 
Jongar/Moghul in the East. This two centuries of struggle between the two 
nomadic societies in the heart of Asia ended with a disaster for the Kazaks. 35 The 
early decades of the eighteenth century were years of blood and turmoil in the 
Kazak territory due to the continuing Jongar attacks on their land in 1681-1684, 
1694, 1710-11, 1713, 1718, and finally in 1723-25, which were named the 
disastrous years of Aqtaban-~ubirmdi.36 This Kazak/Jongar fight between 1723 
33 (In the indigenous language, the word to describe the defense of the fatherland or the nation is 
"el qorgav, or jurt qorgav". In contemporary Kazak language dictionaries, the meaning of the 
term el was given both as the people and the land, i.e., the state.) Please see, Qazaq Tilining 
Tiisindirme Sozdigi, Almat1, G1hm, 1959., p.184. "Elim dep engiregen azamat- is the term used to 
describe those nationalist Ala~ intellectuals or the "bat1r" heroes such as Abilay, Bogenbay, 
Janibek or Kenesan. The famous 18th century popular song "Elim-ay" (Oh my nation!!, Oh my 
people! Oh my land!) is one of the unique example of the feelingd of those sons who loved their 
country, land and the people. 
j4 Sozaqbayev, p.10-11. 
:;~ Muhtar Magavin, "Eki Jiiz J1ld1q Sog1s," Quzaq Tariyhzmng Alippesi, Almati: Qazaqstan, 1995, 
pp. 52-60. 
y. ibid., and please also see, Z. V. Togan, Turkzstan, p.167-171. 
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and 1725, ended with the Kazak loss ofTurk1stan, Savran and Ta~kent. The whole 
territory in the South was added to the territory of the Jongar. Despite the Kazak 
victories at Bulant1 (1728) and Angiraqay (1730), the division of Kazak society 
into the hordes began to crystallize. 37 Tavke Han's departure from life accelerated 
the separation of each Kazak Horde from the central authority of the han. 
A more important subsequent damage in the Kazak history after the Jungar 
invasion of the Kazak land was the so-called Kazak acceptance of Russian 
overlordship.38 Despite the Tsarist and later Soviet claim, it was not an action 
taken with the consent of all the Kazak people, but rather an individual agreement 
made by the Han of some tribes belonging to the Lesser Hordes, Ebulhayir, and 
Saq~aq Janibek Batir leading some tribes in Orta Jiiz. Except the two leaders, the 
rest of the leaders and their tribes did not join this agreement. On February 19th. 
1731, the Russian Tsarina, Anna Ioannovna, signed the imperial decree accepting 
the Kazaks as subjects of the Russian Empire on the petition sent by the Han of 
the Lesser Horde, Ebulhayir. A. Tevkelev, the Volga Tatar interpreter of the 
Imperial Foreign Affairs commission, led the Russian mission to Ebulhayir. Upon 
the assurance of Ebulhayir of the Lesser Horde, the Petersburg administration 
took it for granted that all the Kazak sultans and leaders accepted the protection of 
37 Muhtar Magavin, ibid., p. 94-101 and 203. 
:;s Zeki Velidi Togan stated that when the Kalmuks (a group among the Mongols) moved towards 
west, they had not only brought hardship to the people inhabiting the east and west banks of the 
Edi! river but destroyed the (then) present day provinces of Bokey Horde, Samara, Orenburg and 
Ural. Those areas became uninhabitable and thus were captured by the Russians. Please see, 
Togan, Turkzstan, p.158 and 166. 
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the Russians. However, the personal ambition of Ebulhayir in his power struggle 
against the other Kazak sultans (who are members of the ruling Kazak aristocratic 
family and who do not hold the title of Han) and hans, as well as his personal 
aims of improving his influence among the Kazaks, should be taken into account 
in this attempt. Nevertheless, Ebulhayir's acceptance of Russian protection did 
not result in the permanent halt of Jongar attacks from the East. Han Abilay 
fought against the Kalmuk/Jongar threat even after the 1 730s. At the same time, 
the acceptance of Russian overlordship by all the Kazak regions was not 
complete until the 1820s and 1840s. It was realized only after a number of 
Russian imperial military measures had been taken. The third decade of 
eighteenth century was only the beginning of the process of Russian occupation 
which lasted 13 5 years, from 1734 to 1869. This is an accepted fact, even by 
Russian historians themselves. 39 A Kazak historian Sanjar Asfendiyarov stated. in 
his History of Kazakstan published in 1935, the following: "The proclamation of 
the Kazak acceptance of Russian protection with their own free will is only a 
tale!"40 
Despite the above facts, another phase in the Kazak history started in the 
eighteen century that led to Kazak subordination to the Tsarist colonial 
administration and later to the Soviet overlordship which lasted until 1991. From 
the 1730s until the end of Tsarist Russia in 1917. The Kazak lands and its people, 
B Baymirza Hayit, Turkzstan: Rusya ile <;in Arasznda, istanbul: Otag, 1975, p. 62., cited A. I. 
Mak~eyev, Istoriqeskiy Obzor' Turkzstana I Nastupatel'nago dvijeniya v evo russkih, 1890, p.139. 
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gradually at the beginning and completely in the end, were subjected to the 
control of the Petersburg rulers. The Kazaks entered the eighteenth century as free 
nomads with their own rulers and witnessed the decline of colonial Tsarist Russia 
in 1917, together with their fellow-brothers in the Oasis area, in the Urals, in the 
Caucasus and in the Crimea, as one of the subject peoples. As a result of many 
complex and binding conditions introduced by the Tsarist administration in the 
colonized steppe region, Kazak attempts to form a native Kazak rule, the Ala~ 
Orda, were unsuccessful even after the termination of imperial mastery in 1917. 
From the establishment of the Bolshevik control on the Kazak steppe after the 
1920s until the end of the Soviet Empire in 1991, every single phase of Kazak 
existence was absolutely dependent upon the supervision of the center, Moscow. 
THE ADMINISTRATIVE, POLITICAL AND MILITARY ELITE IN THE 
KAZAK KHAN A TE 
Kazak intellectuals of the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries stated 
that the traditional Kazak political administrative system was based on a structure 
of social democracy among the Kazak tribes.41 The Soviet-era scholars claimed 
• Sancar Asfendiyarov, istor(va Kazakstana, Alma Ata, 1935, p. 116 cited by Hay1t, in ibid, p. 62. 
"The findings of Ahmet Baytursunov and Teljan Sonanov on this subject were cited by Ermuhan 
Bckmahanov, Qazaqstan XIX Gas1rdmg 20-40 Jildarmda, Almati: Sanat, 1994. p.13. This is the 
IDnslation of Bekmahanov's famous book into Kazak during the independence era. The original 
of this book was published in 194 7 entitled Kazakstan v 20-40 god1 XIX veka. It has instigated 
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that traditional Kazak society was one of a feudal community, and that there was 
class inequality among the Kazak society.42 Thus, during the whole Soviet era, the 
group called the "local bourgeois nationalists" was criticized for refusing to adopt 
the Marxist-oriented Soviet claim labeling traditional Kazak society as feudal. 
Kazak historians of the independence era argue with this kind of assessment, 
basing their debate on the fact that the Soviet tradition of history of nationalities 
aimed to prove that the nationalities actually did not have any history. 43 
Political administration of the Kazak State was concentrated in the hands 
of the aristocratic families descended from Chingiz Han. This Kazak aristocracy 
were distinct as Aq Siiyek (the white bone) from the rest of the population that 
were considered as Qara Suyek (the black bone). The Kazak aristocracy played an 
important role in the social and political life of society for centuries. The Kazak 
han used to be elected from among the members of these aristocratic families as 
the leader of the administration. Native sources of Kazakstan claim the system as 
a meritocracy, selecting the leader according to the candidate's distinctive 
personal merits, talent and ability of governing a society, and the necessary 
influence over his subjects.44 
strong criticism of the author and his work, which later became one of the taboo books prohibited 
to mention until the last decade of the Soviet Empire. 
42 "'Qazaq Jastarmmg Uy1mdan," Qazaq-Sovet Entsiklopediyas1, p. 240-241., and many articles 
published in Volume 6 of the same source. 
-0 Muhtar Magavin, Qazaq Tariyh1mng .. ., p. 5-6 . 
.w Qazaqstan Tariyh1, p. 208 and Muhtar Magavin, "Qazaq Ordasmdag1 Han Saylav Dastiiri," in 
Qazaq Tariyhzmng .. ., pp. 185-197. 
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Some other members of the aristocratic family used to be appointed to 
lead tribal groups, according to their ability, prestige and authority among the 
society. These were called sultans, members of aristocratic family who did not 
bear the title of han. However, the authority of the Kazak hans or sultans was not 
entirely independent of the societal control, due to their appointment by the 
approval of the leaders of the general population of Kazaks. Traditionally, months 
before the election of a han, a decree named savm aytuv was announced to bring 
together all aristocratic and non-aristocratic leaders of the Kazak society. This 
kind of gathering was distinct from the usual annual gathering of the Kazak 
leaders at the Han Ordasi, the royal house, to discuss necessary administrative, 
political, military and judicial matters. During the appointment of the candidate 
as Han, both members of aristocracy and members of non-aristocratic leaders 
were given the chance to praise or criticize him. The final decision was given after 
these kind of discussions ended and the candidate seated on a white felt and raised 
over the heads of the sitting participants by four influential members of the 
society (This ceremony was called Aq Kiyizge Sahp Han Koteriiv). Those who 
had supported the candidacy of the newly elected han used to raise him again, 
over their heads, to publicize their confirmation. This ceremony continued until 
the end of all those hordes and groups of tribes that supported the han. There are 
of course many other details of this ceremony but the most significant point was 
the moment discussed above. 
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Kazak tribes played an important role in the political administration of 
their society through their biys, traditional Kazak judges who gained distinction 
among society through their unique oratorical ability as well as for their 
exceptional ingenuity in solving conflicting matters. Appointment of biys in the 
Kazak society was not hereditary, but through the personal achievement of each 
biy in his society. For example, Tobet Biy, during the time of Abilay Han was the 
great grandson of Buqa Batir (the warrior Buqa) of Jangir Han. Biys in Kazak 
society played an important role in both legislatory and judicial matters. For 
example, during the composition of the Jeti Jargz, the Seven Pillar of Tavke Han, 
six biys representing the six sons of Ala~ were appointed to set the rules for 
judicial matters in Kazak society.45 Disagreements concerning the share of 
pastureland, the problems of levirate and sororate, cases of murder and 
punishment were all subjects that the traditional Kazak biy sought to solve. In 
other words, according to Kazak understanding: the "Biy is the seeker and the 
sword of justice, who publicizes the hidden thoughts of the people."46 
The most important military aid to Kazak bans was provided by the Kazak 
batir, warrior, who gained distinction among the society only through his 
individual courage and bravery at the battlefield. For example, the legendary 
Kazak batir, Er Janibek, of the Kerey Tribe of the Orta Jiiz, the Middle Horde was 
~5 Tole Biy from the Great Horde, Qaz Dav1st1 Qaz1bek Biy from the Middle Horde, Ayteke Biy 
from the Lesser Horde, Qara~ Biy from the Kirghiz, Muhamet Biy from Qurama and Sas1q Biy 
from Qaraqalpaq were appointed by Han Tavke. 
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an orphan, who during a battle with the Jongar gave his horse to Abilay Han47 and 
saved the han's life. Later he was rewarded with a seat on the right side of the 
Han. Another Kazak warrior, Qarakerey Qabanbay of the Nayman tribe of Orta 
Jiiz, come to the public eye for his exceptional bravery at a battle with the Jongars 
in the eighteenth century. The influence of these military leaders was especially 
important during the time of wars with neighboring states. Bat1rs from those 
tribes settled on the border areas of the Kazak society were particularly important 
and influential in Kazak society, throughout its history. 
Except during the time of Qas1m Han, Haqnazar Han, Tavekel Han and 
Esim Han, Kazak society did not keep a standing army. Only during the time of 
the above Hans, did Kazaks keep a standing army around the towns and citadels 
in the S1r Darya region in the South. Kazaks had a term called alaman mindeti, 
meaning that each Kazak family was required to provide at least one warrior to 
defend their land. The rules of alaman mindeti were settled by Qas1m Han in his 
famous set of rules known as the Straight Custom of Qas1m Han(Qas1m Hannm 
46 Biyler Sozi: $e~endik, Tolgav, Arnav, Dav, collected by Tursmbek Kaki-?ev, Almah: Qazaq 
Universiteti, 1992., p. 3. 
47 Some most important aide-de-camp to Abilay Han were the following names in the poems of 
Buhar J1rav: 
Qaldan menen urus1p, (When {Abilay Han} was fighting with Haldan) 
Jeti kiindey siirisip (It lasted seven days) 
Sondag1 joldas adamdar: (His aide-de-camps were {the following}) 
Qarakerey Qabanbay, (Qabanbay from Qarakerey {tribe}) 
Qanj1gah Bogenbay, (Bogenbay from Qanj1gah sub-tribe of Argm-Middle Horde) 
Qaz dav1stJ Qaz1bek, ( Qaz1bek of goose-voiced) 
Saq-?aquh Janibek. ( Janibek from Saq-?aq tribe) 
Sirgeli qara Tilevke (Black Tilevke from Sirgeli) 
Qaraqalpaq Qula-?bek,(Qula-?bek from Qaraqalpaq) 
Tigeden -?tqqan Esterbek, (Esterbek from Tige) 
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Qasqa Joh) as early as sixteenth century. The military structure of the Kazak army 
was organized according to the tribal and sub-tribal structure. Each one hundred 
soldiers were composed according to the tiizem (column) order, and the military 
commander of each tribe and sub-tribe was their tribal leader. The tribal structure 
was essential, both for defining the land of each tribe according to their summer 
and winter pastoral needs, and for defending these lands. The strength of some big 
tribes was such that without their support, even hans were not able to gather 
enough strength. The strength and might of Abilay Han was derived from one of 
the big tribes of the Orta Jiiz, the Argm.48 
Another influential group among the Kazak society was the poets (aqm) 
and the royal poets Uzrav). 49 Their strength came from the unique awareness of the 
Kazak nation to the strength of soz, the word, the eloquent speech and the 
message carried by the speech. 50 The Kazak poetic heritage was the unwritten 
history of these nomadic people. Kazak poets were the messengers of past events. 
Sap1ra~tI Navnzbay (Navnzbay from Sap1ra~tI tribe) .... Please see, Bes Gas1r J1rlayd1, 
Compilers Muhtar Magavin and M. Baydildayev, Almat1: Jazuv~1, 1989, vol., p. 98. 
48 Other examples: Baraq Sultan was supported by the Nayman tribe and Ebulhaylf Han of the 
Lesser Horde derived his strength from both the tribes of Lesser and the some tribes of the Middle 
Horde. Ebillhayir Han was the Commander in Chief during the Battle of BulantI in 1728, the 
decisive battle to overcome the Jongar invasion of the Kazak land, in eighteenth century. 
Ebiilhayir and his followers did not join the unified Kazak army during the following Battle of 
Angiraqay in 1730, because of his protest against a unified decision not to elect him as the Han of 
the Kazaks after the death of Bolat Han. From that time onwards, Ebiilhayir of the Lesser Horde 
began to take separate actions from the rest ofKazak society. 
49 Eloquent speech and artful description is an art in Kazak society. In order to describe the 
importance of each group of leaders, a Kazak described his nation as a tu/par (a fast running war-
horse), his han as the halter of this horse, his biy as the bit of bridle, his batir as the whip and the 
poems of aqm-j1rav (poet-royal poet) as the arrow to be sent to faraway targets. 
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Kazaks learnt their history orally from their poets generations after generations, 
until it was recorded by the Kazak intellectuals late in the nineteenth century. The 
first of these poets was Asan Qayg1, who lived in the late fourteenth and early 
fifteenth centuries. He came from the territory of the former Golden Horde to the 
Kazak lands to assist Janibek and Kerey Hans, the founders of the Kazak state. He 
became the champion of the young Kazak state.51 History, philosophical wisdom, 
justice and most other knowledge were provided to the Kazaks by their poets. The 
jzrav, the royal poet, was not only the court historian that kept an account of state 
affairs through his poems, but was also an advisor to the Han. 52 The poem was not 
used only by professional poets but by the biys as well. The famous Qaz1bek Biy 
used his poetic ability to convince the Jongar Han to negotiate with the Kazaks 
when he went to Jongaria as part of the Kazak diplomatic mission in the 
seventeenth century.53 During the negotiation, he described the Kazaks in the 
following words: 
We the Kazaks are a people whose main occupation is husbandry, 
However, we do not show any offense to anybody (around us). 
As an omen to preserve our good-fortune and our unity, 
As a sign to prevent any offensive move towards our territory, 
so Biyler Sozi: Se:fendik, Tolgav, Arnav, Dav, collected by Tursmbek Kaki~ev, Almat1: Qazaq 
Universiteti, 1992. 
$ 1Bes Gaszr J1rlayd1, Compilers Muhtar Magavin and M. Baydildayev, Almat1: Jazuv~1, 1989, vol., 
p. 22. 
52 During the time of Abilay Han, the well-known royal poet Buhar Jirav is reported to have 
advised the Han not to fight with the Russians and to go instead to the South, cross the Sir Darya 
and settle in Jiydeli-Baysm. Please see, Togan, Turkzstan, p. 308., and Bes Gas1r J1rlaydz, 
Compilers Muhtar Magavin and M. Baydildayev, p. 92-93. 
nBiyler Sozi: Se:fendik, Tolgav, Arnav, Dav, collected by Tursmbek Kaki~ev, Almatl: Qazaq 
Universiteti, 1992., p. 33-42. 
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We attach the feather of eagle-owl to our weapons. 
We are people that none of our enemies dare to treat us as inferior beings, 
We are people that nobody dares to ridicule us. 
We are people who can protect a friend. 
We are people who can earn their food and show grace. 
A son is not born to become a slave, 
A daughter is not born to become a concubine. 
We are people who cannot let this happen to our children! 
If you are the Kalmuk, then we are the Kazak, we came to sunder (you) 
If you are iron, then we are coal, we came to melt (you) 
We came to make peace as the children of Kazak-Qalmaq. 
We came to this strange land to meet, 
If you do not accept to meet us, we came to plunder (you). 
If you are a tiger, I am a lion, we came to wrestle. 
I am a newly trained tulpar (war-horse) that came to race (with you). 
Tell us if you agree to negotiate, or set a place (and date) if you want a 
fight. 54 
~ Biz Qazaq degen ma! baqqan elmiz 
Biraq e~kimge soqhqpay jay jatqan elmiz. 
Elimizden qut-bereke qa~pasm dep 
Jerimizding ~etin jav baspasm dep 
Nayzaga iiki taqqan elmiz. 
E~ bir du~pan basmbagan elmiz 
Bas1m1zdan si.izdi as1rmagan elmiz. 
Dos1m1zd1 saqtay bilgen elmiz 
Dam-tuz1m1zd1 aqtay bilgen elmiz 
Atadan ul tuvsa qui bolamm dep tuvmayd1, 
Anadan q1z tuvsa kiing bolamm dep tuvmayd1, 
UI men q1zd1 qamat1p otlra-almaytm elmiz. 
Sen Qalmaq bolsang, biz Qazaq, qarp1sqah kelgenbiz. 
Sen temir bolsang, biz ki.imir, eritkeli kelgenbiz. 
Qazaq-Qalmaq balas1 tab1sqah kelgenbiz 
Tammaytm jat elge tamsqah kelgenbiz. 
Tamsuvga ki.inbeseng, ~ab1sqah kelgenbiz. 
Sen qabilan bolsang, men anstan, ahsqah kelgenbiz. 
Janga iiyretken jas tulpar, jansqah kelgenbiz. 
Berseng ji.indep bitimingdi ayt, ne tunsatm jeringd1 ayt! Please see, Biyler Sozi; Se~endik Tolgav, 
Arnav, Dav, compiled by Tursmbek Kaki~ev, Almah: "Qazaq Universiteti," 1992, p. 38. 
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TERRITORIAL DEFENSE AND STATE CONTROL OF THE KAZAK 
KHANATE 
Kazak control over their territories and the principles of military 
organization were established fully during the time of Qas1m Han. His famous set 
of laws known as the Straight Custom of Qas1m Han (Qas1m Hannmg Qasqa Joh) 
is the solid proof of such a reality. Qas1m Han brought order to the principles of 
military defense of the Kazak lands together with the principles of diplomatic 
representation. The responsibility for defending the border areas was placed on 
the shoulders of those tribes occupying the frontier lines of the state. Thus the 
tribal acceptance of the Han's rule and the Han's influence over the tribes 
inhabiting borderlands were particularly important for the Kazak Khanate. 
As for the alaman mindeti, all the responsibilities of equipping, training 
and preparing such soldiers for war rested on each tribe and sub-tribe. Thus the 
influence of tribal leaders, biy, batzr, or tribal aqsaqal (elderly, white-bearded 
wise person) was significant. The sultans, other members of the Kazak 
aristocracy, who led important tribes with the approval of the Han, were also 
responsible for the relations of the tribe with the Han Ordas1 and with other tribes. 
Each appointed sultan was responsible for protecting his group of people. The 
support was mutual. When a sultan got into conflict with the leader of another 
tribe, it was his tribe that would be the staunch supporter of their sultan. For 
example, when Sultan Baraq of Nayman tribe killed Ebulhayir Han of the Lesser 
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Horde during a duel in the eighteenth century, representatives of the supporting 
tribes of both sides gathered at Abilay Han's Han Ordasz for the traditional trial.ss 
RELATIONS WITH NEIGHBORING STA TES DURING THE KAZAK 
KHANATE 
Starting from the formation of their Khanate, the Kazaks fought many 
times with the neighboring peoples, of the Noghay Horde in the West, the Sibir 
Khanate in the North, the Jongar-Oyrat groups in the North-east and Mongolia in 
the East and also against the Kazaks' ethnic and religious brothers in the South. 
During the time of Haqnazar Han (1538-1580), the Kazak Khanate established a 
military alliance with Abdullah Han of the Bukharan state to gain influence in the 
Slf Darya region. He wanted to establish a strong alliance in the South to gain 
strength for his fight in the North against the increasing attacks of Ki.i9i.im Han of 
Siberia.56 After the establishment of this alliance, the Kazak Khanate gained 
control of the towns and cities in the region, including the towns of Savran and 
Turk1stan. By the end of the sixteenth century, the Kazak Khanate controlled 
Ta~kent and Samarkand as well. However, the enlargement of Kazak territories at 
the expense of the Bukharan state resulted in a Bukharan counter-attack and with 
the Kazak refusal to continue the alliance in 15 83. 
55 $oqan Valihanov, izbranmye Proizvedeniya, Edited by Aikey Margulan, Academic of the 
KazakSSR Academy of Sciences, Alma Ata: Kazakskoye Gosudarstvennoye izdatel'stvo, 1958, p. 
209. 
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Kazak-Russian relations started with the establishment of diplomatic ties 
during the reign of Qas1m Han (1511-1532).57 Tavekel Han (1582-1598) also 
attempted to establish diplomatic relations with Russia and sent two diplomatic 
representatives in 1594 and 1595. Negotiations between the Russian state and the 
Kazak K.hanate were carried out over the Kazak request for Russian help in their 
fight with neighboring lands of Abdullah Han of Bukhara to the South and of 
Kii9iim Han of Siberia to the North of the Kazak territory. 58 Tavke Han's main 
target was to find ways to obtain arms from the Russians. Although some 
historians claim that Tavekel Han, "wished to recognize the authority of the 
Russian tsar,"59 Kazak hans wanted to gain strength by obtaining the alliance of a 
strong power to fight against their enemies. Native Kazak historians claim that 
Tavekel Han's diplomatic representative Oraz Muhammed sought to obtain rifles 
and cannon. Tavekel Han wanted to involve Russia against the Han of Bukhara, 
who had started to extend his influence over the region of Astrakhan, by drawing 
the attention of the Russians toward Abdullah's attempts. Tavekel Han sought to 
surround the Bukharan state by also sending diplomatic representatives to Shah 
56 Qazaqstan Tariyh1, p. 159; Muhtar Magavin, Qazaq Tariyh1n1n Alippesi, p. 29; Martha Brill 
Olcott, The Kazakhs, p. 24 and Togan, Turlastan, p. 151. 
57 
"Qazaq Hand1qtannmg S1rtq1 Sayasati men Diplomatiyas1," Qazaq-Sovet Entsiklopediyasz, Vol. 
6., p. 387. 
58Ibid. p. 387. 
59 Olcott, The Kazakhs, p. 29. 
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Abbas of Persia explaining the Kazak intention of forming an alliance against 
Bukhara. 60 
As the need to defend the Kazak lands with more advanced weapons arise, 
the Kazaks found themselves desperate to obtain such weapons. This pressing 
need forced the Kazak hans to establish ties with states that had them. In general, 
the Kazak search was for an ally to counter-attack against neighboring countries 
and in particular, the Kazak attempt to establish ties with Russia, as the nearest 
strongest state, always coincided with increasing tensions with the neighboring 
regions. Tavke Han sent five diplomatic missions to Russia during his fight with 
the Mongols in the East. This was true even for the much-publicized champion of 
the Russian alliance, Ebulhayir of Ki~i Jiiz, who reportedly requested help from 
the Ottoman Empire through his representatives in Moscow during the 1730s. 
Ebulhayir's representatives asked the then Ottoman Ambassador in St. Petersburg 
to free the Kazaks from Russian overlordship and to accept the Kazaks as 
Ottoman subjects. 61 This fact also makes clear the point that the Kazaks were not 
particularly enthusiastic to establish ties only with Tsarist Russia. They were 
ready to cooperate with any power to defeat their neighbors. 
Another source reveals that Ebi.ilhayir sought Russian support in order to 
win the struggle between the Kazaks and the Ba~qurts to the North. Seyitqul 
Qundagulov and Quthmbet Ko~tayev, the diplomatic representatives of Ebiilhayir, 
60 Magavin, ibid., p. 36. 
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requested imperial help in defending the Kazak territories from outside invasion.62 
According to the native sources published in Soviet time, "the Kazak mass 
thought that the Ki~i Jiiz acceptance of Russian overlordship was an opportunity 
to live a more secure and peaceful life and that it would help to regain invaded 
territories from enemies."63 
Apart from maintaining the territorial security of the Kazak realm, the 
Kazak Khanate was obliged to maintain economic ties with their neighboring 
states, particularly after the establishment of control over the towns in Sir Darya 
region. Kazak territory was home to caravan routes carrying goods back and forth 
from Russia in the north to the Oasis region in the south and to China in the east 
of the Kazak land. Traders usually engaged in barter trade with the nomadic 
Kazaks, though pastoral nomadic life satisfied most of the daily needs of Kazaks. 
Relations of the Kazak Khanate with other states of the world was limited 
to her immediate neighboring states such as Bukhara, Hiva or the Khokand 
Khanates in the South, the Noghay Horde and the Ba~qurt people in the North and 
the North-west, and the Jongars in the East. Their relations went further with the 
exchange of diplomatic representatives with bigger powers such as Russia, China 
61 Zeki Velidi Togan cited the document about this very matter to be in the archive of Torgay 
Provision,(Pamyatnaya Kniga Torgayskoy Oblasti za 1899, p. 359.) in his Turk1stan, p. 175. 
62 "Ko~tayev Quthmbet," Qazaq-Sovet Entsiklopediyas1, Vol. 6, p. 56, and for Qundagulov, Please 
see, "Ki~i Jiizding Rossiyaga Qos1luv1," ibid., p. 193. Qoybagar Kobekov was another diplomatic 
representative sent to S. Petersburg by Ebiilhay1r Han. Please see, "Qazaqstannm Rossiyaga 
Qos1luv1" in "KazakSSR" Qazaq-Sovet Ents., p. 262. 
63 "Ki~i Jiizding Rossiyaga .. " ibid., p. 193. 
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and Persia. Relations of the Kazak Khanate intensified particularly during the 
time of crisis stemming from the threats to Kazak territorial integrity. 
Nevertheless, the Kazak attempt to maintain ties with other countries in 
faraway places of the world was closely associated with its geographic location. 
Beyond that, Kazak self-sufficiency made it unnecessary to search for an ally or 
the protection of any state during peaceful times. It cannot be a fair conclusion to 
declare that the Kazak Khanate was not a state because of its failure to maintain 
ties with countries in faraway regions of the world. Considering the fact that 
landlocked remote regions such as Kazakstan suffer from difficulties arising from 
their geographic location even in our age, it is quite understandable that the 
Khanate had foreign relations only with a limited number of states in its region. 
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THE CONDITIONS LEADING TO THE RUSSIAN OCCUPATION 
The Kazak failure to defend their territory resulted from the Kazak 
obsession with their pastoral life. Kazak satisfaction in leading a pastoral life 
slowed the process of Kazak engagement in the improvement of their military 
ability. On the other hand, any Kazak attempts to establish ties with Russia, at the 
Han's level, were later interpreted as the Kazak desire to obtain Tsarist Russian 
overlordship.64 The main reason the Kazak leaders approached the Russian state, 
as the source of formidable military power and as a would-be supplier of the then 
newest types of military equipment, was always discounted. 
The Han of Ki~i Jiiz, Ebulhayir satisfied his personal ambitions by 
obtaining the support of a strong power in his fight to gain authority in Kazak 
society. However, his supporters advocated the promised Russian support as a 
guarantee of Kazak victory against the Jongars. 65 Ebiilhayir was the Commander-
in Chief, of the unified Kazak alaman forces, at the battle of Bulanti in 1728, 
against the Jongar invaders. The Bulantl battle was decisive in that it marked the 
beginning of Jongar retreat from the Kazak land. Thus, due to his growing 
strength and fame, Ebiilhayir hoped to be elected as the Han of all the Kazaks 
when Bolat Han died in 1728.66 However, the political and military elite that was 
64 This kind of interpretation is usually found in native materials published in Soviet time. Please 
see, "Qazaq Hand1qtarmmg S1rtq1 Sayasat1 men Diplomatiyas1," Qazaq-Sovet Entsiklopediyas1 p. 
387; "Qazaqstannmg Rossiyaga Qos1luv1," ibid., p. 350, 352. 
65 Qabde~ Jumadil, "Qarakerey Qabanbay," Juld1z, Vol. 8, 1992, pp. 3-57, in p. 8. 
66 Togan, Turk1stan, p.174. 
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assigned to elect the new Han did not want to have a strong and ambitious 
personality such as Ebiilhayir. They chose to elect Ebiilmambet as the new Han of 
the Kazaks. Ebillmambet was a more mild-tempered and easygoing personality to 
deal with for the majority of the aristocratic and non-aristocratic members of the 
Kazak political and military elite. 67 The consequences of such an event resulted in 
the withdrawal of Ebillhayir Han of Ki~i Jiiz, and his followers such as Saq~aq 
Janibek Batir of Orta Jiiz, from the unified Kazak attempt to drive the Jongars out 
of Kazak territory. Under the leadership of Ebillhayir Han, some Ki~i Jiiz tribes, 
and under the leadership of Saq~aq Janibek Batir, some Orta Jiiz tribes, accepted 
Russian protection. Ebiilhayir Han was never forgiven for his individual attempt 
to request Russian protection on behalf of the whole Kazaks. 68 Thus he was killed 
by Baraq Sultan of Orta Jiiz in 1748 during a duel between these two members of 
the Kazak aristocratic family. 
The above incident provided an opportunity for the Russian imperial 
administration to implement their policies much more easily to the East of the 
Urals. The Russian state sought to implement more complex plans in her attempt 
to establish ties with the nomadic Kazaks of the steppe. If the Russian military 
and security concerns were the prime reason, the Russian economic concern of 
securing trade routes was the secondary reason. Russian imperial power first 
67 Muhtar Magavin, Qazaq Tariyhmm .. , p. 94. 
68 Togan mentioned in his Turlastan, p. 175 ofBaraq Sultan's dislike ofEbiilhaytr and his sons, 
Nurah and Erah, because of Ebiilhayir's acceptance of Russian protection. Qazaq sultans 
including Baraq Sultan of Orta Jiiz considered Ebiilhayir as "betrayer." 
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sought to find cooperative states in her fight with the regional forces in Siberia, 
such as the descendants of Kii9iim Han. Russia needed to secure the trade routes 
further South through the Kazak steppe and through the Oasis area of Central 
Asia. 
The twin pressure: from inside, the inner power struggle among the 
political/military elite of the Kazaks and the other from outside, the Jongar 
invasion of the Kazak territory brought these nomadic people of the steppe to the 
very edge of a new era, which started with the gradual Russian penetration of the 
Kazak Lands. 
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CHAPTER TWO: THE KAZAK LANDS UNDER TSARIST RULE 
There is a disagreement about the beginning of Tsarist colonial rule on the 
Kazak steppe. The Russian and Soviet-supervised sources tend to accept 1730 as 
the beginning of a new era for the Kazaks under the Russian protection. Other 
sources tend to disagree with this due to the survival of Kazak freedom and a 
refusal to obey the Tsarist rulers until after the total defeat of Kenesan Han in 
1847, when he fought against Tsarist Russian forces and attempted to unify the 
Kazaks to form an independent Kazak state from 183 8 to 184 7. 69 An official 
Soviet source confirms that "the completion of the process of Kazak entrance to 
the Russian imperial rule lasted until the 1860s."70 A Russian administrative 
measure supports this argument. "All matters related to the Lesser Horde (Ki~i 
Jiiz) (in other words, to all the Kazaks according to the then Russian 
understanding) used to be handled through the Russian Imperial Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs. The Lesser Horde was considered by Russian imperial rule as a 
foreign state until 1782. Ki~i Jiiz maintained its existence as a state, subordinated 
to Russian rule from 1730 till 1820. "71 
In spite of the above, a new era began for the Kazaks in 1730. Russian 
rule, gradually at the beginning, started to affect Kazaks through imperial decrees 
and ever-increasing Russian penetration into the Kazak lands from the 1730s 
69 Muhtar Magavin, Qazaq Tariyhznzn Alippesi, p. 205. 
70 
"Qazaqstannmg Rossiyaga Qos1luv1," Qazaq-Sovet Entsiklopediyasz, p. 263. 
71 Baymirza Hay1t, Turkzstan: Rusya ile <;in Arasznda, p. 27. 
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onwards to the end of the imperial administration in 1917. Acceptance by one of 
the Kazak leaders (Ebiilhayir) of Russian protection provided the Russian imperial 
rulers with the necessary legal base to launch the long-sought Russian penetration 
of Central Asia and the establishment of gradual Russian control there. 
Present-day Kazak historians refer to Abilay Han as one of the chief 
individuals who realized the true Russian aim. He foresaw that the Russians were 
not going to satisfy the Kazak need for fire-arms and trained professional soldiers. 
He was reported to have said that the Russian administration even prohibited their 
merchants to sell iron or metal equipment such as hammers, sickles, spades, 
shovels and axes to non-Russian subject nationalities' to prevent native 
ironsmiths turning them into arms, however primitive.72 
There was more than an armed struggle against the forcible policies of the 
colonial administration. The biggest and the most durable opposition was led by 
one of the grandsons of Abilay Han in the nineteenth century. Han Kene's 
struggle against the new invaders proved the obvious weakness of colonial 
control. However, there was no restoration of the free Kazak state. Kenesan's 
struggle failed for a number of complex reasons. One of the reasons was the 
increasing Russian strength in the newly colonized area. Another reason was the 
lack of unity among the peoples of Central Asia. It was the Khanate of Hokand, in 
the end, that ended the life of the last legendary freedom fighter of the Kazaks. 
Some Kirg1z, subjects of the Hokand Khanate murdered Han Kene and presented 
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his skull to the imperial rulers It is still kept at the Hermitage. Elimination of this 
threat enabled the imperial rulers to increase their control, not only on the entire 
K.azak steppe, but, in less than a quarter of a century, in the whole Oasis area as 
well. 
THE KAZAK POLITICAL/INTELLECTUAL ELITE IN THE EIGHTEENTH 
AND NINETEENTH CENTURIES 
The descendants of the Kazak aristocratic family and ambitious members 
of the non-aristocratic elite of Kazak society began to establish ties with the 
Russian administration so as to be given titles and authority during the eighteenth 
century. After Ebi.ilhayir Han, his brother-in-law, Saq$aq Janibek Batir received 
the title of Tarhan (Knyaz-prince) from the imperial administration. Saq$aq 
Janibek Batir was one of the most prestigious warriors of Abilay Han in the early 
eighteenth century. 73 
Starting from the first half of the eighteenth century, many politically 
ambitious members of the elite in Kazak society attempted to gain a politically 
and economically privileged status by accepting Russian imperial overlordship. 
All such members of native elite were required to take an oath upon their 
acceptance of Russian authority and as a sign that they would obey the imperial 
rule. 
72 Qabde~ Jumadil, "Qarakerey Qabanbay," p. 14. 
73 
"Janibek Tarhan," Abay Entsiktlopediya, p. 249. 
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With the coming of the Russian power, during the nineteenth century, a 
number of new administrative positions were created in the Kazak society. Apart 
from the position of Han up to the 1820s, the Russian imperial administration 
gradually created other positions for the aristocratic and later publicly influential 
native leaders in Kazak society. Russian imperial officials hired native or Turkic-
speaking translators, Perevodt;ik, and low-ranking officials as C::inovnik in the 
early period of their administration in the Kazak lands. As need arose and as the 
imperial rule began to establish military control of the steppe, Russia introduced 
new forms of native administrative staff. An avul, the smallest unit of family 
group, was to be led by a Star~m. 74 Ten or twelve avul composed a volost- the 
smallest rural district. A Bohs administered the district. The Bohs worked as a 
police-constable, who maintained peace and order in the district, and controlled 
the regular payment of taxes, and credits, as well as the maintenance of judicial 
.. -, 
matters. Uyez 1 · was a term used for district composed of volosts. Okrug was the 
largest administrative unit and it was bigger than an oblast. By the mid-nineteenth 
century, there were, all together seven okrugs in Kazakstan. Each Okrug was 
administered by an Aga sultan (Star$lY sultan- Senior or Higher sultan).76 
74 Star~m came from the Russian word, strajnik meaning the police constable in rural areas of the 
Tsarist Russia. 
75 Uyez comes from the Russian word uyezd, a term for district in Tsarist Russia. 
76 Chingiz Valihanov (Son of Valt Han and grandson of Abilay Han) was the Agasu/tan of 
Amanqaragay(which later was moved to Qusmurun) for 19 years from 1834 to 1853. He was also 
elected as Agasultan of Kok~etav Okrug in 1857. See Samat Oteniyazov, :joqan men Qayta 
Kezdesiiv, Almati: Qazaqstan, 1990, p. 82. Eseney Estirnesov was elected as the next Agasultan of 
Qusmurun Okrug in 1853. Qongirqulja Qudaymendi was the Agasuitan of Aqmola ; Ib1ray1m 
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Nevertheless, native life was miserable in the eyes of native intellectuals, 
one of whom described it as the following: 
It is difficult to describe the heartrending existence of the Kazaks of those days. 
Ordinary Kazaks use to tremble before the lowest of the Tsarist officials and endure the 
most humiliating disgrace afflicted upon them. It was those ignorant and rude native 
interpreter-chinovniks and volost officials themselves who were responsible for the 
despicable life of the Kazak society. Heavy revenues were imposed upon the natives, 
bribery, the discourteous behavior of the officials, as well as gossipmongery, became 
regular events on the Kazak steppe. 77 
During the second half of the nineteenth century, three most important 
towering literary figures emerged among the Kazaks. They were the pioneers of 
the new generation of Kazaks who were familiar with the Russian language, 
culture and politics. They were Soqan Valihanov, Abay Qunanbayuh, and Ibiray 
Altmsann. The first two were the sons of the highest native administrative Kazak 
officials who cooperated with the imperial rule and served both, Kazak society 
and Russian imperial rule during their decades-long tenure. Chingiz Valihanov 
and Qunanbay Oskenbayuh were Agasultans in their regions. Soqan Valihanov 
and Abay Qunanbay were raised in households very closely involved in crucial 
matters related to the life of Kazak society. At the same time, both grew up aware 
of the importance of the coexistence of both Russian administrative rule and the 
rule of their native people, for whom their fathers played a significant role. The 
times forced them to be enthusiastic learners of Russian culture, politics and 
Jay1qbayev was the following Agasultan of Aqmola in 1864 (Oteniyazov, p. 107); Ahmet Jantiirin 
(until 1855) and his brother Muqan Jantiirin were elected as the Agasultans of Torgay Okrug 
(Oteniyazov, p.167) Another famous Agasultan from among the Nayman tribe was Qunanbay 
Oskenbayuh, father of the nineteenth century philosopher of Kazak steppe and poet Abay 
Qunanbayul1. See, "Qunanbay Oskenbayuh (1804-1886)," Abay Entsiklopediyasz, p. 370-372. 
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developments. However, this fact later was used by pro-Russian circles to gain 
supporters for the Russian way of life from the Kazak society. Thus, during the 
following century, the literature of the Soviet period and the native media 
repeatedly continued to publicize the names and works of these three as the 
pioneers of promoting Russian culture on the Kazak steppe. The life and work of 
the three became a rather tiresome repetitive subject of political/literary 
publications about the Kazak land. 
At the beginning of this century, except for Abay Qunanbay (died in 
1904), the legacy of $oqan Valihanov and Ibiray Altmsann was already history. 
Soqan had died in 1865 and Altmsann in 1889. The twentieth century brought 
new generation of Kazak intellectuals, whose work and influence had a more 
"nationalist" tone. They were a generation, born in the last quarter of the 
nineteenth century, mostly educated in Russian schools and raised aware of both 
the native sufferings under the imperial rule of Russia and of discussions and 
criticisms concerning imperial control. However their activities will be discussed 
at the end of this chapter, after other important subjects of the nineteenth century. 
77 Mirjaq1p Duvlatov's interrogation material in 1929, cited by Qoygeldiyev, p. 92-93. 
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COLONIAL POLITICAL MEASURES TO MAINTAIN IMPERIAL 
CONTROL 
During the years following the acceptance of Russian overlordship, the 
descendants of Ehi.ilhayir did not enjoy Russian protection for long. The Lesser 
Horde was divided into two in 1801 by an imperial decree, into the Lesser Horde 
and a newly created Inner Horde, or Bokey Ordas1. The status of the Han of the 
Lesser Horde was abolished almost two decades after this in 1824, by another 
imperial decree. 
The Han of the Middle Horde, Abilay Han ( 1771-1781 ), tried to take 
measures against a twin threat, first the ambitious Russian Tsarist threat to control 
the traditional Kazak pastureland and second, the emerging Chinese intention to 
invade Kazak territory from the East. Abilay Han tried successfully to engage 
both sides with the wise policy of promising the Russian side to accept the 
Russian protectorate and showing eagerness to the Chinese side to accept Chinese 
suzerainty.78 His recognition by both Russian and Chinese officials as the Han of 
the Middle Horde, strengthened Abtlay's position considerably.79 Upon the death 
of Abilay Han, his son Vah also continued to follow the same line as his father. 
Nevertheless, the Russian imperial administration, this time, would not endure 
n "Ebulmambet (1730-1771) and his successor Abilay Han (1771-178l)(son of Uvah Han), 
united the tribes wandering in the Strdarya and Maveraiinnehr. and settled in Jetisuv. They, 
themselves (the Hans only) accepted Chinese citizenship (1760) and received official titles from 
the Chinese Emperor." Togan, Turkzstan, p. 209-210. 
79 Muhtar Magavin, Qazaqstan Tariyhmmg Alippesi, Almati: Kazakstan, 1995. and ilyas 
Esenberlin, Ko~pendiler, Almatt: Jazuv~1, 1976. 
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this dual policy and decided to abolish the status of the Han of the Middle Horde 
in 1815. 
Tsarist rule introduced another policy by which the peoples of the Middle 
Horde and, in part, of the Great Horde, began to be administered by the Siberian 
Governor-Generalship. Its center was Tobolski until 1839 and later the city of 
Omsk. From this date onwards, the Tsarist colonial administration on the Kazak 
steppe followed a multi-layered policy. The first was the introduction of imperial 
approval for newly-elected Kazak hans, which stemmed from the idea that Kazaks 
could not elect their leaders without Tsarist imperial endorsement. The earliest 
and strongest opposition to this policy came from Abilay Han of the Middle 
Horde who openly opposed this and distanced his rule from this imperial practice. 
To strengthen this practice, the Tsarist administration proclaimed a "Decree on the 
Siberian Kirg1z" in 1822, and thus attempted to introduce the new administrative 
Tsarist system on the Kazak steppe. However, these decrees were not able to help 
colonial Tsarist rule penetrate deeply into Kazak society. 
The Russian colonial administration did not limit its policies only to 
forcible seizure of the Kazak land and its allotment to the landless Russian 
peasantry. Apart from the cultural and religious expropriation of the native 
people, Kazaks were administered by colonial administrative officials alien to the 
area. The highest position given to the native population in the colonial 
administrative system was the lowest rank, the volost (bobs). On the other hand, 
the Governor General assumed absolute authority in his region and thus the 
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Kazaks called him jart1 pat~a, the "half-king." According to article 15 of the 
Turkestan Administrative Statue, and article 17 of the Steppe Administrative 
Statue, the Governor General had the right to exile a politically untrustworthy 
person for five years. Even the nachalnik, the heads of uyezds(a term for district), 
had the right to imprison for a week without any interrogation subjects who did 
not respect the law or who did not follow the orders of an administrative unit. The 
nachalniks also had the right to impose fines. 
The natives themselves used gaps in the colonial administrative judiciary 
to take revenge on compatriots. At the same time, these gaps were also used by 
the newly settled Russian population in their disagreements with the indigenous 
people. On many occasions, Russian peasants confiscated the herds and property 
of natives without the interference of any judiciary organ. 80 
LAND CONFISCATION 
Ebiilhayir, the Han of Ki~i Jiiz aimed to regain the territories between the 
Edil and Jay1q rivers from the colonial rulers. He obtained support from ordinary 
Kazaks who wanted the area to use as grazing field, by promising them the above 
territory. However, the 1756 Russian imperial decree prohibited nomadic Kazaks 
from using the western banks of Jay1q river for grazing purposes. The Tsarist 
administration began to build military garrisons along the river to maintain the 
defense and well-being of the Russian immigrant population to the area. A famous 
Ro Qoygeldiyev, pp. 67-73. 
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Kazak poet Murat Mongkeuh interpreted the Russian occupation of the Edil and 
Jay1q rivers as "The occupation of Edil is an attack of humiliation (as to molest a 
woman by pulling her skirt), the occupation of Jay1q is an attack of decapitation 
(as to insult a person holding him by the throat)."81 
The construction of Russian army garrisons and Russian forts limited the 
use of traditional Kazak pastureland and forced the Kazaks to move into less 
fertile areas. Russian military measures to secure the Southern borders, by 
establishing defense lines along the northern regions of Kazakstan, particularly 
put the Kazaks of the Middle Horde into a difficult position. It restricted the 
traditional Kazak pastureland in the bordering Kazak regions. 
The major part of the Middle Horde and a number of regions in southern 
Kazakstan were joined to the Russian empire only by means of the military 
measures of the Tsarist army. The Tsarist rulers had chosen to force the peoples 
and regions of Central Asia into the Russian state regardless of the will of the 
native peoples as a result of its desire to achieve further goals. Tsarist policy 
began to maintain its colonialist policies by pushing the nomads far from the 
fertile lands and settling the Russian landless mujik (Russian peasant) in their 
stead. The Russian state put into practice its colonization policy on Kazak land in 
full force. 
81 Edildi tart1p algam, etekke qold1 salgam. 
Jay1qt1 tart1p algam, jagaga qold1 salgam. 
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During the first quarter of the nineteenth century, the Tsarist state began 
to introduce some new administrative measures. The particular aim of these kinds 
of measures was to seize previously uncontrolled Kazak land. Thus the 
administrative divisions that were introduced in the Kazak lands were the 
beginning of a gradual seizure of the territories of the Middle and Great Hordes. 
Native Kazaks were having difficulty using their traditional pasturelands because 
of the Tsarist policy of settling Cossacks on the most fertile areas that had been 
taken from the indigenous people. 
Russian colonial rule on the Kazak steppe introduced another measure to 
colonize the steppe region permanently, particularly after 1865. The emancipation 
of Russian peasants by imperial decree in 1861, and afterwards, forced the Tsarist 
rulers to provide the landless Russian peasantry with land and thus reduce 
tensions among Tsarist subjects to the West of the Urals. The solution to this 
problem was the settlement of landless Russian mujik (Russian peasant) on 
Kazak territory. The Tsarist administration sought another objective by this 
policy. It was to use these newly settled Russian subjects as the tools of the 
imperial administration in colonizing and further expropriating the newly acquired 
Kazak land. Another important tool in the early movements of the Tsarist colonial 
administration was, of course, the Kazachestvo, the Cossacks. Four centers of 
altogether eleven Cossack settlements in the border regions of the Russian empire 
were constructed on the western and northern borders of Kazak territory. The 
Cossack settlements surrounding Kazak territory were in the Ural, Sibir, Orenburg 
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and Jetisuv regions. Towards the end of the nineteenth century, Siberian Cossack 
soldiers had taken 11,610, 484 desyatina (one desyatina: 1,09 hectare) of land, of 
which five million desyatina were in the Sibir region, six million in the Ural 
region and 610,484 in the Jetisuv region. 82 The arrogance and bullying behavior 
towards the native population of the newly settled and newly privileged Russian 
subjects annoyed the natives further. 
The Russian colonial administration exacted taxes from the indigenous 
population even on land just acquired from the natives and not practically used by 
either side. The Tsarist rulers promulgated a "Temporary Decree on the 
Administrative Principles of Ural, Torgay, Aqmola and Semipalatinsk (Semey) 
Oblast" on October 21, 1868. According to article 210 of this decree, the land 
inhabited by the Kirg1z (the Kazaks) was declared to be state land and thus would 
be assigned to the use of Kirg1z society only by the permission of the 
administration. 83 The forest area in Kazakstan was also officially declared to be 
imperial property. Apart from ordinary Kazaks, even the descendants of the 
formidable Kazak hans, the then privileged, high native imperial officials were 
not able to use even one branch of a tree from any Kazak forest. 84 
Ri Sanjar Asfendiyarov, Jstoriya Kazakstana, Alma-Ata, 1993, p. 187 cited by Mambet 
Qoygeldiyev, Ala,s- Qozqalzsi, AlmatI: Sanat, 1994, p. 26. 
R3 Materyalz po Jstoriy Politi9eskovo Stroya Kazakstana, vol., Alma Ata 1960. p. 337 cited by 
Mambet Qoygeldiyev, ibid., p. 28. 
84 The official Russian imperial mayor and Agasultan Chingiz Valihanov was not allowed to have 
wood from forest areas to use as building material to renovate and extend his residency. The 
residency was built for the widow of the Russian-recognized Han of Orta Jiiz, Vah in 1830s, by 
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On the other hand, colonial rule introduced a number of privileges for the 
newly settled Slavic population. For example, Kaufman, General Governor of the 
Turkestan region signed a decree entitled "Temporary Measures on the 
Settlement of Russian Peasants Arriving to the Jetisuv area." It was aimed at 
relieving the newcomers from the burdens of settling a colonized land. According 
to this regional decree, each person was to be given 30 desyatina and those who 
would settle alongside the postal line would be given 45 desyatina of land. Those 
newcomers were also exempted from taxes for 15 years and one hundred roubles 
was to be given to those in need. 85 
Rapid colonization of the Jetisuv region aimed at the realization of two 
strategic targets. The first was to define and secure the Tsarist border in the South 
against any kind of Chinese expansion by clearing the area of the soldiers of the 
Khokand Khanate and by constructing military forts and garrisons. The second 
was to wipe out the anti-Russian as well as the anti-colonial elements in the 
region and among the population who had been the staunch supporters of 
Kenesan Kas1mov. Thus an urgent increase of Russian elements and the deep 
penetration of Russian dominance into native life was the aim. In 1874, 
newcomers to the Aqmola region were given more than 18 and less than 30 
desyatina of land to each man (as the head of each family), and centers (uchastka: 
permission of the Russian imperial decree. See Samat Oteniyazov, !joqan men Qayta Kezdesiiv, p. 
98-114. 
85 Qoygeldiyev, ibid., p. 29. 
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settlement area) were prepared for the new comers equipped to settle at least 20 
men (and their families). 
The colonization of Kazak land by Russian peasants from Central Russia 
and Siberia was carried out in an intensive form from the 1860s to the 1890s. 
Some 251, 779 desyatina of land owned by the native Kazaks was seized from 
them in Aqmola Oblast and 24 selo (villages) with 10,940 men and their families 
were settled between the years 1885 to 1893. In Jetisuv oblast, 63 peasant 
settlements with 35,569 Slavic inhabitants were established by 1895.86 
A new law of March 25, 1891, entitled "The Decree on the Administration 
of Aqmola, Semey, Jetisuv, Ural and Torgay Oblasts" enabled the colonial 
administrators to expropriate the Kazak land further. Articles 119 and 120 of the 
decree were aimed at facilitating the further use of Kazak land by the colonialist 
apparatus, as follows: 
lirticle 119-territories and natural resources of the land inhabited by the nomads, 
including the forest areas are all declared to be state property. 
lirticle 120- those territories presently inhabited by the nomads will be given for 
the use of their society. 
An amendment introduced to this article brought more damaging results 
for the native population. According to this amendment, so-called excess land was 
required to be given over to the control of the state apparatus. As a result of this 
amendment, any 'excess' place was added to the Land Allocation Fund of the 
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colonial rule. To use the above article with full force, a so-called scientific 
expedition began with the aim of defining excess land on the native territory. It 
was led by F. A. S9erbina and lasted for three years between 1896 and 1899 
covering the twelve districts (uyezds) of Torgay, Aqmola and Semey provinces. 
According to the results of expedition, in the eight districts of the above oblasts, 
Kazaks previously had 45,889,000 desyatina of land. Only 23,297,000 (51%) 
were left to the Kazaks and 22,592,000 desyatina (49%) were declared to be 
excess land, and was given to the Land Allotment Fund for the newcomers. 87 The 
expedition suggested that an average Kazak with 24 horses needed 187 desyatina 
of land, and the rest of the land in use by the Kazaks was required to be seized by 
the colonial apparatus for the further settlement of Russian peasants. During the 
first decade of the present century, the work of S9erbina's expedition was found to 
be not a fair judgment and new expeditions were organized. As a result of the new 
"scientific" expeditions, the land owned by each middle class Kazak family was 
reduced to 20-30 desyatina.88 During this period, two million desyatina of land 
was declared to be excess land in the Oskemen district alone. 
By 1917, about 17 million desyatina of land had been allocated to 3 
million Russians in 500,000 families. The Land Allotment Fund had an additional 
20 million desyatina of land for the further use of the still arriving Russian 
116 Qoygeldiyev, ibid., p. 32. 
x7 Qoygeldiyev, ibid., p. 34. 
xx Qoygeldiyev, ibid., p. 42. 
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settlers.89 Another source claims that the colonial administration seized about 45 
million hectares of Kazak land from the natives.90 
The earlier Agriculture and State Land Ministry was changed into the 
Land Settlement and Agricultural General Directory on May 5, 1905. The Land 
Allocation Fund was put under the control of this new directory. The main aim of 
this institution was to settle the native population and release as much excess land 
as possible. A certain Veletskiy, head of the Jetisuv Settlement unit, in his letter 
to the Turkestan governor-generalship on September 12th. 1906, stated the 
following: "Settlement of the newcomers is not important for themselves, but it is 
vital for the colonization policy. It is impossible to find excess land without the 
completion of the settlement of the Ktrg1z (the natives). Allocation of land to the 
nomadic natives was not profitable for the colonial administration since nomadic 
life requires more land than the settled one. Thus it is necessary to persuade the 
natives to settle on the land."91 
The land hunger of the Russian peasantry began to press harder on the 
Tsarist administrative officials during the years after the 1905 revolution. Thus 
the concerned Tsarist officials began to satisfy the land hunger of the Russian 
peasantry at the expense of the well-being of the nomadic Kazaks. 
~9 Olcott, The Kazakhs., p. 90 
90 Qoygeldiyev, p. 50. 
91 Qoygeldiyev, p. 55. 
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THE EMERGENCE OF KAZAK NATIONALISM UNDER THE TSARIST 
REGIME 
The colonization policy of Tsarist rulers in nineteenth-century Kazakstan 
provoked a strong reaction from the indigenous people. Armed struggle against 
Russian colonial rule among the Lesser Horde started with Smm Datov (1783-
1797), as a result of the Tsarist decree prohibiting Kazak use of land on the west 
bank of the Jayiq river.92 At the same time, Russia had also limited the rights of 
the Kazak aristocracy and established the absolute rule of the Han of the Lesser 
Horde. Another revolt among the Kazaks was led by isatay Tayman and 
Mahambet Otemis in 1837-38.93 
The most important of these revolts was the movement led by Kenesan 
Qasimov, one of the grandsons of Abilay Han.94 Kenesan Qasimov (1837-1847) 
started his struggle against the Russian colonial administration in order to restore 
the Kazak state to its position in the time of Abilay Han. His struggle and military 
action delayed the firm establishment of Russian colonial control on the Kazak 
lands for about two decades. 
Sarjan Sultan,95 son of Kasim Tore (one of the thirty sons of Abilay Han) 
attempted to unite the Kazaks in opposition to the Tsarist policy of depriving the 
92 "Ki!;ii Jiiz Sarvalannmg Koterilisi," Qazaq-Sovet Entsiklopediyas1, Vol. 6, p. 193-194. 
93 Ig1lman Sorekov, jsatay Mahambet: Dastandar men Olengder, Almah: Jazuv!;)1, 1976. 
94 A. Zeki Velidi Togan, Bugiinkii Tiirkili Turlastan ve Ya/an Tarihi, istanbul: Enderun, 1981, p. 
312-320. 
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native people of their most fertile lands. Sarjan Sultan, brother ofKenesan Sultan, 
retreated south in his fight against the Tsarist military forces and hoped to gain the 
support of the (Beg96) Han of Khokand further south.97 Sarjan Sultan was killed 
(in cold blood) on the orders of the Han of Khokand in 1836. Thus started another 
phase (the Central Asian side) of the struggle for Kazaks who were in conflict 
with the colonial Russian administration. 
It was the most important struggle against the establishment of Tsarist 
colonial rule on Kazak land of all the nineteenth and even the twentieth centuries. 
The Sekti, Tama, Tabm, Al~m, Sumekey and Jappas tribes from the Lesser Horde 
and the Uysin and Duvlat tribes of the Great Horde participated.98 Among the 
fighters of Kenesan, there were individuals of Russian, Uzbek, Kirg1z, Polish and 
Ba~qurt origin as well. The supporters of Kenesan even reached 40,000 families. 99 
95 The term sultan is used by the Kazaks for those princes who were the descendants of Chingiz 
Han from his son <;:091 and for those who were not elected as Han, but for those who were hopeful 
and suitable candidates. Muhtar Magavin, "Qazaq Ordasmda Han Saylav Dastiiri," Qazaq 
Tariyhznzng Alippesi, pp. 185-197. "Hans in Central Asia always maintained the support of at least 
four tribes which hold the "felt of the han" when he assumed power.", Togan, Turlastan, p. 201. 
96 According to Togan, the Begs ofH1yva and Khokand assumed the title of Han at the beginning 
of the nineteenth century. Togan, Tur/as tan, p. 203. 
97Like Hiyva and Buhara, Khokandian rule in Central Asia drew its support both from the 
sedentary population and from nomadic tribes such as the Kirg1z and other Q1p9aq tribes. 
However, in matters of utmost importance for their rule, they preferred to rely upon the sedentary 
population rather than those nomadic or semi-nomadic subjects. Togan, Turlastan, p. 216-218. 
Kenesan, in his attempt to win over the Krrg1z to his side, planned to achieve a double success. 
The first was the maintenance of his authority on the territory of the Khokandian rule, which was 
a more easier force to deal with compared to the Russian threat. He wanted to create a safe heaven 
for his activities and for his followers to gather strength to fight off the Russian threat. Secondly, 
he wanted to carve up the nomadic Kirg1z and Q1p9aq subjects of the Khokandian realm for his 
own advantage. 
98Bekrnahanov, ibid., p.184 
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Representatives of all three Kazak hordes named Kenesan as Han in 1841, 
in the traditional way by raising him over their heads while he was sitting on a 
white felt mat in September 1841. 100 Kenesan 's relations with the Khokand were 
tense, partly due to personal enmity and partly due to his effort to get rid of 
Khokand rule over the Kazak people. Later the Kazak historian Bekmahanov 
claimed that Kenesan Han, after being convinced of the Khokand's determination 
to keep the Kazaks among their enslaved subjects, made his decision to fight 
against the southern neighbor. 101 However, the Kazak Khanate during the time of 
Kenesan had more favorable relations with the Bukharan Emirate and Khivan 
Khanate. The Khivan Khanate provided Kenesan with guns and ammunition from 
time to time. Kenesan Han tried to establish diplomatic contact with the leading 
administrative figures in Central Asia at the time. From his correspondence, one 
can see that his ideas, aims, demands and policies have been well-established. 102 
99 One of the most important documents is the memoirs of S1zd1q Sultan, a son of Kenesan, 
written by Ahmet Sultan Kenesanuh and translated into Russian by E. T. Smimov. Sultan Ahmed 
Kenesarin, Sultanz Kenesarz i Sadik, Translated into Russian by E.T. Smimov, Ta~kent, 1889. It 
appeared in Juld1z, No., 1991, p. 92. 
100 Bekmahanov, ibid, p. 255. 
101 Bekmahanov., ibid., p. 256. 
102 One of Kenesan' s letters read as follows: "You want us to be the subject of your emperor and 
of your empire. You wrote that we believe in the same god but we both belong to two different 
religions. You should note that your ideas do not suit to our understanding. If I accept your 
overlordship, I will act against God's order. I would be afraid of God's punishment and will be 
ashamed before other Muslim rulers ... The Tsar promised that my grandfather would be the sole 
ruler of his (Abilay Han's) country. The current Russian lords occupied our ancestral territories of 
Esil-Nura, Aqtav, Urgat, Qarqarah, Qarmhq, Yarkain(?), Ubagan, Tob1l, Qusmurun, Hayan and 
Tursaq and territories up till Oral for building military garrisons." cited by Baymirza Hay1t, 
Turk1stan: Rusya ile <;in Arasmda, istanbul: Otag Yaymevi, 1975, p. 185. 
68 
He showed the necessary diplomatic understanding when he received Russian 
diplomats and other Tsarist notables. 
Kenesan specified that if all the military garrisons established by Russia 
were destroyed, if all the confiscated Kazak lands were returned to their genuine 
and traditional owners, and if Tsarist harassment of the native Kazaks were 
stopped, then he might consider accepting Russian protection. 
In 184 7, Kenesan Han with his 10, 000 strong fighters entered into the 
Kirg1z territory under Khokandian rule. However, he was not successful in 
fighting against the Kirg1z and together with 32 Kazak sultans, he was killed in a 
battle near the Kirg1z city of Tokmak. His struggle to eliminate colonial rule 
became an unforgettable memory in the minds of not only the Kazaks but of all 
the Central Asian peoples. Kenesan's devotion to protect the interests of his 
people, his leadership abilities, his qualities as a unique and genuine politician, 
found many admirers among the people. 103 Kenesan's failure to reach his aim of 
freeing the Kazaks from Russian colonial rule was also the beginning of the 
extension of Russian colonial policies to the whole of Central Asia. This was not 
realized by all the other Central Asian people (Five years after Kenesan's defeat, 
Tsarist forces attacked Khokand territory from Aqme~it in 1852. ), and thus he 
was murdered by the Kirg1z subjects of Khokand in Maytobe on the upper <;u 
103 Please see Sultan Ahmed Kenesarin, Sultani Kenesan i Sadik, Translated into Russian by E.T. 
Smimov, Ta~kent, 1889. The Kazak translation of it has appeared inJuldiz, No. 5, 1991., pp. 90-
112. Other important material about S1zd1k Sultan is the chapter written by the Russian historian 
N. Pavlov in istoriya Turkistana, Ta~kent, 1910, which again appeared in Juld1z, No. 9, 1990, pp. 
137-143. 
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river in 1847. He was understood, and probably it is partly true, as an ambitious 
leader that threatened the established authority of Khokand in the area. He was not 
recognized as a freedom fighter by other Central Asian rulers. However, in one of 
his letters to the Kirg1z manaps Ormon and Jantay, Kenesan wrote the following: 
"My aim to come here is not to fight or spill blood, (but) to unite the Kazaks and 
the Kirg1z to unyoke them from the Khokandian (rule) and free them from 
Khokandian repression ... After receiving this letter, come before me to display 
your obedience and calm your anxiety. If you do not accept this suggestion and if 
you do not refrain from fighting, then the whole responsibility will rest on your 
shoulders." 104 
Kazak enmity towards imperial rule was the result of policies of biased 
Russian officials. Mirjaq1p Duvlatov attempted to explain this as such: "Kazaks 
have considered all the Russians as their enemies and thus the saying -"Carry your 
axe if you have a Russian friend" - was created among them. Disputes between the 
two nations were artificially created and supported by the administration. If a 
horse from a Russian newcomer was stolen, the neighboring Kazak avul was 
forced to pay the price. Poor Kazaks suffered most from the state taxes. The rich 
Kazaks who owned hundreds or thousands of herds were made equal to a poor 
Kazak in paying state taxes, in the eyes of colonial officials."105 
104 Bekmahanov, ibid., p. 330. 
105 Mirjaq1p Duvlatov's interrogation material in 1929, cited by Qoygeldiyev, p. 92-93. 
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A CHANGE IN DEMOGRAPHIC COMPOSITION 
The beginning of an attempt to settle the landless Russian peasants of 
Central Russia on to the Kazak land started to change the demographic balance on 
the Steppe. This was particularly noteworthy towards the end of the nineteenth 
and the beginning of the twentieth centuries. There were 169,603 newcomer 
shares created between the years 1870 and 1905. However, 197,232 newcomer 
families came to the Kazak territory in the four years between 1906 and 1909. In 
other words, Russian colonialism seized Kazak land at a much faster rate in these 
four years, equaling the colonization of the previous last 35 years. 106 By 1910, the 
population of the Kazak territory had doubled and the population of Russian 
peasants on Kazak land had increased 15 times between 1894 and 1910. This was 
the result of an ambitious program to relieve the pressure on overcrowded Russian 
villages and to solve the agrarian problem in central Russia. By 1917, about 17 
million desyatinas of land had been allocated to 3 million Russians in 500,000 
families. 
The Cossack settlements on the most fertile regions in Jay1q, Oy, Or, 
Ertis, Qaratal, Lepsi, Aqsuv and Ile had deprived the Kazaks of their traditional 
pasturelands. This practice resulted in more burdens for the Kazaks. Most 
important was the prevention of the agricultural development of Kazak society 
and the interruption of the Kazak tribal movement system in search of pastureland 
106 Alihan Bokeyhanuh(Bokeyhanov), Qazaq, 1913, No. 24, cited by Qoygeldiyev, p. 43. 
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vital for the well being of the Kazak herds and thus for the very survival of Kazak 
society. 
The casual attitude of the newly settled Slavic population towards the 
natural environment, wastefully using the natural resources, occupying a 
previously cultivated land and abandoning it in a very short time, following the 
same procedure in another newly captured area all over again in order to receive 
another set of privileges and exemptions allocated to newcomers from central 
Russia. 
Kazak nationalist intellectuals were aware of the changing demographic 
composition of their land. "Strangers are coming to our society. What will happen 
to us when the outsiders come to live among us. If history has any value for 
human experience, one comes to the following conclusion; if the invaders are 
stronger than the natives, indigenous people usually suffer and perish in the end. 
If the indigenous people are stronger than the invaders, they can be assimilated 
into the native life. If both sides are equal then none will suffer. Both can survive 
and live side by side as twin nations." 107 
107 "Orenburg. 10 Fevral," "Qazaq" Gazeti, Chief editor A. N1sanbayev, Reprinted and 
transliterated copy. Almatt: Qazaq Entsiklopediyas1 Bas Redaktsiyast, 1998, p.14. Only 265 issues 
of this newspaper were published during the five years of its existence. Microfilmed individual 
issues of the Qazaq can be found in many libraries and archives in the west before the demise of 
the Soviet Union. Thus individual researchers had to spend extra effort to reach those issues, 
which consumed quite a lot of time and money. At the beginning of the 1990s, a company in the 
USA gathered some issues of Qazaq together with a substantial collection of newspapers and 
journals published in Tsarist Russia before the Bolshevik revolution. As for the Qazaq newspaper, 
recently a group of academics, social scientists, and many other Kazak archivists republished 
some important articles appeared in this newspaper some 80 years ago. However, it is not a 
complete transliteration of the newspaper but rather a selection of materials. It has not been stated, 
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ENVIRONMENTAL DEGRADATION 
The careless attitude of the Russian peasant population in wastefully using 
natural resources was the beginning of the gradual environmental degradation of 
the Kazak land. As early as 1830s, Russian peasants and Russian soldiers began to 
plunder the natural resources of the Kazak land on which they were settled by the 
imperial administration. Apart from the land assigned to them officially, Russian 
settlers went even further in destroying the forest areas and grazing lands, set 
aside for the use of the native Kazaks. This started even in the mid-nineteenth 
century. For example, the Russian administration began an inspection only after a 
letter from Aygamm Han~a, the widow of late Vah Han, arrived in 1837. It was 
officially ordered to find out whether Russian peasants really harvested the grass 
on the Kazak grazing lands and sold the excess grass for private profit. 108 
Plunder of the Kazak land was extended to the country's other valuable 
resources, such as inspections to define gold and other precious metal or gem 
mines. Sensible Kazak leaders were very cautious in disclosing this kind of 
information to the colonialist administration in the nineteenth century. 109 The 
exploitation of the natural resources of the Kazak territory started first by the 
in the book, what kind of criteria was used in the selection of articles for transliteration of the 
Qazaq newspaper. 
108 Samat Oteniyazov, $oqan men Qayta Kezdesiiv, p. 63. 
109 For example, according to Quh~ Jaq1puh Valihanov, grandson of Chingiz Valihanov, his 
grandfather never forgave any Kazak who disclosed gold and silver mining areas in the Kazak 
land to any Russian geologist. Chingiz Valihanov use to severely punish (by secretly killing) the 
natives who disclosed such information to Russian colonialists for a reward. Ibid, p. 117. 
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carrying out of so-called geological explorations to define what kind of riches 
were buried on the Kazak land. This search led to many discoveries of precious 
metals and mines and supported the needs of Russian and later of the Soviet 
rulers. 
The Kazak intellectuals' reaction to environmental degradation was voiced 
in poems, the best and the most efficient way to reach the Kazaks and draw their 
attention. Mirjaq1p Duvlatuh wrote his famous book Oyan Qazaq (Ufa, 1909) 
about the Kazak plight regarding the Tsarist land confiscation. He wrote the 
following: 
110 
In the year of one thousand eight hundred and sixty-eight, 
all the land was announced as the property of (imperial) treasury. 
Thus our land shrank each year 
And was added up to the towns of muj1k(Russian peasant) 
Our land and water are shrinking each year, 
And they were added to the towns of mujik (the Russian peasant) 
Where are your high mountains, crystal springs and big lakes? 
The green mountain hills all went. 
Bitter water and deserted areas are left to us, 
No place is left to us to sow grain. 
Where is your fertile soil? 
Where are your silver lakes? 
Where is your land-on which four types of cattle use to graze 
And you, en masse, use to move freely on (it)? 110 
J 1lmda mmg scgiz jiiz alp1s scgiz, 
Hazmahq dcdi jcrding hammas1da 
Tanhp j1ldan jilga jcr-suv1m1z 
Muj1qtmg kctti bari qalasma 
Zangir tav, aqqan bulaq ~alqar koldcr, 
Kcttigoy bctcgcli biyik bcldcr. 
A~(fl suv bizgc qald1 ~61 dalalar, 
Jaqs1 jcr qaldmnad1 cgin salar. 
Kok maysa bctcgcli jcring qayda? 
Kiimistey tolqmdagan cling qayda? 
lng-jmg bop jcr qay1sqan t6rt tiilikpcn, 
Jongkilip ko~ip-qongan cling qayda? 
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Mirjaq1p Duvlat was one of the staunchest defenders of Kazak rights over 
their land. He was reported to have written the following about the Kazak land 
even in the twentieth century during his interrogation by Soviet security officials: 
" ... The most fertile soils of the natives was seized forcefully from the natives to be 
given to the Land Allocation Fund of the newcomers. Kazaks were driven to live 
on the desert areas."111 
THE SHIFT FROM ANIMAL HUSBANDRY TO AGRICULTURE 
As a result of the restrictions on the traditional Kazak pastureland by a 
number of military and administrative measures taken by the Russian imperial 
administration, nomadic Kazaks increasingly had less and less space for grazing 
their animals. The fertile grazing lands were seized by Russians to be given to 
landless mujik. The native population was prohibited from using these lands for 
agricultural purposes or for winter pasture. If the newcomers used the areas for 
agriculture or for other activities, they were exempted from taxes, and received 
other privileges and were freed from other responsibilities (non-military) for 
fifteen years. 
Please see Mirjaq1p Duvlatov, "Qazaq Jerleri," Oyan Qazaq ( Awaken Kazak!), Ufa: Ne~riyat 
Matbaas1, 1909. Reprinted by Ya~ Tiirkistan Yaymlan: 20, pp. 28-32., and in p. 28. The book was 
devoted to matters of election, the land issue, and religious discussions. It was banned 
immediately after publication by the colonial authorities. 
111 Mirjaq1p Duvlatov's interrogation material in 1929, cited by Qoygeldiyev, p. 92-93. 
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The growing problem of Kazak need for pastureland decreased the number 
of livestock in the society. Individual families with no livestock began gradually 
to turn into j ataq, 112 those Kazaks who were engaged in farming. They were the 
poorest in the society and engaged in a most primitive form of farming. 
Agriculture was a branch of the economy that was not attractive to a Kazak. Only 
out of sheer necessity, the poorest section was forced to engage in farming 
through tilling the earth with a wooden plough. Most of them did not find it 
necessary to irrigate the land. 
There were also many individual cases of Kazak suffering as a result of the 
forced seizure of the native land. A group of Kazaks from the Qo~anay tribe in the 
Seventh Star~m of Targm Bohstzq in Uskamen Uyezd, complained that their land 
had been seized by the authorities. According to an article by Bokeyhanov, they 
were forced to rent hayfields from Russian peasants. They even rented grazing 
fields from Russian peasants as well. They use to pay ten tzyzn( cent) for each 
horse and five tzyzn(cent) for each sheep to graze on, the then Russian-seized, 
former Kazak pastureland. 113 Although this case was made public in Qazaq in 
1913, citing a discussion in the Third Russian Duma, it was documented during 
the Ss;erbina expedition (1896-1901 ). 
112 Mirjaq1p Duvlatov claimed that as a result of Russian seizure of the native land, Kazaks \Vere 
turned to jataq (a poverty-stricken Kazak who was settled on a piece of land to engage in farming 
as a result of his poorness). Duvlatov, Oyan Qazaq, p. 31. 
113 Qir Balas1(one of the pen names of Bokeyhanov), "U~in~i Duma Ham Qazaq," "Qazaq" 
Gazeti, Reprinted copy, Almat1: "Qazaq Entsiklopediyas1" Bas Redaktsiyas1, 1998, p. 29. 
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Between 1907 and 1911, the then Russian Prime Minister, Pyotr Stolypin 
undertook an ambitious program of colonization in the eastern steppe region 
(Kazak territory) to relieve the pressure on the overcrowded Russian villages and 
to solve the agrarian unrest that the land shortage had caused. 114 High-ranking 
officials such as Stolypin argued that the interest of the Russian state could not be 
sacrificed to the interest of one small group of people, the Kazaks. 115 Thus the 
particular needs of nomadic life were openly disregarded to ease the difficulties of 
the center. 116 
The Russian peasants, freed by legislation from the responsibilities of communal land-
ownership, were given generous allotments of land suitable for agricultural purposes in one 
of the steppe provinces, and were assisted by loans and other means to establish themselves 
permanently in their new homes. This entire operation was conducted by a special Bureau of 
Resettlement (Pereselencheskoe Upravleniie). The land was obtained either by purchase 
or, more frequently by a transfer of ownership from the Crown, which claimed for itself 
most of the territories inhabited by the Turkic nomadic tribes, to the settler. The <;:enter of 
colonization was the Semirechie (Jetisuv) province, administratively as part of Turkestan, 
but settlements were also founded in the adjoining provinces. By 1915-1916 there were 
established on the Kazakh-Kirgiz territories 530 Cossack and peasant colonist settlements 
with 144,000 persons. By 1914 the government had distributed in the Semirechinsk province 
alone 4,200,000 desyatinas of land, a total of 31 million desyatinas available in that 
province, including most of the land of agricultural value. 117 
The sessions of the Third Russian Duma ( 1911 ), during the discussion to 
introduce an amendment to the 279th. article of the 1886 imperial decree with 
reference to the matters of the Kazak land, disregarded the plight of the Kazaks in 
114 Richard Pipes, The Formation of the Soviet Union: Communism and Nationalism, 1917-1923, 
Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1954, p. 83. 
115 cited by Olcott, p. 89. 
116 Boris Quvatov, Otamm1zdmg Tariyh1 Tuvralz Sayasiy Engime, AlmatI: Bilim, 1993., p. 107. 
117 Richard Pipes, The Formation of the Soviet Union, p. 83. 
the Sirdarya region. Their land was also confiscated, ignoring the fact that the 
Kazaks had orchards, hayfields and had dug water canals to irrigate the land. 118 
The Kazak struggle to protest against the official policy concerning the 
land found an advocate in Baq1tjan Qaratayev, a Kazak deputy to the Second 
Duma in the twentieth century. He said the following during one of the Duma 
sess10ns: 
Presently, The Vedomstvo (Directory-Agency) of Agriculture and Settlement is carrying 
out the practice of driving the native KJrg1z out of their houses, organized in the form of 
Poselke and derevniya by force together with enthusiastically inviting the (Russian) 
peasants and settling them onto the Steppe provinces. As you see, the settlement process 
is being carried out in parallel with driving the natives who agreed (to give up nomadic 
life )settlement, from their houses in the most fertile regions. I can support this with 
official evidence. All of them believe that all the KJrg1zs are nomads. No, gentlemen, 
there are nomadic and settled KJrg1z. Settled Kirg1z have inhabited the fertile parts of 
southern regions of the Steppe for decades. They have been living in their permanent 
houses together with animal keeping facilities of sheds and barns. Agriculture is an 
essential part of survival for the Kirg1z of such. Keeping herds is an additional part of 
their living. Compared to agriculture, the pastoral life needs less labor. Thus the settled 
KJrg1z held the most fertile areas decades ago. The Agency of Agriculture and 
Settlement engaged in deporting the Kirg1z from their warm homes and from fertile lands 
and carrying out the settlement process (of the Russian peasants instead). 
THE DECLINE OF THE NOMADIC LIFESTYLE 
Towards the end of the nineteenth and at the beginning of the twentieth 
centuries, the population in the Kazak land was increasingly forced to choose one 
of the two main types of lifestyle. They were to choose either to settle on a piece 
of land and engage in animal husbandry or settle on a piece of land and engage in 
farming. This meant the end of the nomadic lifestyle. This gradual development 
began to be felt, for example, in Qostanay province from the decline in the 
118 Qtr Balas1(one of the pen names ofBokeyhanov), "O:;;in:;;i Duma Ham Qazaq," "Qazaq" 
Gazeti, Reprinted copy, AlmatJ: "Qazaq Entsiklopediyas1" Bas Redaktsiyas1, 1998., p. 28. 
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number of sheep. At the same time, increasing demand for cattle-meat from the 
cities and towns of central Russia helped to increase the number of cattle in 
Kazakstan. Mirjaq1p Duvlatov wrote in Kazak, in satirical style, by asking 
whether "the Kazaks should graze their livestock an barren dirt, if they lose the 
remaining land?" 119 
Towards the end of the nineteenth century, the nomadic economy and 
lifestyle was preserved only in regions such as Sirdarya, Central Kazakstan, the 
region around the Betpaq Dala, Manq1stav, Semey and Aqmola oblasts. As a 
result of demands from the newly settled Russian peasants to buy horses, rich 
Kazak families began to increase the number of horses and to decrease other 
livestock, such as sheep. 120 
THE ST A TE OF EDUCATION 
The basis of traditional education in Kazak society was according to the 
elementary knowledge of Muslim teaching. A mullah was hired by parents to 
teach children the basic pillars of Islam, reading the Koran and writing using the 
Arabic script, in the Kazak avul. Contemporary subjects of education were almost 
non-existent in the Kazak avul schools. Those Kazaks who could afford to have 
119 Aynlsaq qalganjerden os1 kiingi, (Ifwe loose the remaining land) 
Top1raqqa mald1 Qazaqjayasmg ba?(Are you, Qazaq, going to graze livestock on dirt?) 
Tatti ~op tu~91 suvdmg bari sonda(Sweet grass, tasty water are all there) 
Tabatm bugan hayla qayda erler?(Will there be a man to find a solution (to this)? 
Please see, Duvlatov, Dyan Qazaq, p. 30. 
120 Qazaqstan Tariyh1, p. 241. 
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their children receive further education used to send them to madrasas. Most of 
the mullahs on the Kazak steppe used to come from the Tatars and Ba~qurts. Due 
to the lack of educational materials in the Kazak language, children used to learn 
everything mostly from books published in Tatar. Tatar-led educational facilities 
were convenient for the Russian colonial administration for the official reasoning 
that Catherine the Great accepted that the Tatars should spread Islam among the 
Kazaks. 
After the agreement between China and Tsarist Russia 121 on the definition 
of borders in the Central Asian region, the Tsarist government began openly 
implementing its religious missionary policy that aimed to Russify the natives 
gradually. The missionary activities of the colonial administration went parallel 
with the settlement of Russian population in the area, as well as the educational 
policy of opening of mixed Russian-Kazak schools. The aim of colonial rule was 
not the genuine humanistic concern to bring civilization to the area, but to use the 
Russian-educated Kazaks as the lowest level of servants for the Russian 
administrative apparatus as interpreters or volost officials. The isolation of Kazaks 
from Tatar influence that earlier had the effect of introducing Islam to Kazaks via 
the Volga Tatars, as well as the separation of the Kazaks from the more sedentary 
Islamic influence of the Central Asian Khanates, particularly that of Bukhara, was 
121 For the delimitation of the border between the Chinese part of Turkestan (Sinkiang) and 
Russian Central Asia, two Treaties were signed. The first was The Treaty of Peking in 1860 and 
the second was the Treaty of Tarbagatay in 1864, that resulted with large losses on the Chinese 
part by the decision to follow "the line of the permanent pasture pickets." Harry Scwartz, Tsars, 
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also Tsarist policy. During the nineteenth century, a well-known Russian 
turcologist and missionary, Nikolay ilminskiy's activities related to the education 
of the people of Turkic and Muslim stock under the Tsarist administration 
deserves attention. Between 1861 and 1862, ilminskiy worked as the Professor of 
the Turcology Department at the Kazan University. His main target was to serve 
the Russian government by carrying out his missionary activities supported by his 
linguistic abilities in oriental languages. He developed his system of education by 
relying on the mother tongue of each group of people, and using it as the language 
of instruction. 122 The tool of the ilrninskiy ideas in promoting the use of the Kazak 
language as the medium of instruction was a nineteenth-century Kazak 
intellectual, Ibiray Altmsann. He wrote the first Kazak grammar book and a 
Kazak-Russian dictionary. A contemporary Uzbek historian, Dr. Baymirza Hayit 
(who would like to be called rather a 'Turkistanian'), claimed that ilminskiy and 
his follower N. P. Ostroumov 123 worked together to create a Sart124 language, 
Mandarins and Commissars: A History of Chinese-Russian Relations, Garden City, N. Y. 
Anchor Books, 1973, p. 58. 
122 The best work about Nikolay Ilminski, in the West, was written by Isabelle Kreindler, 
"Educational Policies Toward the Eastern Nationalities in Tsarist Russia: A Study of Ilminskii's 
System," Unpublished Ph.D. Dissertation, Columbia University, 1969. 
123 N. P. Ostroumov was the editor of Turkestanskiye Vedomosti and the Chief Editor of Turkzstan 
Vilayetining Gazetesi between 1887 and 1917. See, Baymirza Hayit, Turkzstan: Rusya ile <;in 
Arasmda, istanbul: Otag Yaymevi, 1975, p.168-170. 
124 The word 'sart' is commonly used among the peoples of Central Asia as referring to the settled 
people of the Oasis or for those who were traders (tiiccar). There were many attempt to explain the 
meaning of this word by well-known orientalists and scholars, such as Barthold, Radloff and 
Togan in the past. Zeki Velidi Togan, used the word and explained its historic and etimologic 
meaning in his Turk1stan , 28 times. However, the Kazaks have a saying as "Ozbek oz agam, sart 
sadagam," meaning Uzbek is my own brother, sart can be spent to save my life, as "sadaqa"(alms 
or charity money). 
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aiming to separate the people of the Oasis from Turkic influence by introducing 
non-Turkic Persian words heavily into the language of the Oasis people of Central 
Asia. 125 
The consequence of all the above educational policies and practices was 
the alienation of the nomadic Kazaks from their native tongue by using either 
Tatar, when they wrote in Arabic script, or Russian. An article published in Qazaq 
in one of the 1913 issues, reveals that most of the educated Kazaks were ashamed 
of writing in their mother tongue. Their reasoning comes from the perception that 
Kazak language was not the language of belles-letres. The article argues against 
this idea by stating that all of those who receive education either in Tatar 
madrasas or at Russian language schools actually were not able to improve the 
level of their mother tongue, but were restricted themselves to the language they 
received their education from. 126 This tendency prevented Kazaks from writing in 
their mother tongue and was the beginning of the dilemma of the major part of the 
Kazak educated class in present-day Kazakstan, as well. 
The first decade of this century brought some hopes for Kazaks in 
education. The Russian tsar allowed non-Russian subjects to educate their 
children in their mother tongue during the two years of their primary education by 
an imperial decree issued on the 14 January 1906. After this decree, it became 
evident that those who did not have their own unique alphabet were required to 
125Baymirza Hayit, Turlastan: Rusya ile <;in Arasznda, istanbul: Otag Yaymevi, 1975, p.168-170. 
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use cyrillic in preparing their class material. An article in the Qazaq interpreted 
the decree as pointing to the possibility of an official demand that peoples like the 
Noghay, the Ba~qurt and the Kazak use cyrillic alphabet in preparing the class 
material for their "national schools."127 Although usage of the cyrillic alphabet by 
non-Russian people was not put into practice in Tsarist times, it became a reality 
during the Soviet rule. 128 Ahmet Baytursun, a leading Ala~ activist and educator 
created a unique Kazak alphabet in Arabic script, named as "Baytursun Ulgisi, 
Baytursm Alippesi," (the method of Baytursun or the Baytursun Alphabet). He 
was also the author of Ti! Qural (The Tool of Language). Ala~ intellectuals wrote 
other books such as Esep Qural, Alippe, Q1raat Kitab1, etc., at the beginning of 
this century. 129 
126 "Orenburg, 10 Fevral'," "Qazaq" Gazeti, Chief editor A. N1sanbayev, AlmatJ: Qazaq 
Entsiklopediyas1 Bas Redaktsiyas1, 1998, p. 14-15. 
127 "$koldarda Ana Tilimen Oquv," "Qazaq" Gazeti, Chief editor A. N1sanbayev, Almati: Qazaq 
Entsiklopediyas1 Bas Redaktsiyas1, 1998., p. 165. 
128 Preparation of the ground for using the cyrillic alphabet in Kazak was made earlier in the 
second half of the nineteenth century, when ilminskiy was working with lblfay Altmsann. 
129 Please see the list of books, announced for sale in "Qazaq" Gazeti, Chief editor A. 
N1sanbayev, AlmatJ: Qazaq Entsiklopediyas1 Bas Redaktsiyas1, 1998., p. 191 
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THE NATIONALIST INTELLECTUALS OF THE TWENTIETH CENTURY 
Kazak intellectuals at the beginning of the twentieth century were not 
many in number. The reason for this was the Tsarist educational policy of opening 
only secondary educational facilities for the Kazak people, rather than opening 
higher educational institutions to prepare Kazak professionals on the steppe. As 
one native intellectual put it; "the Russian Tsarist educational target was not the 
genuine cultural elevation of Kazak society to higher levels, but to keep Kazak 
society in a backward state."130 Mirjaq1p Duvlatov reported the following about 
this subject: "The Tsarist government have exiled those natives who attempted to 
open schools on the Kazak land. (Qos9ugulov131 and Navan Hazret132 were exiled 
in Yakutia for attempting to open schools.) The administration has prevented the 
natives themselves from building schools, let alone opening educational facilities 
for its native subjects."133 
However, a decision to open a number of secondary level Russian-Kazak 
schools was necessary for the need of the imperial administration itself. It had two 
reasons; the first to "protect" the Kazaks from the Islamic preaching of mullahs 
and, second, to increase "Russian influence on the steppe." Thus the colonial 
130 Mekemtas Mirzahmetov, Qazaq Qa/ay Onstand1r1/d1, Almati: Atamura-Kazakstan, 1993. 
131 According to Togan, Qos9ugulov is the deputy $aymardan Qos9ugulov of the State Duma 
after 1905, and he was also a supporter of Navan Hazret. Togan, Turkzstan, p. 348. 
132 According to Zeki Velidi Togan, Navan Hazret was Molla Palas oglu Navnzbay, the famous 
and influential intellectual from Kok~etav, who also had studied in Bukhara. Togan, Turkzstan, p. 
346. 
133Mirjaq1p Duvlatov's interrogation material in 1929, cited by Qoygeldiyev, p. 92-93. 
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administration was obliged to give a few scholarships to native Kazak students. 
Therefore a few Kazaks found the opportunity to study in the cities of Moscow, 
Petersburg, Kazan, Orenburg, Omsk and Warsaw. Kazak students who were lucky 
enough to receive higher education during the last decade of the nineteenth 
century later became the participants in political and intellectual activities in the 
Kazak steppe, especially after 1905. Moreover, all of those in the last list were 
members, or at least supporters of, the Ala~ Movement in Kazakstan. 134 
During the first decade of the twentieth century, socio-political events and 
intellectual activities in the central cities of the empire helped Kazak student 
youth to improve their socio-intellectual development and to promote their 
political activities. The participation of Kazak youth in political activities in the 
Empire was not limited to Kazak students studying in the major cities of Russia. 
Young Kazaks studying at the regional seminaries, institutes and high schools, in 
cities like Omsk, Semey and Ural, also followed the political events of the Empire 
closely, and took part in the activities of various societies in their cities. 135 As a 
result of these kinds of activities, a number of Kazaks in Semey(Semipalatinsk) 
province were either imprisoned or exiled or entered into the ranks of those who 
are labeled as "untrusworthy" citizens of imperial Russia. 136 
134 Qoygeldiyev, p. 87-88., and Kenges Nurpeyisov, Ala~ hem Ala~ Orda, AlmatI: Atatek, 1995, 
pp. 216-219. 
135 Qoygeldiyev, p. 92. 
136 Mirjaq1p Duvlatov, Qazaq, 1913, No. 28. cited by Qoygeldiyev, p. 92. 
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POLITICAL FREEDOMS AND POLITICAL PARTICIPATION 
At the beginning of this century, Russian colonial officials observed 
closely the reactions of the native population to political and military events in the 
Russian Empire. Investigation by Tsarist officials of the political activities of the 
natives increased particularly after the Japanese defeat of the Russians during the 
Russo-Japanese war, in 1905. A certain ~inovnik, local Russian official, 
representing the head of the Verniy district, wrote the following to the Military 
Governor of the area: "During my nineteen years of service to the Tsarist 
administration on the steppe, I observed a decrease in the colonial influence of the 
Russian empire particularly after the Russo-Japanese war. The Kirgiz (meaning 
the Kazaks) came to the conclusion that they had overestimated the might of the 
Russians before." 137 
Clearly, decades long, hidden opposition of the Kazaks to the colonial 
policy burst out after the major political events that followed the 1905 war. Alihan 
Bokeyhanov, the most famous and influential, active Kazak intellectual, wrote 
that the steppe region was galvanized when the Russian Tsarist declaration, on 
February 18, 1905, was made, permitting the petitioning of the Tsarist authorities 
concerning the needs of the people, and when freedom of assembly was 
announced. According to Alihan Bokeyhanov, "During the 1905 revolution, the 
137 Qoygeldiyev, p. 94 . 
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whole steppe region was drawn towards the political arena and the whole steppe 
entered into the arena of the movement for independence." 138 
Native correspondence started on a massive scale to communicate the 
needs of the Kazak people. The Tsarist decree of April 17, granting religious 
freedom to minorities, further accelerated Kazak activities. Kazaks began to 
organize meetings to discuss the needs of their society during the summer of 
1905, one after another. All the biggest Steppe fairs were turned into political 
arenas. During those meetings, the Kazaks discussed the matters to be included in 
the petitions that would be sent to "his royal highness." 139 
Thus, in the year 1905, a new phase in the development of the Kazak 
freedom movement started and it was elevated to a new stage. The political 
activities of Kazaks were limited to writing petitions to the Tsar and to the central 
authorities. Petitions were organized in almost every region of the Kazak steppe, 
Ural, Qarqarah, and Jetisuv. A petition written by the Kazaks of the Lepsi district 
of Jetisuv Oblast (province) included the signature of 1,000 Kazaks. Another 
petition sent from Ural and Torgay provinces was signed by 44 Kazaks. The most 
famous of all was the one written in the Qoyand1 fair of the Qarqarah region that 
obtained the signatures of 14,500 Kazaks. It included eleven articles that covered 
the most pressing problems of Kazak society. The petition asked the authorities to 
13s Qoygeldiyev, p. 81 cited Alihan Bokeyhanov's famous work Kirgizz- Formz Natsiyonalnovo 
Dvijeniya v sovremennzh Gosudarstvah, 1910. 
139 Alihan Bokeyhanov, Kirgizz- Formz Natsiyonalnogo Dvijeniya v Sovremennzh Gosudarstvah. 
Pod Redaksii, A. 1. Kostelyanskogo. SP6, 1910 ... , p. 596-597. cited by Qoygeldiyev, p. 95. 
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introduce new amendments, according to the particular needs of the Kazaks, into 
the regional administrative apparatus, judiciary system, and education. It also 
asked the Tsarist administration to grant Kazaks freedom of conscience, freedom 
of religion, freedom of the press and freedom to open printing houses, together 
with the replacement of the obsolescent Steppe Statue and the election of native 
officials to high executive organs. The most crucial matter for the Kazaks, the 
land problem, was not omitted in this famous Kazak petition to the tsar. The 
petition writers reminded the authorities that Kazak land, on which the blood of 
Kazak ancestors had been spilt in its defense, had been forcefully seized from the 
natives. Article 4 of the Kazak petition stated as follows: 
"Article 4. Colonization of the Steppe carried out during the last fifteen 
years. The land owned by the Kazaks is shrinking as time goes on. Animal 
husbandry requires the extensive usage of land and thus it requires vast 
pastureland. However, the most fertile soil and the lands with rich water 
resources were seized by the authorities for the new uchastkas of the newcomers. 
Thus it is necessary to declare the land inhabited by the Kazaks as belonging to 
the natives." 
Alihan Bokeyhanov, Ahmet Baytursun and Jak1p Aqbayev were among 
the writers of the Qarqarah petition. The Tsarist colonial administration was 
aware of the activities of Kazak intellectuals. Thus they began their retaliation 
with Alihan Bokeyhanov, on January 8, 1906. On his way to a meeting in Semey, 
he was imprisoned by the authorities. Bokeyhanov was going to Semey in 
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preparation for being elected as the Semey Representative to the First Russian 
State Duma, the parliament. Detailed discussion of this will follow. 
GROWING KAZAK POLITICAL CONSCIOUSNESS AND PRESS FREEDOM 
The October Manifesto of 1905 granted Kazaks the right to send their 
deputies to the Russian State Duma. Kazak intellectuals actively participated in 
the election of deputies to the State Duma and considered the Duma as the sole 
agency for affecting the colonial policy towards Kazak lands, and as the vital 
organ through which one could raise the problem of Kazak land. However, the 
Kazaks at this time suffered from Russian administrative practices and were given 
the right to elect only one Kazak deputy for each province. A petition to high 
Russian officials such as Graf Witte on this subject was ignored. 
Kazak intellectuals participated in the heated debates of the election 
campaigns without any prior preparation of a political organization. Realization of 
this shortcoming compelled the Kazaks to organize meetings of candidate 
deputies of the Kazaks from five provinces before the end of 1905 in the city of 
Ural. Kazak delegations from Aqmola, Semey, Torgay, Ural and Jetisuv provinces 
gathered and announced their decision to establish the Kazak version of the 
"Constitutional Democratic Party." 14° Kazaks introduced a number of particular 
targets for the party: 
140 Qoygeldiyev, p. l 05. It seems an inaccurate conclusion of Prof. Martha Brill Olcott in assessing 
that "Creation of the State Duma gave Kazaks additional occasions to voice their indignation, both 
in election meetings and when they petitioned the new representatives ... Two of these meetings 
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1. The necessity to adopt a law declaring that the land of Kazaks was solely their 
property; 
2. The discontinuation of new Russian settlement on Kazak land; 
3. Making laws which would provide Kazak workers with freedom, equal 
payment and rights, as well as protection of their rights, 
4. Opening educational institutions for Kazak children. 
However, Kazak attempts to form a political party were unsuccessful. It 
was partly due to the lack of preparation of Kazak society for entering suddenly 
into a politically active life. Second, it was not a priority for the central Kadet 
Party, to help to create a political organization that aimed at the freedom and 
equality of the Kazaks. However, the reason Kazaks supported the Kadet Party of 
imperial Russia was due to the decision of the All-Russian Muslim Congresses in 
1905-1906. 
For the First Russian Imperial Parliament, the Kazaks were required to 
elect altogether six deputies from Ural, Torgay, Semey, Aqmola, Jetisuv and 
Sirdarya Provinces. Alp1sbay Qalmenov from Ural Oblast and Ahmet Birimjanov 
from Torgay Oblast were elected and went to participate in the First Russian 
Imperial Duma only one-and a-half months after the sessions had started. Due to 
his imprisonment during his candidacy for the elections for deputy in the Semey 
Ob last and due to the delay of the elections in that province, Alihan Bokeyhanov 
were particularly noteworthy. The first, held in Uralsk in December 1905, drew representatives 
from five oblasts of Kazakstan; it was at this meeting that the Alash Orda party was 
formed ..... " Olcott, p.112. 
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arrived in Petersburg only a couple of days before the dissolution of the Duma. He 
had signed the Viborg Manifesto, a document protesting the dissolution of the 
First Imperial Duma, and thus was later prohibited from participating in the next 
Duma elections. Later he was imprisoned as well. One other Kazak deputy, 
$aymardan Qos9ugulov, the elected deputy to the First Duma from the Aqmola 
province, was rejected because of his inability to speak Russian. Deputy elections 
in the Jetisuv and Sirdarya Provinces were not complete when the First Duma was 
suddenly dissolved by the decision of the government after only 72 days of work. 
Thus only two Kazak deputies, Qalmenov and Birimjanov, attempted to voice the 
problems of about four million Kazaks and particularly their grievances about 
land, in cooperation with the Muslim faction. 
The Second Russian Imperial Duma began its sessions on February 20, 
1907, and Kazaks were represented by five deputies, all of them supporting and 
cooperating with the Muslim Faction in the Duma. Baq1tjan Qaratayev from Ural, 
Muhammetjan Tm1~bayev from Jetisuv, Baq1tkerey Qulmanov from Astrakhan, T. 
Aldabergenov from Sirdarya and T. Nurekenov from Semey Provinces went to the 
Second Duma representing the Kazak nation. 
The Second Duma became an arena for voicing criticism against the 
Tsarist government policies and thus was not able to win the favor of the Tsar and 
his government. It was dissolved by Imperial decree on June 3, 1907. The decree 
introduced substantial changes into the election system in the Empire. Most 
important of all was the decision to deprive the colonized people of the Steppe 
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and Central Asia of their universal manhood suffrage rights. The Tsarist 
government preferred not to have native deputies elected from the Kazaks, Kirg1z 
and Uzbeks. 
During the short working opportunities of the first two Dumas, the 
introduction of any law that would inflict change on the colonized life of the 
Kazaks was possible. Kazak intellectuals, who were prevented from taking part in 
the Imperial Duma, began to concentrate their socio-political activities outside the 
Duma, by cooperating with the Muslim Faction, through Siberian Deputies and 
through leftist Kadet members in the Imperial parliament. Kazak intellectuals 
attempted to petition the major parties in the Third Duma and at the same time 
tried to persuade deputies in the Duma to pass a bill restoring the violated political 
rights of the Kazaks. During December 1912, deputies of the Kadet party 
proposed to introduce amendments to the then current election law, but 
unsuccessfully. 
This was the end of the Kazak political activists' opportunity to participate 
in official Russian political institutions through their rightfully elected deputies. 
From this time onwards until the Bolshevik revolution, Kazak political activists 
used another method to bring Kazak problems forth to the attention of policy-
makers by increasing the political and social awareness of the Kazak masses. 
The first publication on the Kazak Steppe was Turkzstan Valayatmmg 
Gazeti that appeared in 1870 as a supplement to the Russian language newspaper 
Turkestanskiye Vedomosti. In the beginning, it was published four times a month 
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and two issues were published in Kazak. Dala Valayatz, a Kazak literary journal 
edited by B. Abulhay1rov, began to appear in Omsk, as a supplement of 
Akmolinskiye Oblastniye Vedomosti, which was the official news organ of the 
regional administration. Contemporary Kazak scholars evaluate the work of the 
official Russian press organs, such as the Turkestanskiye Vedomosti, or the 
Akmolinskiye Oblastniye Vedomosti as the tool of the colonial rulers, rather than 
being the voice of the indigenous people. 141 After the 1905 Revolution a second 
group of newspapers began to appear on the Kazak land. They were Serke ( 1907), 
Qazaq Gazeti (1907), Dala and Qazaqstan (1911-1913), as well as E$im Dalasz 
(1913). The first periodical in the Kazak language was Ayqap that began to be 
published in Troytsk in 1911 and ceased in 1915. The newspaper Qazaq142 was the 
most important organ on the Kazak steppe during the period between 1913 and 
1918, and began to appear in Orenburg. It soon became the leading organ of the 
Kazak intelligentsia and nationalist movement. Within one year the number of 
subscribers to Qazaq reached three thousand, then eight thousand. There were 
subscribers to the newspaper from all the then Kazak territory, and from Fergana, 
Samarkand, Zakaspiy, Ufa, Kazan, Petersburg, Moscow, Tomsk, Chinese-
Sinkiang (Eastern Turkestan), and even Ottoman Turkey. 143 It was edited by 
141 Mirzantay Jaq1p, "Turkistan Valayatmmg Gazeti Jane Ons Baspasozi," Juld1z, 12 Jeltoqsan 
(December) 1996, pp. 184-192., in p. 184. 
142 Please see, "Qazaq" Gazeti, Chief editor A. N1sanbayev, Almah: Qazaq Entsiklopediyas1 Bas 
Redaktsiyas1, 1998. 560 pages. It also includes a biographic appendix for the editors, writers, and 
coJTespondents of the newspaper. 
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Ahmet Baytursun and its major writer was Mirjaq1p Duvlat. Alihan Bokeyhanov 
wrote very often in this newspaper. The newspaper received financial support 
from Kazaks belonging to different levels of income. The reason the Tsarist 
authorities permitted the publication of Qazaq was their demand from the editorial 
board that they publicize the internal and external policies of imperial rule, 
informing the Kazaks of decrees and decisions by the Steppe authorities and 
explaining administrative innovations. According to the Qazaq editorial board, the 
newspaper was to fulfill the following duties: 1. Publication of state decrees and 
laws regarding the Kazaks, 2. Publication of the activities of the State Duma and 
the Government, 3. Internal and foreign news items. 
In the first issue of Qazaq, Baytursunov declared that "for the preservation 
of our national identity we must proceed toward enlightenment and develop our 
own literary language. It should never be forgotten that only that people who 
create a literature in their own native language have a right to independent 
existence." Furthermore, Baytursmov explained the aims, of having an organ for 
the Kazaks as follows: 144 
First, the newspaper is the eyes, ears and the language of the people ... Those people who 
do not own a newspaper are deaf-and-dumb and blind comparing to those who own a 
newspaper. 
Second, the newspaper will support the public sense. The reason for this is that the 
educated, enlightened, experienced intellectuals will appear before the people (by writing 
in the newspaper) and lead them (to a better life). 
143 Information about the subscribers to the newspaper was published in the first issue of the year 
1914. The subscription reached 3000 at that time. The news about subscribers to the newspaper 
even from the Ottoman Turkey is correct, based on the fact that copies of Qazaq were actually 
found by this author in the Hakk1 Tank Us Library in istanbul not more than a decade ago. There 
were five subscribers to the newspaper from Ottoman Turkey already by 1913. 
144 Qazaq, 1913., No. I. 
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Third, the newspaper serves as an organ to spread knowledge among the people. 
Fourth reason, the newspaper is the voice of the people. Those citizens (intellectuals-
azamat) advocating the rights of their people, will speak up in the pages of the newspaper 
to defend their nation. 
This newspaper emerged as the new tool by which Kazak intellectuals 
could elevate the political, social, and educational level of their society. It also 
served as the tool for organizing concerted action among the peoples of the Steppe 
as well as to strengthen Kazak unity and political awareness. The newspaper has 
provided researchers with valuable materials related to the life of Kazak society 
during the first two decades of the twentieth century. This publication that 
appeared during the developmental stage of the Kazak nationalist movement 
served to refine the ideology of the struggle for liberation. Thus, it is impossible 
to understand the principal aims and developing stages of the struggle carried out 
by nationalist Kazak intellectuals without the materials published in Qazaq. 
The major subject of discussion of the few Kazak organs was concentrated 
on the most pressing issue, land, the so-called excess land, as well as the 
settlement of the native nomadic population alongside the Russian peasantry. The 
editorial board of Qazaq wrote that the land question 145 was the question of the 
very survival of the Kazaks. They also opposed the administrative measures 
145 There were 30 articles and news related to the Qazaq land question in the issues of the 
newspaper Qazaq published in the year 1913 only. For this, please see the index of the , "Qazaq" 
Gazeti, p. 461-465. Press material in the pages of the native Kazak media covered issues of 
international state interactions, international political matters; internal political, economic, 
cultural, and religious issues in the Russian Empire; matters related to Kazak history, literature, 
and ethnography. At the same time an extended detail of the Kazak press material would surpass 
the limit of this study. Even the analysis of the material published in Qazaq itself can be the 
subject of another doctoral or a major academic study. 
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concemmg the settlement of the Kazaks alongside the Russian peasantry by 
arguing that this kind of policy would lead the Kazaks' being deprived of their 
land forever. In other words, this group did not oppose the settlement of nomadic 
Kazaks, but disagreed with the colonialist manipulation of naive nomadic 
Kazaks. 146 Alihan Bokeyhanov, Ahmet Baytursm and Mirjaq1p Duvlat did not 
agree with the Tsarist Russian policy of providing the Kazaks with only 15 
desyatina of land. They demanded from the authorities to give Kazaks more than 
the above measure according to the need of each Kazak family to meet the 
essential amount of pastureland for their livestock. Baq1tjan Qaratayev and 
Muhametjan Seralin, on the other hand, agreed with the Tsarist decision to give 
Kazaks and those Russian peasants the above amount of land. Their reason for 
supporting this decision stemmed from their agreement to blame nomadism as the 
sole cause of the backwardness of the Kazak society. 147 At the beginning of this 
century, a Russian scholar P. Migulin wrote that the "historic duty of Russia is not 
expropriate the areas heavily inhabited, but to arrange for the habitation of the no-
man' s land in the East." 148 This statement clearly demonstrates the Russian aims 
behind occupying the nomadic Kazak land, that later would be exacerbated as a 
result of Soviet policies. This policy, by the last decade of the twentieth century, 
146 Quvatov, ibid, p.111. 
147 Abdijappar Abdakim, Qazaqstan Tariyh1, p. 185. 
14 ~ ibid. 
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would make Kazakstan partly belong to the Russian world because of its 
numerous Slavic inhabitants. 
KAZAK INTELLECTUALS DURING THE FIRST WORLD WAR 
During the establishment of colonial rule in the Caucasus and Central 
Asia, the Tsarist administration agreed not to call up Muslims for military duty. 
This was confirmed by a law passed in 1886 by the Tsarist government. Thus 
when the First World War started, the Muslim subjects of Tsarist Russia were 
exempt from the duty of military service. 
Nevertheless, Kazak intellectuals and the Kazak society obeyed their 
overlords in fulfilling their duties both as individuals and as a society when the 
World War started in 1914. They made contributions to the then newly 
established Temporary Muslim Central Committee, to help soldiers and their 
families at home, and in Petrograd (Petersburg). The committee organized various 
activities such as concerts or literature festivals to raise funds to carry out its 
charitable work. Kazak intellectuals collected money from the Kazaks, 
particularly during the fairs organized on the Steppe in the summer of 1915. 
Money collected from the Kazaks was also handed over to the Committee by the 
famous Qazaq newspaper as well. 149 A clinic to take care of the wounded soldiers 
was opened near the city of Ural sponsored by Kazaks who gave twenty-five 
149 18,874 roubles and 98 Kopecks were collected among the Kazaks in Lbi~in, Temir and Guryev 
area between May 9 to July 23 of 1915. By the end of August, money collected by the Kazak 
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horses and four camels. Kazaks from the Jubam~kol area agreed to sponsor the 
salaries of medical staff of the clinic. 15° Kazaks from Torgay province collected 
226,999 roubles and 74 kopecks between 1914 and 1917. During the first three-
years of war, only from the Turkestan province, including today's Q1zilorda, 
S1mkent, Jambul, Almatl and Tald1korgan, 20,899 thousand pood151 of cotton, 
300,000 pood of meat, 109,000 pood of cotton seed oil, 474,000 pood of fish, 
229,000 pood of soap, 70,000 horses, 12, 700 camels, 38,000 square meters of felt 
and 13,441 traditional Kazak felt-houses were collected. During 1914, only from 
Jetisuv province, agricultural products and other materials costing 34,000,000 
roubles were taken for the war. 152 A call in the pages of the Qazaq to help the 
Muslims of Kars and the money collected from the Kazaks became customary 
news items of this newspaper. 153 
During the second stage of the First World War, when the Russian army 
was suffering from a manpower-shortage and was being defeated, the Tsarist 
"government decided to mobilize Muslims in labor battalions behind the lines, 
newspaper was 22,615 roubles and 37 kopecks. Qazaq, 1915, No. 144 and 147, cited by 
Qoygeldiyev p. 170. 
tso Qoygeldiyev, p.170. 
isi A traditional Russian weight of almost 20 kilograms. 
isi Qoygeldiyev, p. 171. 
153 Qazaq, 1915, No. 107, No. 140. For more articles about this subject, please see the newly 
reprinted and transliterated copy of the "Qazaq" Gazeti, 
-"Qazaqtan Soldat Aluv," 1916, p. 261-262. 
-M. D. (Mirjaq1p Duvlat), "G. Duma ham Soldatt1q Maselesi," pp. 269-270. 
-A. B. (Ahmet Baytursun), "Petrograd Hati," pp. 272-273; 274-275; 276-277; and 279-
281. 
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for the construction of trenches, barracks, and infirmaries." 154 Uprisings started in 
areas suffering from economic hardship as a result of the continuing land seizure, 
endless demands for material contributions to the war, as well as the unfair 
organization of the list of draftees. Reaction to the mobilization of labor battalions 
was not limited to the Steppe region, but quickly spread to the Oases area as well. 
Asking Kazaks to serve a government who did not even provide the people of the 
Turkestan Khanates and of the Steppe with the basic right of representation in the 
Parliament was considered as unfair. Besides, asking them to serve behind the 
lines (as if they were all too untrustworthy to bear arms in defense of the state) 
seemed a humiliating action. 155 Thus started the most violent reaction to Tsarist 
rule in the twentieth century. The peoples of Central Asia, the Uzbeks, Kazaks, 
Kirg1z, and Turkmens all participated in the uprising although to different 
degrees. Kazaks attacked Russian and Cossack settlements, military officials, as 
well as the natives who had collaborated with the Tsarist authorities in listing the 
natives as draftees. The colonial administration spent considerable effort in 
suppressing the uprising by using the local garrisons and other Tsarist military 
forces. 
The role of Kazak nationalist intellectuals during the uprising is worth 
attention. The activities of intellectuals on the editorial board of the newspaper 
Qazaq during 1916 reveal their growing positive influence among the Kazaks. 
154 Serge Zenkovsky, Pan-Turkism and Islam in Russia, Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 
1967 ., p. 130. 
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Calls in the editorial articles of the newspaper for Kazaks to remain calm and to 
refrain from opposing the government forces, and their consequent organization 
of visits to the capital, as well as to the front, easing the hardship of draftees on 
the front, bore fruit later in the form of support from the ordinary people when the 
leading editors of Qazaq attempted to form the Ala~ Orda government in 1917. 156 
Kazak intellectuals dealt with the misery of their people resulting from the 
colonial policy of the Petersburg administration, particularly about the land 
problem. During the 1916 revolt, they voiced their open criticism of these rather 
unfair policies in the pages of Kazak language materials. Nevertheless, they 
cautioned the natives and tried to prevent them from opposing the Tsarist army. 
Specifically, the editors of the Qazaq newspaper proved their devotion to their 
people in trying to save them from the armed punishment of the colonial 
administration. Thus it is not possible to agree with the conclusion that the 
editorial staff of the Qazaq newspaper were "standing helplessly aside during the 
popular unrest in the summer and fall of 1916."157 The Kazak language materials 
of the Ala~ intellectuals are of the utmost importance in understanding and 
analyzing the Kazak attempt to reach independence, although it was unsuccessful. 
155 Baymirza Hay1t, Turkzstan Rusya ile <;in Arasznda, istanbul: Otag, 1975, p. 207. 
156 Qoygeldiyev, "Kazak Demokratiyahk intelligentsiyas1 Birin~i Diiniyejiizilik Sog1s jane 1916 
J1lg1 Ult-Azatt1k Koterilis Tusmda," ibid, pp. 166-214. Please also see, "Onnbor 8 iyul," "Qazaq" 
Gazeti, 1916, pp. 310-311. 
157 "The gazettes and their editorial staffs remained a lobbying group in the steppe until the 
Russian Revolution, when they established and staffed a short-lived Kazak autonomous 
government.... These writers may have helped frame public opinion, but they were only one force 
and were more successful in harnessing popular fury than in preventing it. They were forced to 
stand helplessly aside during the popular unrest in the summer and fall of 1916." Olcott, p.118. 
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It is also vital to realize the influence of Kazak intellectuals on the minds of native 
people, not only in the early decades, but also the later decades of this century. 
The Soviet period introduced a seventy-year long pause even in the discussion of 
most pressing problems of Kazak survival. Besides, the Soviet period made the 
situation worse with the Russification of the natives as well as turning Kazakstan 
into a Russian province. Open discussion of the subjects written by the Ala$ 
intellectuals was prohibited during the Soviet period. The forceful confiscation of 
Kazak land, the settlement of Russian peasants on Kazak territory and the 
deteriorating state of the Kazak language were important threats from Soviet rule, 
taking deep root on the Kazak lands. If those discussions had been continued, and 
if the Ala$ intellectuals had not been wiped out, the maintenance of free Kazak 
survival would not be so difficult in the present day. 
THE NATIVE ATTEMPT TO FORM A NATIONAL STATE 
A whole new phase started for the Kazak intellectuals after the February 
Revolution of 1917 in Russia. In other words, a new responsibility for struggle 
towards Kazak independence was placed on the shoulders of the native 
intellectuals. It was a major event for the Kazaks, first to free themselves from 
colonialist expropriation and humiliation. Second it brightened their hopes of 
finding an opportunity of administering themselves. 
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Alihan Bokeyhanov, Mirjaq1p Duvlatov, M1rzagaz1 Esbolov and Tel 
Jamanmunnov were in Minsk, helping Kazak draftees for the Tsarist army in 
labor battalions. In their telegram to the leading figures on the Kazak Steppe, 
which was published in the pages of Qazaq, they wrote the following: 
"The day of liberty, equality and fraternity for all the nationalities of Russia has 
come. It is necessary for the Kazaks to organize support for the newly established 
government.... It is necessary to prepare for the elections to the all-Russian Congress .... 
You should also be prepared to raise the land issue. The form of government that we 
support should be "demokrati9eskaya respublika."158 
As a result of their close association with the Kadet Party of Russia, the 
Provisional Government appointed Alihan Bokeyhanov as the Commissar of 
Torgay Oblast, Muhametjan Tm1~bayev as the Commissar of Jetisuv and 
Mustafa <;:oqay as the Commissar of Turkistan Ob last. 159 On March 20, 1917, 
Alihan Bokeyhanov, together with Mirjaq1p Duvlatov and Mustafa <;:oqay, wrote 
their famous letter to the "Sons of Ala~," which was published in Qazaq and read 
as follows: 160 
The day of liberty has arisen. God has let us to reach our aim. We were slaves 
yesterday, we are equal today ... We are in the same ship with the just government of free 
Russia ... We did not have any sympathy for Russia before. Now since we became equal 
to the Russian people, we should share their happiness and sorrow ... Thus we should do 
our best to help the new government. 
Starting from the first fortnight of March 1917, the old administrative 
organs and their officials began to be replaced with the new. The initiative for this 
158 Qazaq, 1917, No. 223 cited by Qoygeldiyev, p.216., also see, Alihan, Mustafa, Mirjaq1p, "Ala~ 
Ulma," Reprint "Qazaq" Gazeti, pp. 372-373; "Zor Ozgeris," ibid., pp. 366-367. 
159 Qazaqstan Tariyh1, p. 302-303. 
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attempt was in the hands of the Russians in Kazakstan, as in all the provinces of 
Russia. The natives this time tried to seize the opportunity for self-administration 
and began to organize Kazak Committees of Liberty. Starting from April 1 to 
May 7, a number of Kazak congresses were held. In Orenburg, there was the 
Congress of Torgay Kazaks; in Almatl, the Congress of Jetisuv Kazaks; in Ural, 
the Congress of Ural Kazaks; in Semey, the Congress of Semey Kazaks and in 
Omsk, the Congress of Aqmola Kazaks. The first of these congresses was held in 
Orenburg by the Torgay Kazaks on April 1, with the participation of 300 
delegates and the Ural Congress was held from April 19 to April 22 and was the 
biggest with 800 delegates. During the Orenburg Congress of the Torgay Kazaks 
delegates from the B6key Horde, Orenburg Province, Kazan, Ufa, and Ta~kent, as 
well as the former deputies of the First Russian Duma, Alp1sbay Qalmenov and 
Ahmet Birimjanov, participated. They discussed altogether thirteen matters, 
including the new form of administration, the land problem, and the 
maladministration of the colonial regime. They declared their preference for the 
form of government of the Russian state to be a "democratic parliamentarian and 
decentralized republic." 161 The meaning of this was the aim of those native 
intellectuals to keep the decisive role in administering their land and the people in 
their own hands. Those provisional Kazak Congresses represented the Kazaks 
desire for self-rule and to have their own educational, judicial and military 
160 Qazaq, 1917., No. 225, cited by Qoygeldiyev, p. 217. 
161 Qazaq, 1917, No. 226, cited by Qoygeldiyev, p. 222-224. 
103 
administration, after decades of hidden anger against the former Tsarist colonialist 
practices. 162 
The decision to organize the First All-Kazak Congress was also made 
during the Torgay Kazak Provisional Congress held in Orenburg. 163 The First All-
Kazak Congress was held in Orenburg, July 21-26 1917. As a result of the 
announcement made in the native press and through unofficial calls, twenty 
representatives from Aqmola, Semey, Torgay, Ural, Jetisuv, Sirdarya, Fergana, 
Orenburg and the Bokey Horde participated. Among the matters discussed, two 
were the most decisive: one concerned the political status of Kazakstan, whether it 
should be an independent autonomous republic a view supported by Ahmet 
Baytursmov and Mirjaq1p Duvlatov or a national-territorial autonomous region in 
the Democratic Federative and Parliamentarian Russian Republic, an idea 
supported by Alihan Bokeyhanov. Representatives accepted Bokeyhanov's 
102 A. K. Boc;:agov, Ala~ Orda. Kratkiy istorit;eskiy Ot;erk o natsiyonal 'no-burjuvaznom dvijeniye v 
Kazakscane periyoda 1917-1918., Q1z1l Orda, 1927, p. 8, cited by Qoygeldiyev, p. 231. 
1 ~3 It is noteworthy to mention one point about the date of the First All-Kazak Congress. In some 
western sources, there seems to be a confusion on the date of this congress which was held for the 
first time in the summer of 1917, instead of spring time of the year. This is important due to the 
necessity of correctly placing the formation of the Ala~ Party. The decision to form a Kazak 
political party was taken during the All-Kazak Congress held in Orenburg in the summer of 1917. 
Although it was realized mostly because of the influence of the Ala~ intellectuals like 
Bokeyhanov, Duvlatov and Baytursunov, they were cautious enough in taking this kind of 
decision to seek the approval of the representatives of all the Kazaks. Thus it is difficult to number 
the Orenburg meeting of the Torgay Kazaks on April 8, 1917 as the First Congress of the Kazak 
National Party, Ala~ Orda. However, although discussion about forming a Kazak political party 
was in the minds of the Ala~ intellectuals, realization of this plan was not possible due to the 
membership of the leading Ala~ activists, such as Bokeyhanov, of the Russian Kadet party. 
Bokeyhanov, during the spring and summer of 1917, was still a member of the above-mentioned 
Russian political organization. Therefore, it seems proper to label the First All-Kazak Congress as 
the one that took place in the Summer of 1917 and the second All-Ktrg1z(Kazak) Congress as the 
one that occurred in December of 1917. (Please see, Society for Central Asian Studies, Reprint 
Series, No.; The Revolution in Central Asia as seen by Muslim Bolsheviks, Oxford, 1985, p. 12.) 
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proposal and declared that the Kazak provinces should be in the form of a 
territorial-national autonomy. 164 In reality, the First All-Kazak Congress was 
turned into the Congress of the Ala~ movement. Thus the second important 
decision, to form the Ala~ Party, was made during this Congress. 165 
The Kazak land problem, the formation of military units, educational 
matters, judiciary institutions, religious affairs, the problems of women, 
preparations for the election of All-Russian People's Congress and to the 
forthcoming All-Russian Muslim Congress, as well as the formation of the first 
Kazak political party were discussed by the participating delegates at length. Tens 
of thousands of Kazaks who had fled the country after the 1916 events began to 
return. Harassment of all these natives by the veteran Russian soldiers and the 
Cossack cavalry, particularly in the Jetisuv area, was another matter discussed at 
the Orenburg Congress in July 1917. 
In the meantime, the All-Russian Muslim Congress was also held in 
Moscow May 1-11, 1917. They organized a Sura-i Islam, a central committee 
consisting of 30 members and an Executive Committee consisting of 12 members. 
The Congress decided to give a five member share to Kazaks on the central 
committee. This was another part of the duty of the Kazak intellectuals, as 
members of the Muslim Community in the land of the Tsars. 
164 Qazaqstan Tariyh1, p. 305. 
165 The Russian Provisional Government-1917, Documents, Robert Paul Browder and Alexander 
F. Kerensky (eds.), Hoover Institution Publications, Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1961, 
Vol. I, p. 167. 
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Among the leading Kazak intellectuals and political activists that 
supported the Ala~ Party were Alihan Bokeyhanov, Ahmet Baytursm, 
Muhametjan Tm1~payev, Mirjaq1p Duvlatov, Magjan Jumabayev, $akerim 
Qudayberdiyev, Sultanmahmut Torayg1rov, Halel Gabbasov, Alimjan Ermekov, 
Jihan~a Dostmuhammedov and Hale! Dostmuhammedov. All of those listed 
above combined around the idea of liberating the Kazaks from colonial 
expropriation. Among them the most famous was Alihan Bokeyhanov, member of 
the First Russian Duma and one of the signatories of the famous Viborg 
Manifesto, as well as the first and last president of the Ala~ movement on the 
Kazak steppe. Alihan Bokeyhanov was a staunch defender of the Kazak right on 
land-related questions against the Tsarist colonialist policy. His opposition to the 
Tsarist land policy in Central Asia was shaped during his two-year participation in 
the famous $<;:erbina expedition that lasted for ten years. The $<;:erbina expedition 
had consisted of a group of well-known scientists, military analysts, ideologists 
and theoreticians of the colonial system of Tsarist Russia. 166 Bokeyhanov was a 
member of the Russian Kadet party before the formation of the first Kazak 
political party. On March 28,1917 he was appointed by the Kerensky 
Government as the Commissar of the Provisional Government in the Torgay 
Province. 167 However, he considered departing from the Kadets a long time before 
!Ni Tursm Jurtbay, "Talq1: Qazaqta Bas1 Art1q Jer Joq," Juldzz, No. 4, 1997, pp. 3-40. This work 
was published as a book in 1988, though this author has not seen the published form yet. The 
author of this article spent five years in the archives and this article reveals important information 
about the Ala~ intellectuals' activities, mainly during the first quarter of this century. 
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he put this idea into practice. 168 Bokeyhanov understood that the Kadet Party was 
against the idea of national autonomy and that their policy was not suitable for the 
"sons of Ala~,'' who wanted to form a national autonomous region. At the same 
time, Bokeyhanov was against the proposal to allow Kazaks to have private 
property. He claimed that if Kazaks individually owned the land, they would in a 
very short period sell their properties to Russian peasants and face the same fate 
as the Ba~qurts who had experienced this earlier and had afterwards remained 
landless. Muhametjan Tm1~payev was another Ala~ intellectual who became the 
first transport engineer of the Kazaks after studying in Petersburg. He was a 
member of the Second State Duma. Later he became the Prime Minister of the 
Hokand Autonomous Government and during the 1920s, he participated in the 
construction of the Tilrk-Sib Railway. Muhametjan Tm1~payev's political opinion 
towards colonialist rule was shaped. during his stay in the Tsarist capital both 
when a student and later as a member of the State Duma. In one of his letters to 
the President of the Ministerial Council of the Tsarist Duma, Tm1~payev 
presented Kazak grievances in a well-versed manner. 169 Another increasingly 
important figure among the Kazak intellectuals who formed the Ala~ Movement 
167 The Russian Provisional Government-1917, Documents, Robert Paul Browder and Alexander 
F. Kerensky (eds.), Hoover Institution Publications, Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1961, 
Vol., p. 167. 
p;s Zeki Velidi Togan, Hatzralar: Tur!astan ve Diger Miisliiman Dogu Tiirklerinin Milli Varlzk ve 
Kiiltiir Miicadeleleri, istanbul, 1969, p. 147. 
1
'
9 Muhametjan Tm!!jipayev, Qazaq Halqznzng Tariyhz, Almat1, 1993, pp. 15-19 cited by Mana~ 
Qoz1bayev in Qazaqstan Tariyhz, Almati: Atamura, 1994, pp. 5-9. 
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was Ahmet Baytursm. 170 He was a philologist, educator, poet, ethnographer and 
historian. Before actively participating in Kazak political life during 1917, he 
taught in various Kazak schools and wrote about problems related to the Kazak 
language and land matters, together with important evaluation of the work of the 
Tsarist Duma in the well-known Kazakjournal of Ay-Qap (1911-1915). 171 After 
1909, he was first arrested and then expelled from the steppe region. Thus he was 
forced to live in Orenburg, where, between 1913 and 1918, he published the 
influential periodical Qazaq that later became the official organ of the Kazak 
national party Ala~ Orda. 
170 There are a whole new set of articles and books published about Ahmet Baytursun in present-
day Kazakstan. The following list (which was cited by Saken Ozbekuh in the foreword of the 
reprint of Janga Nizam by Ahmet Baytursunuh, Almat1: Jeti Jarg1, 1996, p. 4) is only a part of this 
new movement, merely to present the new wave and new tendencies of current Kazak intellectuals 
and media: 
-Rabiyga S1zd1kova, "Ahmet Baytursun," Qazaq Adebiyatz, 6 Qangtar, 1989 
-A. Mektepov-G. Anesov, "Hahq Perzenti," Orken, 14 Qangtar 1989. 
-R1mgali Nurgaliyev, "Ahp Bayterek," Qazaq Adebiyatz, 21 Savir 1989. 
-A.Mektepov-G.Anesov, "Ana Tilin Tiirlendirgen Ahang," Jalzn, No. 2, 1989. 
-Sam~iyabanu Setpayeva, "Ahmet Baytursunov," Ahmet Baytursunov: $zgarmalarz, 
Almatt: 1989. 
-Rabiyga S1zd1kova, Ahmet Baytursunov, Almat1: 1990. 
-Rabiyga S1zd1kova, "Ahmet Baytursunov: Omiri men Q1zmeti Tuvrah," Ti! Tag!tmz, 
Almati: 1990. 
-J. Ismagulov, "Ahmet Baytursunov: Aqmd1q jane Tarjima~1hq Taghm1," Juldzz, No. 1, 
1992. 
-A.Qaydari-0.Aytbayuh, "Ult Madeniyetining Han Tangiri," Egemen Qazaqstan, 28 
Qangtar 1993. 
-S. Kaki~ev, Ahang Tuvralz Aqiyqat, Almat1: 1992. 
-M. Mamajanov, Aszl Mura, Almatl: 1993. 
-Rabiyga S1zd1kova, "Ahmet Baytursunov: Agartuv~1 Gahm, Qogam Qayratkeri," Zam!, 
Almatl: 1991. 
-Tursmbek Kaki~ev, "Sm men Q1ysm Sardan," Aqzyqat, No. 12, 1994. 
171 This journal was published between 1911 and September of 1915. Its editor was M. Seralin. 
Please see, Ay-Qap, Reproduced by "Qazaq Entsiklopediyas1" Bas Redaktsiyas1, Edited by 
R1mgali Nurgaliyev, Almatl, 1995. 
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Together with Alihan Bokeyhanov and Mirjaq1p Duvlatov, Baytursm 
played a leading role in the process that led Kazak intellectuals to decide to 
proclaim the autonomy of the Kazak steppe and to elect an executive committee 
by forming the Ala~ Orda Government in December 1917. 
The Formation of the Ala~ Orda Government 
Soviet historians claim that the reason for the emergence of the Ala~ Party 
and of the Ala~ Orda Government was a reactionary-oppositionary bourgeois-
nationalist movement against Bolshevik power. In reality, the rise of the Ala~ 
movement stemmed from the ages-old longing of the Kazaks to express their 
desires, and from the weak central control and administration of the provisional 
government. Chaos and turmoil preceding the February Revolution, as well as a 
famine due to climatic conditions, had made the life of the Kazaks worse during 
1917. It was coupled with the harassment of natives by Cossack cavalry units and 
soldiers returning from the front. Kazak intellectuals around the newspaper Qazaq 
were compelled to take the matters of the defense of their people and their 
territory into their own hands. They decided to call the "First All Kazak and 
Kirg1z Congress" to make a decision to form military units for their own defense 
owing to the chaotic situation on the steppe. In Mirjaq1p Duvlatov's words, it 
became a duty for the native intellectuals to dedicate themselves to guiding their 
people to defend their nation at a chaotic time when no authority existed on the 
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Kazak Steppe to restore order and establish authority. 172 After discussing the 
current situation, a handful of Kazak intellectuals, including Alihan Bokeyhanov, 
Ahmet Baytursm, Mirjaq1p Duvlat and others, decided to organize the All Kazak 
and Kirg1z Congress on the 5th of December 1917. Another important matter to 
be decided in the congress was to form the Ult Kengesi, the National Council, to 
facilitate the administration of five million Kazaks on the Steppe. The All Kazak 
and Kirg1z Congress was held in Orenburg on December 5, 1917, with the 
participation of 82 delegates from all over Kazak society. It lasted for nine days. 
The Congress formed the National Council (Ult Kengesi) and decided to 
name it the Ala~ Orda. Thus the first Kazak government was born and among the 
25 members of the government ten seats were given to non-Kazaks. Among those 
who were elected to the government were Validhan Tana~ev from Bokey Horde, 
Halel Dosmuhammedov from Ural, Aydarhan Turlubayev from Aqmola, Ahmet 
Birimjanov from Torgay, Halel Gabbasov from Semey, Sadiq Amanjolov from 
Jetisuv, Mustafa <;oqay from Sirdarya, as well as Alihan Bokeyhan, Jahan~a 
Dosmuhammetuh, Alimhan Ermekuh, Muhametjan Tim~bayuh, Baq1tkerey 
Qulmanuh, Jaq1p Aqbayuh, Bazarbay Mam1tuh, Otm~1 Eljanuh. Alihan 
Bokeyhanov was elected as the President of the National Council, winning 40 
votes out of 79. 173 The National Council was assigned to form national military 
172 "El Qorgav," Qazaq, 1917, No. 249. 
173 Qoygeldiyev, p. 332-333. 
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units, to establish a national educational system, as well to arrange the financial 
and budgetary affairs of the new government. 
The Congress declared the formation of the Ala~ Orda Government to 
include territories of the Bokey Horde, Oral, Torgay, Aqmola, Semey, Jetisuv 
provinces and some areas that were inhabited by Kazaks in Zakaspiy province and 
the Altay region. The Congress also defined the share of soldiers for each 
province as well as responsibilities for training and equipping the units. It was 
planned to obtain the financial support of the Kazak military units from taxes that 
were to be collected by the central authorities. It was also decided to ask help 
from the Orenburg Cossack units for training the native units. 174 
THE KAZAK PERCEPTION OF THE WORLD AND THEIR CONTACTS 
Kazak intellectuals were aware of their ethnic and religious differences 
from the Slavic and Orthodox world with which they shared the same umbrella, 
the Tsarist flag. Nevertheless, they were conscious that there would be no 
possibility of driving the imperial colonial rule out from their land without 
unification with other forces inside the empire. The doyen of the Kazak 
intellectuals, Bokeyhanov, was busy in the first decade of this century trying to 
find other forces at the empire-level to unite against the autocratic rule of the 
tsars. The Tsarist archives reveal that he participated in the organizing activity of 
174 Qazaqstan Tariyh1, p. 310. In Richard Pipes words : "Ala~ Orda leaders established contact 
with the Orenburg Cossacks, who formed something of a third force in that area. In December, the 
Orenburg Cossacks made an alliance with the natives." Pipes, ibid., p. 84. 
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the all-Russian revolutionary groups at a meeting m Samara in 24 October 
1912. 175 According to a young native scholar, Sultanhan Aqquluh, this meeting 
was organized by the Mason Society in Russia. Alihan Bokeyhanov' s 
participation in the organization of this meeting was a result of his membership of 
the Mason Society of Poliyarnaya Zvezda (the North Star or Pole Star) of St. 
Petersburg, earlier in 1908. 176 It is not surprising to see Alihan Bokeyhanov in a 
Masonic society. His influence was considerable as a member of the Kazak 
aristocratic family, a political activist, a member of the First Russian Duma and a 
member of the Russian Kadet party. He was the writer of many political and 
judicial analyses of imperial politics in newspapers and journals not only in 
Kazakstan but in many organs at the imperial level. m 
The nationalist intellectuals had some contacts with other Turkic and 
Muslim intellectuals and societies, at least, in the form of bilateral agreements, 
though none reached success. They attempted to cooperate in the wake of the 
mounting events that occurred in the first quarter of this century in Russia. 
Cooperation with other Muslim groups and organizations was one way to pressure 
the official authorities on matters regarding Kazak life. Thus Kazak intellectuals 
attended every invitation for a Muslim gathering organized in Russia. The Kazak 
175 Documents from the State Archive of the Russian Federation was cited by Sultanhan Aqquluh, 
"Alihan Bokeyhan," Juld1z, 1 January 1996, pp. 3-61, in p. 17. 
176 David Yusupovi9 Bebutov, "Russkoye Masontsva XX veka" in Russkoye Masonstvo I 
Revolutsiya, Yu. Fel~tinskiy, editor and compiler, Moscow: Terra, 1990., p.134. cited by 
Sultanhan Aqquluh, in ibid. p.18. 
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goal of having close contact with other groups, including the Muslims in Russia, 
followed the same aim of voicing Kazak concern and representing the Kazak 
point of view in all matters. Unfortunately, due to the lack of consensus among 
the Muslims of Russia on many matters, be it the future form of political 
administration or less important subjects such as the marriage age of a Muslim 
girl, gatherings of Turko-Muslims of Russia did not reach their targeted aim of 
taking concerted action, political or otherwise. 178 These attempts also proved the 
failure of Pan-Islamist ideas to bring unity to Russia's Muslims, whose 
populations lived scattered in quite different geographic regions in the Russian 
Empire. When the hopes of forming a strong center to organize concerted action 
among the Muslims of Russia was shattered, it was very easy for any militarily 
strong power to defeat each region one after the other. Problems stemming from 
diverse regional characteristics and interests, as well as different targets and aims, 
led each group of Turko-Muslim people to seek solutions unique to their own 
needs. For example the Ba~qurts chose to cooperate with the Kazaks, rather than 
with the Tatars of the Volga region. (The reasons for this action are, of course, not 
within the scope of this study.) 
One of the most important contacts of Kazak intellectuals was established 
with the Ba~qurts under the leadership of Validov. Validov or Zeki Velidi Togan 
was one of the first who understood the real aim of the Bolsheviks towards the 
177 Bokeyhanov's articles appeared in Rer;, the organ of the Russian Kadet party, and in Na~a Jizn 
. Please see, by Sultanhan Aqquluh, in ibid., p. 18. 
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Turko-Muslim peoples of the former Tsarist land. The Bolsheviks were ready to 
sacrifice the Turko-Muslim masses for the sake of the overall success of the 
revolution. Validov also believed in Socialist principles, while trying to preserve 
the interests of his fellow-brothers, the Turko-Muslims. Thus he wanted to work 
together with the Soviets during 1918, together with the Ala~ Ordists and later 
when he was in Turkestan. Togan accepted the idea of "socialization of the land" 
and thus wanted to cooperate at the beginning with the SRs (the Socialist 
Revolutionaries). However, after witnessing "the Russian chauvinism of the SRs, 
he stepped back from his earlier decision. He later formed the opinion that a 
"Nationalist Socialist Party" should be organized. 179 Validov's ideas and 
connections with almost all the active political and literary figures to the East of 
the Urals, as well as the united attempt of Turko-Muslim intellectuals to obtain 
help from outside powers to support the nationalist attempts, alarmed the 
Bolsheviks. 
During the Stalinist period, when almost all the Kazak intellectuals, be 
they Ala~ Ordist or not, were interrogated, the key question asked by the Soviet 
security officials was about their ties and relations with Validov. Validov's 
memoirs, published in Turkey in 1969, reveal important aspects of the then 
current political ideas and the reasons for the behavior of Kazak intellectuals in 
Russia. The significance of Validov's memoirs is now clearly understood, 
178 Nadir Devlet, Rusya Tiirklerinin Milli Miicadele Tarihi(J905-1917), Ankara: Tiirk Killtiiriinil 
Ara~tirma Enstitilsil, 1985. p. 291-297. 
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particularly after the Soviet disintegration, after which many materials related to 
the activities of the Ala~ intellectuals began to be published in Kazakstan. 
Fascination follows when one sees the opinions Validov's memoirs, parallel to 
those of Ala~ intellectuals whose works have been openly circularized after the 
independence of the Central Asian republics, particularly of Kazakstan. 180 The 
following is an excerpt from Validov's memoirs that reveals the close contact of 
Kazak intellectuals with Validov himself: 
Kazak leaders, the author Ahmet Baytursm, a much respected elderly person and a 
descendant of Chingiz (Han), ~ahingerey Sultan Bokeyhanov of Bokey Horde, Mustafa 
<;oqayoglu from Ta~kent, Jihan§a Dostmuhammedov from Oy1l and others met 
(frequently) in Alihan Bokeyhanov's office (who was the Commissar ofTorgay Province 
appointed by Kerensky government) during the last days of October and first days of 
November (1917). I was present at most of these meetings. It was during those days that 
the Soviets were becoming successful and were sabotaging the election preparations of 
the Constituent Assembly (w;:reditelnoye sobraniye), as well as when whispers of 
dictatorship were spreading. Alihan announced his departure from the Kadet party of 
which he was until that time an official member and accepted the idea of the foii.ndation 
of the (Kazak) autonomy under the name of Ala~ Orda. Mustafa <;oqayoglu wanted to 
stay in Orenburg because of the Soviet takeover of Ta§kent on October 28. The Kazak 
elders advised me to deal with Ba~qurt matters and suggested that <;::oqayoglu return to 
Ta~kent and remain there. The discussion that lasted for two days drew our destinies. We 
decided to remain faithful to the principles of democracy and the constituent assembly, 
never to accept Bolshevism, (and) to follow the Ukrainian way of autonomy, (W)e were 
to organize the All Kazak and All Ba~qurt Congresses in Orenburg at the same time, at 
the end of December, (and) support the autonomy of Turkistan, (W)e were not going to 
publicize the matter of creating a single republic since Russian circles supporting the 
federation idea and of Orenburg, and Ural Cossacks who separately agreed with the 
autonomy of Turk1stan, Kazakstan and Ba~qurtistan, disagreed over the alternative (the 
united) form. These were the most important decisions we took during the 1917 
revolution. 181 
179 Togan, Turk1stan, p. 361-362. He also wrote that they were not successful in forming a 
nationalist socialist party and decided to stay in the general national platform. 
iso See Validov's evaluation of socialist ideas and its suitability to the Turko-Muslim peoples East 
of the Urals and, just for the sake of an example, see Ahmet Baytursmov's letter to Lenin that very 
much resembles Validov's opinion. For this, see particularly of Validov's memoirs and his book 
on the history of Turk1stan. Ahmet Baytursmov's letter to Lenin was republished in Qazaqstan 
Tariyhz: Hrestomatiya, Compiler Mana~ Qoz1bayev, Almat1, 1994., pp. 100-105. 
181 Togan, Hatzralar, p.184. 
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Kazak and Ba~qurt cooperation went even further than the above ideas and 
their contact extended in the following year. Validov's aim was to publicize the 
current political situation of Turk1stan, Kazakstan and BaNurtistan to the world 
through Japan. He also made an agreement with the Kazak leaders to accomplish 
this task with Kazak help as well. The Kazaks also accepted an attempt to reach 
the world public through Gulca-ile city, on the Chinese side of Turk1stan. 
Representatives and leaders of both sides met several times to realize their aim. 
The first of these meetings took place in Semey(Semipalatinsk), July 18-21 1918. 
The Ba~qurt side was represented by Seyid Girey Magaz and Kazak leaders 
including Alihan Bokeyhanov and Muhammetjan Tm1~payev were present there. 
Among the agreed matters, there was a point that revealed the Ba~qurt, Kazak and 
Turk1stani (Khokand) preference of keeping their national struggle within the 
borders of Russia. They wanted to establish contact with the Japanese diplomatic 
representatives in Siberia and Gulca rather than making ties with the Germans 
who, then, occupied Ukraine and who had attempted to make contact with Kazak 
leaders in Astrakhan. The reasons for this preference stemmed from following the 
same line as the Russians who, then, were an ally of Japan. 182 
The second meeting between the BaNurt, Kazak and Turktstani 
representatives took place in the late summer and early fall of 1918 in Orenburg 
and Samara. Alihan Bokeyhan, Ahmet Baytursm, Mirjaq1p Duvlat; the former 
Prime-Minister of the Khokand Government, Muhametjan Tm1~payev; Secretary 
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of Foreign Affairs Mustafa <;oqay and many others, together with Ba~qurt leaders 
gathered and exchanged opinions over the future of their country. They made a 
decision to form a South-East Federation of Muslims, to unite Ba~qurt and Kazak 
soldiers into a single army corps. A decision was also taken to suggest to the 
Russian organizations that a bigger federation, such as the Eastern Russian 
Alliance, with the participation of the governments of Sibir and Samara, as well as 
of Ural and Orenburg Cossacks should be formed. 183 Togan wrote that they later 
had to step back from this decision after understanding the White Army 
Commander, Admiral Kol9ak's refusal to recognize the Ba~qurt and the Ala~ 
Orda governments, and the Kol9ak's intoleration of the two government's armies. 
They also did not see any reason to fight against the Ta~kent communists. In the 
same manner, the Turko-Muslim leaders hope of obtaining arms and ammunition 
from the British and American representatives in Omsk also failed due to their 
need to acquire arms via Vladivostok. 184 
On September 12, 1918, Kazak and Ba~qurt delegates met Yusuf Ak<;ura, 
the famous pan-Turkist theoretician and then, the representative of the Red 
Crescent (Hilal-i Ahmer Cemiyeti) Society. Alihan Bokeyhanov, 
Muhammmetjan Tm1~payev, Mustafa <;oqay and Zeki Validov met him in Samara 
and intended for him to assume responsibility for the foreign affairs of the 
planned, future South-Eastern Muslim Countries Federation. Ak9ura, reportedly, 
182 Togan, Hat1ralar, p. 216-217. 
183 Togan, Hat1ralar, p. 229. 
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refused to accept the proposal, owing to his acceptance of Turkish citizenship. 
Additionally, Akyura proposed to use as the name of the future state 'the 
Federation of Eastern Turks.' Alihan Bokeyhanov, arguing against this 
suggestion, followed a more cautious stance and pronounced his reluctance to use 
this label. Bokeyhanov did not want to alarm Russian circles by using anything 
that will sound to the ears like pan-turkism. He reportedly said that the time was 
not ripe to use such labels. 185 This is the perfect example of the sensibility, 
perhaps caution, of the Ala~ leader with regard to the existing circumstances. 
Nevertheless, under the leadership of Alihan Bokeyhanov, there were Ala~ 
or Kazak intellectuals who supported and advocated the idea of Turkic unity, such 
as the poet Magjan Jumabayev. As in other parts of the Turkic and Muslim world 
the ideas that propounded the unity of Turks all over the world remained only in 
the poems of Magjan for the Kazaks. Any sensible Kazak was aware of the 
difficulty of realizing the dream of Turan, particularly, at those times, when the 
Bolsheviks, or to the Kazaks the former Tsarist tyranny dressed in a red coat, was 
gaining control of the whole Central Asia, including the Kazak steppe. 
KAZAK IDENTITY IN THE TWENTIETH CENTURY 
At the beginning of this century, on a more general level among the 
Turkic-Muslim peoples of the Tsarist Empire, there were three main different 
184 Togan, Turk1stan, p. 376. 
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ideas discussed by the intellectuals: Pan-Turkism; Pan-Islamism, and the 
relationship of the Turko-Muslim groups with their overlords, the Russians. 
Intellectuals in the Kazak lands were not alien to these discussions. The search to 
find the most suitable path for the Kazaks also led native intellectuals to discuss 
and prefer certain of the above ideas according to the beliefs and personal 
experiences of each. Those graduates of the traditional madrasas in Kazan, Ufa, 
Bukhara, and Ta~kent felt close to the ideas of pan-Islamism and the religious 
unity of their people with their Muslim brothers. This group wanted the Kazaks 
to turn their face towards the East. Their ideas can clearly be observed from their 
attempts to form societies such as Ulu Turlostan, Turlostan Birlestigi and 
$ura-i islami. Another group of Kazak intellectuals preferred more ethnically 
oriented ideas and the 'New-Method' (the Jadidist) viewpoints. Their position was 
to adopt a more modern, western (but not altogether Russian) type of life, on the 
condition of preserving some unique characteristics of their people. There was a 
third group which felt closer to the second but differed from them by visualizing 
the development of the Kazak land through Russian culture and Russian language. 
The third group sided with the then newly-emerging Bolshevik ideas. 
Different ideas on the future definition of the Kazak path began to take 
shape among Kazak intellectuals prior to and during the Bolshevik revolution. 
Some supported the idea of forming a "Q1p<;aq type of state" in which many 
185 Togan, Hat1ralar, p. 230-231. Yusuf Ak<;:ura did not mention in his work of his meeting with 
the Kazak abd Basqurt delegates, in his work entitled Osmanlz Hilal-i Ahmer Cemiyeti Rusya 
Osera Murahhas1 Yusuf Ak<;ura Bey 'in Raponi, Dersaadet(istanbul), 1335. 
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Turkic-Q1p9aq speaking tribes and people, such as the Kazak, Kirg1z and 
Qaraqalpaq, would unite under one flag. Another group wanted to form an "Ulu 
Qazaqstan" including the neighboring regions of Siberia. A third group wanted to 
form a "federation" of the three Kazak Hordes. Still another group suggested that 
a federation consisting of the Kazaks, Uzbeks, Ba~qurts and others should be 
formed. Almost a century afterwards, during the present-day, intellectuals have 
begun a new search regarding the future path of their country. All of the above 
ideas are still in play. Discussion of this will, however, be the subject of following 
chapters. 
CLASH OF POLITICAL IDEAS 
Each group of intellectuals in the Kazak lands tried to use the then i:nodern 
tools of reaching the public. Education and journalism, as well as political 
activities, were their main professions. The leading Ala~ intellectuals such as 
Alihan Bokeyhanov and Ahmed Baytursmov had always had a leading role in 
matters related to both journalism and education. The newspaper Qazaq was the 
organ of mass communication in the hands of the Ala~ Ordists. They established 
their control over the Kazak people. Kazaks supported the Ala~ Ordists, in some 
provinces, by 85.6 percent during the first quarter of the twentieth century. 186 
They used the Qazaq newspaper to awaken the political, social and cultural 
consciousness of their people, aside from simply enlightening them in educational 
1 ~6 Mambet Qoygeldiyev, Ala~ Qozgalisz, Almah, 1995, p. 317. 
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matters. 187 The enlightened Kazak elite attempted to organize on the basis of their 
faith, as well as on their ethnic, linguistic and territorial characteristics and to 
gain political power as the most effective way of controlling the political destiny 
of their people. This fact also proves as correct the idea of the well-known 
academician Anthony Richmond in his statement that "the teachers and journalists 
play an important part in this respect and are often among the strongest supporters 
of ethnic nationalism... Access to and control over the instruments of mass 
communication becomes an important issue."188 
During the fall of 1917 another political party was formed by a different 
group of Kazak intellectuals alongside the Ala~ Movement. Those who formed the 
U~ Jiiz (The Three Horde) party described it as the "Socialist Party of the Kirg1z 
(meaning the Kazaks)." It was formed by a handful of Kazak intellectuals who 
were influenced by some leftist groups in Russia. Regardless of a very small 
number of supporters, this kind of groupings emerged, not only among the 
Kazaks, but in other Turko-Muslim groups like the Ba~qurts and Tatars. The 
emergence of a small number of opposition leftist groups was not unique to 
Kazak society. On the contrary, it was a common phenomenon in all Russia. 
Discussions among the leading political activists and those who were aware of the 
187 The outstanding contemporary Kazak writer Muhtar Avezov evaluated the Qazaq newspaper 
as: " It was the newspaper Qazaq that cerebrated all the Kazaks from bended old to the crawling 
baby, awakened them from their eternal sleep, revitalized their souls, energized them as the 
morning breeze of the fall and retrieve them." cited by Altay Sarmurzin and Mambet Qoygeldiyev 
in "Hahqtmg Janq Juld1Z1: Qazaq Gazetining S1guv Tariyhman," Juldzz, Vol. 9 (1990), p. 189. 
188 Anthony H. Richmond, "Ethnic Nationalism and Post-Industrialism," in Nationalism, John 
Hutchinson and Anthony Smith, eds., Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1994, pp. 289-300. 
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ideological struggle taking place in all of Russia offered different alternatives to 
the Turkic and Muslim society. The triumph of the Bolshevik power and the 
defeat of forces opposing it, both those who supported the White forces and those 
who belonged to more specific national movements, such as the Ba~qurt and 
Kazak liberation movements, obliged the Turko-Muslim leaders to consider a 
future cooperation with whoever was gaining the upper hand. This prepared the 
ground for a group of the natives to unite with the Bolsheviks. The outstanding 
Ba~qurt scholar and the most important Ba~qurt political theoretician Ahmed Zeki 
Velidi Togan, known in Russia as Validov, shed light on this very matter in his 
memoirs. The Ba~qurts informed the Kazaks of their decision of forming a 
Ba~qurt Socialist Party and Validov suggested that the Kazaks also should form a 
Kazak Socialist Party, instead of the Ala~ Orda that was not supporting socialist 
ideas in its social and economic principles. 189 This was an alternate way of the 
Muslim and Turkic peoples of the area to cope with the changing circumstances in 
order to safeguard the survival of their people. Since both the Kazak and Ba~qurt 
intellectuals were united in their decision to make an agreement with the Soviet 
authorities, 190 it cannot be correct to label the fJ~ Jiiz Party as a movement totally 
independent of the general current of the Kazak intellectuals. 
The D~ Jiiz party that was formed in October and November of 1917, 
attempted to cooperate with the Ala~ movement during the very beginning of its 
1R9 Zeki Velidi Togan, Hatzralar, p. 247. 
190 Togan, Hatzralar, p. 243. 
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existence. But in a very short time after its emergence, it became one of the major 
critics of the socio-political and socio-economic program of the Ala~ group. The 
leading activists of the fr~ Jiiz party were Kolbay Togusov, who worked as an 
amateur lawyer, 191 journalist and dramatist; Saymerden Eljanov, a public health 
worker and interpreter; Abilhayir Dosov, a student; Ishaq Qabekov, a porter; and 
Muqan Aytpenov a journalist. It is interesting that Eljanov, Aytpenov and 
Togusov occasionally wrote in the famous Kazak periodical Ayqap during the 
period between 1912 and 1915. 
Kolbay Togusov had been subjected to Tsarist punishment in the period 
1907-1912. He had also published a newspaper on 1916 in Ta~kent entitled Ala~, 
in which any anti-governmental material is hard to find during its first year of 
existence. A revolutionary-democratic tendency began to be observed in this 
newspaper only after its twelfth issue appeared in February 24, 1917. Kolbay 
Togusov helped Mustafa ~oqay to form branches of the ~ura-i Islam 
organization in small towns and other settled areas of Jetisuv province during 
March and April of 1917. He also became a member of the above organization's 
Ta~kent branch. Thus he later participated in the All-Russian Congress of Sura-i 
Islam and was elected to the executive committee of the organization. But the 
activities of Kolbay Togusov were not unknown to the Ala~ leaders. The Ala~ 
leaders did not take Togusov seriously. They rather treated him as an 
191 Kolbay Togusov did not hold a law degree but worked as an amateur lawyer in Zaysan uyezd 
after 1905. Please see Kenges Nurpeyisov, Ala~ Hem Ala~ Drda, p. 127. 
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inexperienced naive supporter of current movements. As early as 1916, Mirjaq1p 
Duvlatov wrote an article reviewing Togusov's rather amateurish drama 
Nadandzq Qurbam (Victim of Illiteracy). This fourteen page work of Togusov 
was severely criticized by Duvlatov in the Qazaq newspaper. 192 
According to Zeki Velidi Togan the D~ Jiiz party was a pan-turkist and 
socialist oriented organization. 193 Nevertheless, the main principles of the D~ Jiiz 
party were quite similar to those of the Ala~ Party. Only after the political 
situation in the country begun to be chaotic and only after the process of class 
struggle began to crystallize, did D~ Jiiz start to separate its path from the Ala~ 
movement and incline to identify itself with the Bolsheviks and other leftist 
groups. The open opposition of the D~ Jiiz party to the Ala~ movement started 
only after the October revolution of 1917. 19~ In the words of Turar R1squlov, 
" ... those Kazaks who supported the Bolsheviks in the early days broke away from 
the Kazak masses.'' 195 The same Turar R1squlov claimed that "the nationalist 
liberalist intellectuals (led by Bokeyhanov) basically advocated the interest of the 
representatives of the upper class and attempted to protect their ideas." 196 
192 Madiyar, "Nadand1q Qurbam," Reprint "Qazaq" Gazeti, pp. 281-284. 
193 Zeki Velidi Togan, Bugii,nkii Tiirkili Turkzstan ve Yal..-in Tarihi, istanbul, Enderun, 1981, p. 362. 
194 Nurpeyisov, p.129. 
195 Martha Brill Olcott, The Kazakhs, p.140. A Kazak communist leader who became one of the 
victims of Stalinist terror in 1937. R1squlov worked in the very upper echelon of the Soviet 
leadership, in the People's Commissariat of Nationalities and during the early 1930s worked 
close to Stalin in Kremlin as well. 
196 Sultanhan Aqquluh, "Alihan Bokeyhan," Juld1z, 1January1996, pp. 3-61, in p. 6-7. 
124 
Risqulov labeled the Ala~ intellectuals as bourgeois nationalists. Actually, it was 
Turar R1squlov who supported the Bolshevik power more seriously than Kolbay 
Togusov. Turar R1squlov's activities and his digestion of socialist principles 
helped him to rise to very high positions in the early Bolshevik period. 
Native representatives of the so-called proletarian literature, such as Saken 
Seyfullin, Gabbas Togjanuh, and Sabit Muqanuh, began to attack Ala~ 
intellectuals particularly during the late 1920s. Alihan Bokeyhanov belittled and 
ridiculed the enthusiastic supporters of the Soviet rule 197 and in some cases 
severely criticized the naivete of some young poets in the press even after the 
establishment of Bolshevik power in Kazakstan. 198 It was not politically possible 
for the Ala~ activists to enter into a more open discussion with their native 
Bolshevik opponents during the 1920s. 
Apart from the above list, Kazak intellectuals, reportedly, formed other 
parties such as "The Erk Socialist Party ( 1919) formed by Kazak Januzakov, 
Ba~qurt Validov (Zeki Velidi Togan) and the Uzbek activist Aripov." 199 However, 
there is not enough information about them. 
197 Alihan Bokeyhanov described Saken Seyfullin as "Baygus Saken" the poor Saken, and as the 
"tout poet" in one of his letters to Ahmet Baytursun. This criticism resulted from Saken 
Seyfullin's repeated usage of Lenin's name to present himself as " poet of the revolution." 
Sultanhan Aqquluh, "Alihan Bokeyhan," Juld1z, 1January1996, pp. 3-61. p. 39. 
198 ibid., p. 38-39. 
199 Abdijapar Abdakimuh, Qazaqstan Tariyh1, Almat1, 1997, p. 253. Actually, the founders of the 
above mentioned party, were Abdiilhamid Arifov, an Uzbek intellectual and Tiirekul Canuzakov, 
a Kirg1z (not Kazak) intellectual. Please see, Zeki Velidi Togan, Bugiinkii Tiirkili Turkistan ve 
Yakm Tarihi, istanbul, 1981, p. 402, 407, 420-421, 473 and for Arifov, p. 376, 406, 407, 416, 418. 
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The total sum of all of these native intellectuals involved in political 
matters on the Kazak steppe was only a handful. Only around one hundred of the 
Kazaks200 received higher education or had to receive a higher education diploma. 
Some one thousand of them were graduates of secondary educational institutions 
such as gymnasiums or other types of pre-university educational facilities. A few 
thousand of them received education at traditional Madrasas. Nevertheless this 
handful of intellectuals shouldered mounting problems. It was because of the 
influence of this small group of intellectuals that Bolshevik power "met with the 
greatest difficulty in consolidating their power"201 on the Kazak steppe. 
CONCLUDING THOUGHTS 
According to Mustafa <;oqay, the only Ala~ activist who reached the free 
world, the national liberation movement of the Central Asian Turkic people 
"started as a result of opportunities ensuing from the revolution in Russia. (The 
Central Asian national liberation movement) did not begin at a defined particular 
time and in conditions suitable to the natives. As for the failure of the movement, 
<;oqay wrote that "the Turkestanese were not able to establish a solid united front 
despite awareness of the desperate need of such a unity." <;oqay also admitted the 
200 According to Togan, the Kazak intellectuals consisted of people quite highly educated than that 
of their other fellow-brotherly societies, such as Kirg1z and others. "Asri terbiye gormii~ adamlan 
nisbeten c;:ok bulunan Kazakistan'da miinevverler ... ", Togan, Tur!astan, p. 356. 
201 Geoffrey Wheeler, The Modern History of the Soviet Central Asia, London, 1964, p. 129. 
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weakness of Central Asian society in "using the opportunity resulting from the 
revolution to their advantage ofrealizing the national liberationist targets." 202 
When the attempts of the Ala~ Orda Government to form an alliance with 
the liberal counter-revolutionary Russian forces failed, they reluctantly agreed to 
cooperate with the Soviets. The nationalist Ala~ intellectuals began 
communicating with the Bolsheviks in 1919. They agreed, later, to cooperate with 
the Bolsheviks. Only then, the Bolsheviks were able to establish control on the 
steppe. In May 1919, we see Ahmet Baytursm traveling to Moscow as the Ala~ 
representative to sign an agreement with Lenin and Stalin to establish the First 
Kirg1z Revolutionary Committee, the Kirrevkom. It was planned to be the 
nucleus of autonomous Kazak government. Later, on October 4, 1919, the decree 
of the Turkistan Revolutionary Military Committee pardoning those Ala~ activists 
who had supported Bolshevik rule was released.203 
The emergence of Bolshevik control of the former Russian Empire 
prevented the newly formed Kazak government from fully establishing their 
power. It also became clear that the solution of the destiny of the nationalities was 
not a primary matter for the Bolsheviks. The national misery of the Kazak people, 
starting from the Mongol conquest of their land in the eighteenth century and 
followed by the Russian colonial expropriation until the disintegration of the 
Russian Empire, was not ended with the establishment of the first native 
202 Mustafa <;::okay, "1917 J1l Estelikterinen Dzindiler," fa,I' Turlastan, No. 76, 1936; No. 90, 1937, 
reprinted in Turkish as 1917 Yi/1 Hat1ra Parqalan, Ankara: Ya~ Turk1stan Yaymlan, 1988. 
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government, the Ala~ Orda. Yet it was an attempt by a handful of Kazak 
intellectuals to seize the opportunity of reaching out to the most natural right of 
self-rule in their land. However, the times were not ripe for the movement to 
achieve success due to the overall condition of the Russian Empire. Forces 
beyond the power of five million Kazaks drew their destiny into a totally different 
path that we will try to discuss in the next chapter. 
203 Foreign War Intervention and Civil War in Central Asia and Kazakstan (in Russian), Vol. 2, 
Almatl, 1963 cited by Qoz1bayev, p. 92-93. 
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CHAPTER THREE: KAZAKSTAN UNDER SOVIET RULE 
The Bolshevik Revolution of 1917 marked the beginning of a new era for the 
people of Kazakstan. It was to be an era that would shatter their hopes of self-rule. The 
Soviet administration replaced all the natives with non-natives. All of the native 
intellectuals were gradually eliminated regardless of whether their ideology was 
nationalist or communist. Starting from the 1920s, the central control of the Bolshevik 
administration began to tighten its grip on the republican leadership. The Kazak people 
came to the very brink of destruction as a result of the policies carried out by the central 
administration. Seven decades of Soviet rule proved to be the continuation of the tsarist 
political, economic, and cultural policies. But Soviet rule went even further than the 
Tsarist administration. Confiscation of the Kazak land; ending the nomadic tradition; 
destroying the traditional administrative structure; changing the demographic balance of 
the region to the benefit of the Slavic population; the transition to agriculture, though in 
forms dependent on the center; degradation of the natural environment; the creation of a 
whole new set of civil and military servants, loyal to the political system of the center, 
out of the native population; the elimination or burial of all those free, democratic 
thoughts among the native educated elite -all these were the "achievements" of the 
socialist system. The early Soviet rule, the Stalinist era, the Hru~<;ev era, the Brezhnevite 
years as well as the Gorbachev era that marked the end of Soviet rule will be the subjects 
of discussion in this chapter. 
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Throughout seven decades, the quality and quantity, as well as the characteristics, 
of the Kazak intellectual elite also changed. The nationalist native intellectuals, as well 
as the native Bolshevik leaders of distinctive quality, were wiped out during the 1930s. 
Starting from the end of the W.W. II, a new generation of the party elite began to emerge. 
All of them lived according to Soviet and party standards. After the disastrous years of 
the late 1930s, it took more than four or five decades before there was a new generation 
of native intellectuals (mostly men of letters and social scientists) to be the advocates of 
native grievances. Most of these were born during the dreadful years of the 1930s or 
later. All of them concealed their disagreements, if they had any, with the regime until the 
Gorbachev years and until the independence era. Although some genuinely sought to 
voice the Kazak plight, some supported the re-emergence of Kazak ethnic nationalism as 
a new tool to exploit for their personal gain. This last group contained native 
"partocrats"( party-bureaucrats) of the Soviet period. 
Native social scientists, including officials working in the native press, academics 
of various rank, native men of letters, all became the champions of this new trend. This 
kind of change started during the Gorbachov rule. The native intellectuals began to 
present a critical approach towards the Soviet regime as the aga buvzn, the senior 
generation, whose influence was/is the leading force shaping the now-ethnic (if not 
openly nationalist anymore) conscience of Kazaks. Behind them stood the whole native 
population of Kazakstan who had not completely adapted themselves to the Russian way 
of life. However, the source of their native arguments, their land, number, language, 
environment, their economy had suffered serious damage as a result of 70 years of Soviet 
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rule. In other words, the nightmares of native intellectuals at the beginning of this century 
had became reality by the end of the century. Thus this chapter is important for 
understanding the details of changes that worsened the possibility of a free, independent 
Kazak existence in the 1990s. 
The Maintenance of Soviet Control 
According to Soviet sources, Soviet power began to be established in the major 
cities and towns of Kazakstan between October 1917 and March 1918. 1 Many important 
events occurred before the republic was finally formed under the name of the Kirg1z2 
ASSR on August 26, 1920. However, the true picture of the area was as follows: " ... the 
course of the entire Revolution and Civil War was deeply influenced by a traditional 
conflict between the native Turks and Russian colonists overland. Nowhere in the 
Empire did the national struggle assume such violent forms as here, where nationalism 
merged completely with class and religious antagonisms. From 1917 until 1923, these 
territories suffered all the horrors of what early Soviet accounts called, with much justice, 
"a colonial revolution."3 The Kazak steppe became the fighting arena of the White and 
the Red forces, as well as of the small number of nationalist liberationist native groups of 
those years. It was difficult for any group to establish a permanent control over cities like 
Orenburg or others for a long time. Neither the White forces nor the nationalist 
1 Qazaqstan Tariyh1, p. 307. 
2 This practice of calling the Kazaks as the Kazak-Kirg1z started by the Russian scholars and the Tsarist 
administration and continued for sometime, during the Soviet period. 
3 Richard Pipes, The Formation of the Soviet Union, p. 82. 
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intellectual Ala~ group, and in some places not even their combined forces were able to 
overcome the Bolshevik power permanently. 
The integration and the formal consolidation of the Soviet territories into a single 
state was completed in 1922. The work of the Red Army, the completion of party 
branches all over Soviet tenitory and finally the consolidation of government authority 
prepared the grounds for the integration of the Soviet state. The name of Stalin and his 
steel power also began to climb to its zenith in the Soviet territories starting from the 
early 1920s. Much of the suffering and much political maladministration as well as the 
state terror, began to take root during these years, and all were associated with the name 
of Stalin. However, it is right to state that in Kazakstan "a stable administrative 
apparatus was not established until the very eve of the World War II."4 Nevertheless, 
until 1923, early democratic principles in the communist party were not violated. Yet 
intimidation of those (most of all the native) activists who expressed their own opinion 
freely had already begun. 5 
NATIVE POLITICAL PARTICIPATION IN THE EARLY SOVIET PERIOD 
It is clear that the former Tsarist civil servants, merchants, officers and wealthy 
farmers, in other words the Tsarist gentry in Central Asia and in the Steppe region, were 
the supporters of Soviet power. They cooperated with the Bolsheviks and viewed all 
. 
Muslims as their main threat. Turko-Muslim intellectuals, and particularly those who felt 
4 Olcott, p. 220. 
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close to the Bolshevik views concerning Tsarist oppression, were rather annoyed by this 
fact. The natives did not want to see their former oppressors in a new red cloth allied with 
the newly established power to which many had devoted their hopes of a brighter future 
than the one that had been overthrown. Thus, together with a handful of loyal 
communists under the leadership of Turar Risqulov, many Kazak intellectuals decided to 
fight against the conditions that were still in the process of becoming established in order 
to safeguard the interests of their people under the new rule. 
Nevertheless, the Bolshevik realization of the influence of the native intellectuals, 
the Ala~ activists, over the indigenous population and the inclination of the native 
leaders to cooperate with the growing Soviet power, was one of the factors which 
facilitated the maintenance of native support for the revolution on the steppe. As a result 
of the mutual trust established between the native intellectuals and the Bolshevik 
administration in the center, contact was established between the two sides. Bolshevik 
'\ 
leaders in the region such as Mikhail Frunze, the famous Red Army Commander in the 
area, offered all the Ala~ supporters full amnesty if they would stop cooperating with the 
White forces and if they would begin to support the Communists. This was confirmed by 
the central authorities in Moscow as well. Ala~ activists, supporters and intellectuals were 
declared to be included in this promise, which facilitated the Ala~ participation in the 
Bolshevik administration of the steppe region. The responsibility for invigorating 
relations with the Bolsheviks was given to Ahmet Baytursun, as the Ala~ leader of the 
Torgay province. He communicated with the local Bolshevik authorities through natives 
5 Mam bet Qoygeldiyev, "Ult~1ld1qpen Kiires Navqam," Sotsialistik Qazaqstan, 7 Mamir 1991, p. 3. 
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such as Bayqadam Qaraldin. 6 Thus, Ahmet Baytursun first held talks with A. Jangeldin 
and then went to Moscow to meet Stalin and discuss the future of the Kazak state on 
April, 1919. 7 Lenin signed the decree which created the Kirg1z Revolutionary Committee 
(Kirrevkom) on June 10, 1919.8 
The nationalist native intellectuals decided to support the growing Bolshevik 
power not for their own personal gain. On the contrary, they decided to coexist with the 
Bolsheviks for two main reasons. The first was to seize important positions in the local 
party organization in order to overthrow the domination of the colonialist gentry in the 
region. The second was to become acquainted with the top Bolshevik leaders in order to 
inform them of matters related to the Kazak masses, without using the mediation of the 
non-Muslim Bolshevik officials on the periphery. Local nationalists faced a dilemma in 
their attempt to realize the above targets due to the firm stand of Moscow, which was 
giving the top positions of all the organs of political power to officials appointed by the 
center. Problems between native and Russian party officials were not limited to the share 
of political power. Both sides had constant quarrels over economic issues as well. Among 
the direct appeals made to Lenin himself, a letter by Ahmet Baytursm read as follows: 
l)The representatives, appointed by the central authorities to administer the Kirg1z land, 
do not have a crystallized idea, thus do not have a clear-cut plan (in their newly appointed jobs) .... 
6 Bayqadam Qaraldin was mediator between the Ala:;; Movement and Alibiy Jangeldin, a Kazak native 
communist. Please see, Kenges Nurpeyisov, Ala~ hem Ala~orda, p. 207 and 205. Qaraldin was 
accompanying Ahmet Baytursun to Moscow to hold talks with the leading Bolshevik leaders. For this, 
please see, Ahmet Zeki Velidi Togan, Hat1ralar, p. 251. However, it is interesting to see a certain Qaraldin 
among the Ala:;; activists and supporters' list provided by Kenges Nurpeyisov in the above book. 
7 Kenges Nurpeyisov, Ala~ hem Ala~orda, p. 197. 
s "Qazaq SSR," Qazaq Sovel Entsiklopediyas1, p. 266. 
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2) Mutual understanding and trust was not established between the representatives of the center 
and of the people. 
It is not possible for the Russians to gain the trust of the non-Russian subjects who have 
been familiar with the cunning Tsarist policy for ages, by wearing the internationalist-communist 
label overnight... It is possible that the natives might once again bury their enmity under their 
patience as they were doing for ages. However, this silence might continue until the day when an 
opportunity arises for the natives to voice their disagreement in certain ways. 
Two alternatives exist for the Russian proletariat. The first is to appoint dictators, 
following the example of the Tsarist governors and governor-generals and force its overlordship 
upon the natives. The second alternative is to gain the trust of the toiling Kirgtz (Kazak) people. 
The first alternative is quite clear because it was experienced under the authoritarian-Tsarist rule to 
a sufficient level. The second alternative is more complex and needs some explanation. Besides, 
choosing the first alternative means destroying everything that was built in the name of the Soviet 
system .... 
The main problem lies here; there are a group of intellectuals, among the Kirg1z (Kazak), 
in whom people trust. It is possible for them to be mistaken or to fall into error. Yet, they will 
never betray their people for their personal gains. 
For the Russian proletariat, the most successful way can be realized through these kind of 
native intellectuals. Yet it is necessary for those intellectuals to be in mutual trust with the Soviet 
government. The difficulty for the Kirg1z lies in the following matter: the mutual distruot between 
the Kirg1z, the colonized native and his former boss, the colonizer.9 
This distrust among the natives towards the newly established power and 
particularly of its representatives on the steppe and in the Central Asian region is revealed 
by another Russian scholar. Georgiy Safarov, an early Soviet historian and a victim of the 
Stalinist purges in the 1930s, wrote as early as 1920 that " the Soviet government in 
Turkistan was established by a handful of Russian workers around the railway line. That 
the sole possessor of the proletarian dictatorship in Turkestan can be the Russians is still 
the only valid opinion there even until today." 10 Safarov further stated that the advantages 
of the revolution were turned into the achievements of the Russian nation. Former Tsarist 
officials and the Russian people in Central Asia began to harass the native people. 
9 Central State Archive of the Kazakstan Republic cited by Mana~ Qoz1bayev, Qazaqstan Tariyhz, p. 100-
105. 
10 Georgiy Safarov, "Tiirkistan", Pravda, June 20, 1920, reprinted in Juldzz, December 1991, p. 84-85. 
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They took advantage of the deficiency of the system and Russian population to 
support the centrally-imposed changes and used the revolution to their own advantage of 
further plundering natives and their resources. Safarov warned the Bolshevik leadership 
against the use of former Tsarist administrative personnel in promoting Bolshevik power 
in the former colonies of the old regime. 11 Safarov stated further that: "It is necessary to 
be very cautious in using specialists of Russian origin, because they were the 
practitioners of colonialist repression and colonialist exploitation."12 Memoirs of the 
Premier-Minister of the Khokand Autonomous Government and one of the Ala~ 
intellectuals, Mustafa <;okay, confirm Safarov's claim. Mustafa <;okay went to Ta~kent 
on April 10, 1917 and participated in the meeting of the Ta~kent Soviet of Workers and 
Soldiers, convened at the hall of the Palace of Turkestan Governor-Generalship in the 
city. When <;okay entered the hall, a speaker was uttering the following: "The revolution 
was realized by Russian revolutionaries, Russian workers and Russian soldiers. Hence 
the administration of the Turkestan region should be given to the Russians. the natives 
have to accept what we offer to them." 13 
It was more suitable and less costly for the central administrators in Moscow to 
sacrifice those who did not adapt to the defined general guidelines of socialist principles. 
Those general guidelines were defined according to the needs of the Russian peasantry, 
11 Safarov, " Revolutsiya jane Tiirkistandag1 Ult Maselesi," Pravda, July 24, 1920, reprinted 
inJuld1z, December 1991, p. 85. 
12 Safarov, "Ult Maselesining Evolutsiyas1," Pravda, December 12, 1920., cited by ibid. 
13 Mustafa <;::okay, "1917 Jd Estelikterinen Ozindiler," Ibid. 
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particularly in matters of agriculture. Thus peripheral rural societies were expected to 
behave like the Russian mujik. Therefore any argument, even by specialists, against the 
interference in the traditional Kazak livestock-breeding economy and related land 
distribution was disregarded by the administration. All of the appeals to halt the 
introduction of rapid change to the traditional practices were pushed aside until after the 
most severe depression occurred among the natives on the steppe in the 1930s. 
THE STATE OF THE ECONOMY 
During the early years of the 1920s, the steppe economy was in grave condition. 
The negative consequences of the world war, the 1916 revolt, the revolution and the civil 
war had brought the downfall of the steppe economy. It was particularly harsh for the 
landless Kazak nomads who were forbidden to graze their animals in the war-tom areas. 
Nomadic Kazaks particularly suffered from the absence of grain for their own survival 
and for fodder to feed their animals. Agricultural activities almost ceased to exist. The 
number of livestock also declined to less than in prewar years. Kazaks who were 
struggling to control their ancestral territories faced much harsher conditions after they 
began supporting the Bolshevik power. Thus famine began in 1920 and became worse 
during the winter 1920-1921. 
During the mid-1920s, there was a slight improvement in the number of cattle on 
the steppe. This was owing to a one-step-backwards policy of the party. The Soviet 
administration had declared the completion of the renewal of economic life by the second 
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half of the 1920s and then started to restructure it according to the so-called New 
Economic Policy. Nevertheless, forced mass-collectivization, and the industrialization 
drive destroyed the steppe economy together with devastating the native population by 
the artificial famine created as a result. 
Rapid industrialization of the heavy-industry sector and the collectivization of 
agriculture was linked to the elimination of anti-regime elements. It was carried out 
together with the maintenance of the administrative apparatus, centralization and a 
growing strength of the punishment mechanisms in the country. Thus, during this period, 
implementation of this campaign went parallel to the practice of forceful and violent 
measures by the administrative organs. The main financial support for industrialization 
was obtained from the ordinary citizens of the countryside, the peasant~ and workers. 
They were over-taxed in order to fulfill this campaign. 
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COLLECTIVIZATION AND INDUSTRIALIZATION 
A well-known Kazak writer and poet Oljas Siileymenov stated the following 
when he was referring to the collectivization:" ... Who knows that there were six million 
Kazaks on their territory at the end of the 1920s, but only three million after 
collectivization." 14 A western scientist wrote the following, quoting Oljas Siileymenov: 
In the case of Kazakhs, some things will be hard to forget. During Stalin's 
collectivization drive, their nation was abruptly forced to abandon its traditional way of 
life. The campaign to transform the nomadic Muslim people breeders of livestock into a 
secular, agricultural group cost an estimated 1.5 million lives or between 15% and 20% 
of the Kazakh population. No wonder that at the writers' congress in Moscow the Kazakh 
author Olzhas Suleimenov asked how he and his compatriots could be expected to be 
open in their writing if they were not allowed to treat the collectivization period. 15 
Another article published in 1992 reported the following about the collectivization 
and industrialization drive: "During the years of industrialization, disregarding the 
resources and conditions of the (native) people, government began to build giant 
industrial complexes and railway lines. Maintenance of the workers and other personnel 
with food was shouldered by the native people. Instead of requiring the people of the 
newly-established towns to increase the production of agricultural goods, government 
officials confiscated livestock and the grain supply of the natives and peasants. An export 
policy for agricultural goods was also carried out in order to furnish giant industrial 
complexes with the necessary technical equipment. All of these measures were conducted 
14 Sally Newman, "Suleimenov Promotes Study of Kazakh History," RFE/RL Archive Material, June 14, 
1988., No. F-5632-533., p. l. 
15 Bohdan Nahaylo, "Moscow Hears From the Kazakhs," Wall Street Journal, 22 December 1986. 
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by total confiscation of peasant properties in the avuls and in the peasant villages. Even 
during the worst years of famine, in 1931-32, fulfillment of meat and grain as well as 
other agricultural product plans and their shipment to the center was not halted." 16 
The collectivization drive did not originate from the requests and desires of the 
masses; on the contrary, it started from an order imposed from the center. In order to 
carry out the collectivization and settlement campaigns, 8000 local activists and workers 
were drafted for the work, together with 1204, '25.000'ers (a unique Soviet style of 
naming certain activist groups), specially selected activists from Moscow, Kharkov and 
Leningrad. All of these had no idea of the importance and particularities of the settlement 
issue and of the mechanization of agriculture. Many centers did nothing but bring 
together all the livestock-breeders into one area that lacked sufficient water sources and 
grazing facilities. Particularly those activists from the center misunderstood the 
practicalities of the settlement of nomads in the form of the traditional Russian village. 
They forced the nomadic felt houses into the same order as Russian village houses: on 
straight street lines on the frozen earth. Thus they organized the settlement areas on 
square shaped village plans. When the number of felt houses was not enough to complete 
the square shape they ordered some more nomadic households to be brought from 
different areas. They were used to complete the square shape of the settled area in the 
form of Russian derevniya. 17 
16 Qaydar Aldajumanov and Juld1zbek Ebilgojin, "Etnotsid," Egemendi Qazaqstan, 30 Mamlf 1992, p. 2. 
17 Qazaqstan Tariyh1, p. 325-326. 
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The economic backwardness of Kazakstan, one of the legacies of colonial times, 
shortages of equipment, financial support and the lack of local specialists, was the reason 
which hindered the accelerated revival of industry and the transport system. This lasted 
until 1927, by which time other parts of the Soviet Union had already entered the era of 
industrialization. According to the Party and the Soviet government, Kazakstan was 
required to leap forward to the socialist stage of development without experiencing the 
capitalist stage. When industrialization took off, scientists had not completed surveys and 
feasibility studies of coal, oil, ferrous and non-ferrous metal resources of the region. 
Kazakstan lacked oil, gas and ferrous metal refineries. There were no enterprises devoted 
to machine-tools, car spare-parts, tractors or the tools of agricultural machinery. Many 
consumer goods such as clothes and shoes used to be brought into the republic from other 
parts of the union due to the lack of necessary workshops to make those items. In 
addition to the transportation of coal, fuel and iron ore, salt, cotton, grain, wool, other 
agricultural products and raw materials were taken from Kazakstan and Central Asia to 
the center. Machinery, mechanical devices, metal parts, cement and wooden products 
were brought to Kazakstan from the center. This system took deep roots during the 
colonial period and was not changed during Soviet times, even after World War II. 
Kazakstan still suffers from the negative effects of this lopsided economic development. 
Like many other Turko-Muslim intellectuals, the Kazak elite were also disgusted 
by the discriminatory anti-native views of some of the Bolshevik officials as well as with 
their readiness to sacrifice small nations for the benefit of the revolution, without even 
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blinking an eye. 18 Sadvaqasov, a senior native Bolshevik figure, was particularly critical 
of Zelensky, and later of Golo~i;:ekin. Smagul Sadvaqasov19 argued against Zelensky (the 
Chairman of the Central Asian Bureau of the Party) concerning his plan to turn the Kazak 
steppe into an agricultural area. He said that industrial enterprises and industrial centers 
had to be established close to the agricultural areas, i.e., in Central Asia. Zelensky's idea 
was supported by Golo~i;:ekin, a Bolshevik figure appointed by the center who later, in 
1925 became First Secretary of the Kazak Communist Party and remained so until 1933. 
Zelensky wrote that it was more profitable to establish small scale enterprises in 
Kazakstan rather than building big factories. Sadvaqasov argued that .Kazakstan needed 
bigger industrial enterprises than workshops for wool-washing, butter and grain 
refineries, and repair shops. At the same time, the development of agriculture, argued 
Sadvaqasov, required the development of industry, and thus neglecting the construction 
of industrial enterprises would be a serious mistake.20 Sadvaqasov further argued that 
industrialization of the rural areas was carried out at a retarded pace, and he opposed the 
acceleration of (Slavic) peasant settlement on the Kazak land.21 Sadvaqasov's shrewd 
style of arguing in the Soviet press against the mighty theoreticians of the center obtained 
18 Zeki Velidi Togan, Hatzralar, p. 305. 
19 Although Smagul Sadvaqasov was described as a senior Bolshevik figure who was never associated with 
the Ala~ movement by Olcott, Kazakhs, p. 212., in reality he was the son-in-law of Alihan Bokeyhanov. 
20 S. Sadvaqasov, "O natsiyonalnostiyah i natsiyonalah," Bol~evik, (1928), reprinted by Mana~ Qoz1bayev, 
Qazaqstan Tariyhz, pp. 165-178. 
21 Abdakim, ibid., p. 176. 
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for him the title of "nationalist- diehard" and soon he was silenced eternally, in Moscow 
in 1933. It was announced that he died from unknown reasons. 
An article in the current Kazak press, entitled "etnosid," evaluated the policies as 
follows: 
However, it does not seem right to blame industrialization for the torment that Kazakstan 
went through during those years. The preconditions of the suffering took root right at the 
beginning of establishment of the regime. The artificial entanglements of class struggle 
continued on the one hand, while the confiscation of bays using terror methods was 
carried out on the other. During collectivization, kulaks and bays were totally eliminated 
from the society. The traditional economic system on the Kazak steppe was destroyed by 
forcibly collecting thousands of poor Kazaks into the kolhoz centers. It would have been 
possible to develop the private agricultural enterprises by reforming them according to 
the government requirements without any sacrifices. Those were the ideas expressed 
during the 1920s and 1930s, by the native intellectuals of Bolshevik and non-Bolshevik 
upbringing. Among them were Turar R1squlov, N. Nurmaqov, Smagul Sadvaqasov, and 
Z. Teregojin.22 
Between 1926 and 1940, a number of achievements were made in Kazakstan 
regarding the industrial development in the region. Among them were the development of 
the towns, the rise in the number of inhabitants in the cities, the improvement in the 
number of trained engineers and other technical cadres, and particularly of native cadres. 
Some 200 big industrial enterprises were built in Kazakstan in the years preceding World 
War II. "The ~imkent Lead factory provided 73,9 percent of the whole USSR's smelted 
lead production. The Balqa~ Copper Factory provided 51 percent of probably the whole 
union's smelted copper before W.W. II. The Qaraganda coal mine provided 90 percent of 
Kazakstan's coal production in 1940. Oil production in Kazakstan reached 700.000 tones 
22 Qaydarbek Aldajumanov and Juld1zbek Ebilgojin, Ibid. 
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in 1940, ranking third in the whole USSR, after Russia and Azerbaidjan."23 Particularly 
after the war, Kazakstan became one of the most important energy suppliers for the 
whole Soviet Union. Kazakstan occupied third place after Ukraine and the Russian 
Federation in grain production. There were 6715 kolhoz, 364 mts(motorized tractor 
stations), and 210 sovhoz as well as 25709 tractors and 12579 combines in 1946 m 
Kazakstan. 24 
Native specialists in present-day Kazakstan belittle the achievements of the 
industrialization drive in the republic during the Soviet period. According to their 
arguments, republics such as Kazakstan, during Soviet times, were required by the center 
as sources of raw-materials, partly-colonized areas in which only second-class industrial 
enterprises could develop. 25 
23 Abdijapar Abdakim, ibid., p. 177. 
24 "Qazaq SSR", Qazaq Entsiklopediyas1, p. 270. 
25 Talas Omarbekov, "Qazaq Nege Sibmday Qmld1?" Egemen Qazaqstan, I Tam1z 1992, p. 5. 
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SOVIET LAND CONFISCATION 
There was mismanagement m the redistribution of land in the steppe. Plain 
distribution of land without providing other necessary material help was not enough to 
eliminate the economic difficulties of the region. Agricultural equipment, transportation 
vehicles (or rather cattle for transportation), seeds and other essential materials were not 
provided by the authorities. This condition left even the average peasants, let alone the 
penniless, helpless in improving their economic conditions. Therefore, those who were 
provided with land allotments were not able to use the land efficiently and thus returned 
the parcels to their previous owners. There were obstacles to the distribution of the 
meadowlands as well. According to the newly introduced reform rules, meadowlands 
were distributed in proportion to the (male) head of each household. Previously, 
meadowlands were divided according to the number of livestock of each family or clan. 
Those poor people who dared to use the newly distributed meadowland that previously 
belonged to the rich came under the "moral pressure" of disregarding the "soul of the 
ancestors." As a result of the confiscation of cattle, and the land and meadowland of the 
rich, the poor were not able to own sufficient numbers of cattle or enough land to start a 
new economically strengthened life. Cattle distributed among the poor were either 
slaughtered or sold and the land distributed among needy people was abandoned due to 
the shortage of equipment, seed and other material related to the start of proper farming. 
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THE END OF THE NOMADIC TRADITION 
Bringing the so-called socialist order to traditional Kazak life required the 
destruction of traditional customs and traditional social, cultural, as well as genealogical 
types of kinship and of tribal bounds. In 1924, the settlement of nomadic and semi-
nomadic people of the steppe was put into practice. The same year, S1rdarya and Jetisuv 
were given to Kazakstan. During 1926-1929, sovietization of the Kazak avul began, 
together with the cleansing of the avuls of the bays (the rich). In 1928, 145.000 cattle 
were confiscated from the wealthy livestock breeders and divided up among the poor. 
Nevertheless, the confiscated and "equally" distributed cattle was not enough to improve 
the life of the poor. They were either sold or slaughtered soon after. 26 In other words, the 
confiscated cattle were not enough to meet the minimum necessity to support 
communities' need for decent survival. Besides, there was a great shortage of fodder and 
confusion was widespread in the definition of grazing land. Confiscation was always 
publicized as a "better way" of cleansing the malicious elements, the "expropriator 
parasites" from the communal life. This method went further and average livestock 
breeders, with 300 to 400 animals were also subjected to confiscation. During 1927-28, 
another burdensome measure was put into practice on the steppe. The Kazak avul and 
villages were subjected to heavy taxes in order to finance the industrialization drive. It 
made worse the economic conditions far more than the previous years. The fulfillment of 
meat, wool, animal skin, as well as hoof and horn requirements, of the state plans 
20 Qazaqstan Tariyhz, p. 321. 
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followed, and all of those plans were over-fulfilled, while almost all the Kazak livestock, 
together with half of the Kazak population, was devastated as a result of famine in the 
1930s.27 
Cattle were also collected into centers that lacked adequate shelter for the harsh 
winter. This was an unusual practice for the Kazaks, because each avul had their own 
grazing fields for their own cattle. It is not a wise practice for nomadic Kazaks to gather 
huge number of cattle in one center without adequate grazing fields or enough fodder-
stock to feed the animals. As a result of such unwise measures, Kazak livestock which 
was collected in such centers, without sparing even a single animal, began to perish soon 
after. When the grazing areas were trampled, nomads who were forcibly brought to such 
areas began to escape disregarding the orders of any authority. The figures for the 
decrease in cattle and other livestock were as follows: 
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For the settlement of the nomads, the authorities had previously announced that 
they would give the necessary equipment, enough vehicles for transportation, as well as 
27 Mana~ Qoz1bayev, "Sagmgd1 Smar Kiln Tuvd1," Egemen Qazaqstan, 28 Navnz (March) 1996. 
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loans and exemptions from providing the state with meat and grain for two years. As a 
result of the crude and coarse policy, local organs had almost unlimited authority over the 
local people. Fulfillment of the orders given above was compellingly strict. Those who 
did not meet the demands to fulfill the meat, grain, wool, cotton, food and other plans 
were imprisoned and were punished without a fair trial. Wool ropes were untied and felt 
used for the yurt or for floor coverings was collected to fulfill the wool plan. Some who 
lacked all of the above materials were required to shear their sheep during the freezing 
winter time. For example, in 1930, in Balqa~ district in AlmatI province, a requirement of 
around 300,000 livestock for the fulfillment of meat plan was announced notwithstanding 
the fact that the total number of livestock in the province was only 173,000. The same 
type of requirement was made in Irg1z, Sozaq, Ab1rah, $mg1stav, Qarqarah and other 
places. This instigated a strong reaction from local people. 28 
NATIVE POPULATION DECLINE 
Native communists disagreed and protested against the bias of the Russian party 
officials in the distribution of food and grain, which was offered for the use of the non-
Muslim population in the region. It was during those early years of the 1920s that famine 
struck the Kazak steppe. The native population suffered the most owing to the loss of 
their cattle during 1916, during the turmoil of revolution and civil war. During the worst 
year of famine, some Bolshevik figures opposed aid to the starving Kazaks, arguing that 
the strengthening of military units was more important and that giving aid to the Kazaks 
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was rather a waste of money. For example, J1mp1yt1 uyezd of the Ural Province mainly 
consisted of native Kazaks and their number was 90,000 during the years 1917 and 1919. 
After the famine in 1921, the population had declined to 60,000. 29 It was during this kind 
of discussions that Turar Risqulov, a senior native Bolshevik figure, showed his strongest 
indignation towards his Bolshevik comrades. 
Other measures taken during the collectivization added to native population 
decline in Kazakstan. Some 180,015 people or 46,091 households from other parts of the 
Soviet Union came and settled in the republic during the campaign. During the summer 
of 1931 alone, the height of the famine, 150,000 Russian peasants were brought to 
Kazakstan and were settled in Esil, Qorgaljm, Aqmola, ~ubartav, Telman, Abrah, 
Bayanav1l and Aqkelin districts. They were provided with 350,000 to 400,000 hectares of 
land for agricultural needs. 30 Between 1930 and 1931, 281,230 households left Kazak 
territory for China, Iran and Afghanistan. 
Western sources such as Robert Conquest's Harvest of Sorrow reveal that the 
actual deaths in Kazakstan during the famine of the 1930s were at least one million. 
However, Conquest also included a cautious statement: " .. .In fact, more recently 
available figures imply that the loss was even larger. The number of Kazak households 
declined from 1,233,000 in 1929 to 565,000 in 1936."31 However, native academicians 
28 Qaydar Aldajumanov and Juld1zbek Ebilgojin, ibid. 
29 Mam bet Qoygeldiyev, "Ult~1ld1qpen Kiires Navqam," Sotsialistik Qazaqstan, 5 Mamir 1991, p. 3. 
30 Qoygeldiyev article, ibid. 
31 "Among the Kazakhs the population deficit between the 1926 and 1939 censuses (even accepting the 
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such as Mana~ Qoz1bayev, claim that "During the famines of 1921-22 and 1931-32, some 
three million Kazaks perished."32 A well-known Kazak scholar and historian, Mambet 
Qoygeldiyev, stated that the famine created in the Kazak steppe was much more 
devastating than that of Aqtaban Sub1rmd1, the ruination caused by the eighteenth 
century Mongol invasion. Qoygeldiyev claims that the losses of the Kazaks were much 
more overwhelming during the 1930s and that the previous disaster was surpassed, both 
qualitatively and quantitatively. Behind the apparent facts such as the decrease of Kazak 
population to half of its previous size and the destruction of traditional economic 
practices, there are other grave consequences. Kazaks as a young national unit were, at 
that time, trying to reach political freedom, they were hoping to become sovereign. All of 
these hopes were shattered by the then current system and the Kazaks were subjected to 
spiritual decline. Spiritual ties between the generations were also cut. 33 
According to the sources at the Party archives of the Almat1 Political and 
Administrative Institute and the Party archive materials in Moscow, the population of the 
Kazak countryside declined by 3,379,500 between 1930 and 1933. Native specialists 
attribute the decrease in the rural population almost totally to the Kazak share relying on 
the fact that 90 percent of the Kazaks were rural and only 6 percent of them were living 
average (as we have done for the Ukrainians) gives us 948,000. But the 1926 population should have grown 
to 4,598,000 in 1939 (on the very conservative assumption that the average USSR growth rate of 15.7 % 
prevailed, whereas in fact other Soviet Muslim populations grew much faster). That is, the population 
should have been over 1.5 million higher than it was. If we allow 300,000 for unborn children and 200,000 
for successful emigration from the areas closest to Sinkiang, we have a death roll of one million." Robert 
Conquest, Harvest of Sorrow, N. Y.: Oxford University Press, 1986, p. 190. 
32 Mana~ Qoz1bayev, "Diiniye Jiizi Qazaqtanmng Qunltay1: Ata Tariyh1 Tuvrah Sir," Egemen Qazaqstan, 3 
October 1992., p. 2 and 6. 
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in the cities at that time. Although the number related to population decrease in the Kazak 
countryside might include emigrants, it is still huge enough to emphasize the horrors of 
mass famine in Kazakstan. The following information was sent by the Kazak Central 
Agricultural Center to the related organs in Moscow and to the First Secretary of the 
Kazak Communist Party, L. i. Mirzoyan. The actual population decline in the Kazak 
countryside between 1930 and 1936 was listed as34 : 
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Years Rural population in Kazak Countryside 
1930 5,873,000 
1931 5,114,000 
1932 3,227,000 
1933 2,493,500 
1934 2,681,800 
1935 2,926,000 
1936 3,287,900 
33 Mambet Qoygeldiyev, "Ult~Iid1qpen Kiires Navqam," Egemen Qazaqstan, 5 Mamir 1991, p. 3. 
34 Talas Omarbekov, "Qazaqtar S1bmday Qmhp JatJr," Egemen Qazaqstan, 13 July 1991, p. 2. 
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Native specialists in present-day Kazakstan calculate that those who emigrated to 
neighboring republics and to the Chinese side of Turkestan amounted to 1,081,700 during 
the late 1920s and throughout the 1930s. Thus the number of those who perished as a 
result of starvation, i.e. from artificial famine in the republic, was 2,297,800. The same 
source claims that the number of the non-Kazak population decline was 20,000 as a result 
of starvation in the republic. There were 6,688,200 people living in Kazakstan in the year 
1930, and 4,012,900 of them were Kazaks. Official measures to prevent famine in 
Kazakstan were taken only after the well-known Kazak Communist Turar R1squlov's 
letter dated 9 March 1933 was handed to Stalin himself. Letters from various Kazak 
intellectuals and also of officials did not attract the attention of the party organs in the 
center and in the Kazak capital before this date. When the loss of the natives reached one 
million, which was one fifth of the total Kazak population in 1921, native intellectuals 
began to shower the center with telegrams and letters.35 
It seems that a mere set of figures related to the horrors of famine in Kazakstan 
cannot illustrate the crime or rather genocide committed against the Kazak nation. 
Famine memoirs about the sufferings of native Kazaks from the disastrous Stalinist 
policy of forced collectivization, rapid industrialization, and confiscation of grain and 
meat from the poor Kazak nomads in order to fulfill the meat and grain plan, will in the 
future be the subject of many volumes. One cannot help but include some unnerving 
memoirs published in the native press during the last decade in Kazakstan. Starving 
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Kazaks tried everything to escape famine. They ate mice, rats, sparrows, snakes and 
earthworms. Rotten meat, rotten or dried animal skin as well as bones gnawed by dogs 
also constituted the diet of the Kazaks. 36 There were also young women lying dead, who 
still had their living babies at their breasts. Parents use to wander in search of food 
locking their children in their houses or in their barns. Most of the time the parents died 
on the fields, in the streets and the children in their locked places. Sometimes parents had 
to choose to save a stronger child and sacrifice the weak one. A well-known Kazak 
historian, Mekemtas Mirzahmetov (born in 1930) was saved by his mother through the 
sacrifice of his infant sister when they were attacked by wolves in search of food while 
going from one village to the next. Native sources state that the children who perished 
during the famine were mostly those under four years of age. Another native source 
claims that "two-thirds of unweaned children and half of those between six and seven 
years old perished."37 According to Conquest, " In 1941, there were a million fewer 
seven year olds than eleven year olds in the schools ... In Kazakstan, the seven year old 
group was less than two-fifths the size of the eleven year old."38 
During the collectivization drive, the native population displayed their discontent 
through various riots in the republic. Archive materials reveals that there were about 30 
35 Richard Pipes, ibid., p.174. 
36 (Famine Memoirs)" Witness Eyes: Our Main Aim was Survival", Egemen Qazaqstan, 30 Mamir 1992, p. 
2. 
37 Abdijapar Abdakim, Qazaqstan Tariyh1, p. 194. 
38 Conquest, p. 297. 
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riots in 1929. The number reached 80 in the next two years. Altogether the number of 
riots against the then current policy reached 200 between 1929 and 1931. 39 
STALINIST PERSECUTION OF NATIVE ELITE 
Both nationalist-and Bolshevik-oriented native intellectuals struggled in the 
steppe and Central Asian region against similar problems in order to save their kinsmen 
from the bias and maladministration of Russian or Russified non-native local Bolshevik 
officials. Both of these groups, the Ala~ and native Bolshevik intellectuals, attempted to 
voice their disagreement by trying to ask for the interference of the central Soviet 
authorities in Moscow. Unfortunately for the Kazaks, the central administration in 
Moscow remained opposed to any policy which sought Kazak recovery at the expense of 
the Russian peasantry. The regime did not want to understand the specific economic and 
agricultural problems concerning tradition or custom which had regulated the nomadic 
life for centuries. At the same time, the regime could not afford to treat the Kazaks as a 
special case owing to the fact that this kind of special treatment would have been 
followed by the demands of other nationalities and might create a new chain of problems 
in the newly established, multi-ethnic Soviet society. The application of general policies 
set by the center would become impossible in such circumstances. 
As early as 1923, the centrally-appointed Bolshevik officials began to form their 
own "internationalist" opinion against the so-called regionalist view of the native Kazaks 
39 B. Tolepbayev, "Golo~yekinning Stalinge Hati," Egemen Qazaqstan, 30 March, 1991, p. 2. 
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in the party. E. M. Yaroslavski, representative of the Russian Communist Party Central 
Committee, spoke at the regional party congress in Orenburg, March 17-22, 1923. He 
claimed that the native communists in the Kirg1z(Kazak) republic paid too much attention 
to nationality problems and thus measures to carry out the class struggle could not be 
properly fulfilled. The reason for this was, according to his judgment, the environment 
where the Kazak communists had their roots and where the struggle for nationalist 
independence played a very important role. 40 During the same meeting, A. I. Veinstein 
said that the native communists' attitude of giving priority to national unity and national 
concepts in advising the people about the social changes, was hindering the development 
of class consciousness among the poor. 41 Smagul Sadvaqasov, a native Bolshevik in 
Kazakstan, disagreed with the above statements and said that "the (Kazak) people do not 
need shaking off anymore but are desperate for peaceful work ... The poor Kazaks suffer 
from joblessness and not from expropriation by anybody. Thus it is necessary to judge 
(the condition) of poor Kazaks from this point of view ... Let the Kazaks have horses, 
fodder, and kosilka (mowing-machines). By doing this, let them improve their 
conditions. This will be one hundred percent more profitable than plainly dividing 
everything." This sounded like open opposition to the structure of the society according 
to the socialist order and thus Sadvaqasov was accused of having a rather me~~antsvo ( 
petty-bourgeois or narrow-minded) attitude.42 
40 Patty Archive of the Kazak CP Central Committee, cited by Mambet Qoygeldiyev, "Ult~1ld1qpen Kures 
Navqam," Sotsialistik Qazaqstan, 5 Mam1r 1991, p. 3. 
41 ibid, p. 3. 
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As can be seen from the above lines, an opinion began to be formed, particularly 
among the centrally appointed party officials, that these native communists were rather 
inferior, ill-educated, pseudo-intellectual nationalists who were not able to understand the 
achievements of great revolutionary changes. If this was one side of the coin, the other 
side was distrust toward the native communist activists. Among the native communists 
were Sultanbek Qojanov, Smagul Sadvaqasov and Jaqtp Mmgbayev, each quite well-
known personalities serving the newly established party apparatus in Kazakstan. Stalin 
through his appointee Golo~9ekin, sought to eliminate bourgeois nationalists and the Ala~ 
Ordists from the party apparatus and to create a whole new generation of loyal 
communists of native stock. "Golo~9ekin considered the native Kazak intellectuals (both 
the loyal communists and the Ala~ Ordists) to be temporary comrades. He used them to 
win over the native population in rural areas and later threw them away when their help 
was no longer required."43 Golo~9ekin, during the first year of his appointment m 
Kazakstan, formed the op1mon that there was the bays ruled m the rural areas of 
Kazakstan and that Soviet rule did not exist on the steppe. 
Native communist intellectuals felt a disguised mistrust toward those centrally-
appointed party officials who were out of touch with the character of the region. The 
native Kazak intellectuals attitude illustrates the findings of the western scholar Walker 
Connor about the "homeland people" who possess a primary and exclusive title to their 
homeland. As "the sons of the soil" this should put them in a privileged position relative 
42 ibid. 
43 Abdakim, ibid, p. 192. 
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to those 'interlopers,' 'staygrants,' or the 'sojourners'.44 Thus during the late 1920s, a 
number of leading native communists were singled out and criticized for becoming the 
henchmen of bourgeois intellectuals.45 The earlier laws and decisions, in which benefit 
to and characteristics of the native were taken into account, during the first years of the 
Soviet rule, were abandoned. The land and water reforms of 1921 and 1922 were not 
carried out to their planned end, and the aimed for results were thus not achieved. The 
native suggestion to give priority to the natives in the land allotment plan and a 
temporary halt of the settlement of Slavic peoples on the Kazak land, until the completion 
of land allocation to the Kazaks first, was neglected. On the contrary, confiscation of the 
Kazak land by the outsiders increased further during Soviet rule. 46 
The conditions that enabled the Stalinist ideological apparatus to destroy the 
historic consciousness of peoples, by executing the national intellectuals, began to take 
root in the 1920s. As the totalitarian system began to became stronger the victims of it 
also began to be pointed out openly. Political persecution of the participants of the Ala~ 
movement, as well as those leading native officials who criticized the central policy-
makers' behavior towards the peripheral regions, concerning violations of rights of the 
indigenous peoples and concerning the speed and methods of reinvigorating economic 
life and constructing socialist ideology, started particularly after the mid-1920s. Socio-
political conditions in Kazakstan abruptly changed from this time onwards. Prominent 
44 Walker Connor, Ethnonationalism, Princeton, 1994, p. 78. 
45 Qoygeldiyev article, ibid, 8 Mamir 1991, p. 3. 
46 Abdakim, ibid., p. 189. 
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native political figures were exiled from Kazakstan after 1927 and 1929. Among them 
were Turar R1squlov, N. Nurmakov, Sultanbek Qojanov, and M. Mtrzagaliyev. The 
Kazakstan Central Executive Committee Chairman Jaq1p Mmgbayev, the People's 
Commissar of Education, Smagul Sadvaqasov, and the People's Commissar on Land 
Related Matters, J. Sultanbekov were fired from their posts. 
High party officials of Russian origin wrote to the center that all of the Kazak 
party cadres and all of the Kazak communists were poisoned by the idea of nationalism 
and by the struggle of cliques. They claimed that there was not even one clean party soul 
among them. Forty-four Ala~ activists were arrested as bourgeois nationalists. Among 
them were Ahmet Baytursmov, Mirjaq1p Duvlatov, Magjan Jumabayev, Jiisipbek 
Aymav1tov and Halel Gabbasov. One year later, another group of 49 intellectuals 
including Muhametjan Tm1~payev, Halel Dosmuhammedov, Jihan~a Dosmuhammedov, 
Jaq1p Aqbayev, and Q. Kemengerov, were arrested. Despite the amnesty declared by the 
Soviet government in 1919 and 1920 for those participants of the Ala~ movement, seven 
to eight years later, almost all of the Ala~ activists were thus arrested. During the first half 
of the 1920s, they made enormous contributions to the improvement of science, 
education, literature, and art in the republic. They became victims of Stalinist repression 
as the "enemies of people" and thus were executed without any fair trial at different times 
throughout the 1930s. 
As the difficulties in the social and economic development of the Soviet Union 
began to worsen during the late 1920s and early 1930s, the search for anti-Soviet 
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elements and underground organizations started to widen. Investigations to find 
nationalist enemies of the state were carried out. Responsibility was attributed to the 
"people's enemies" whenever an unexpected accident occurred in the mines, enterprises, 
kolhozs or in sovkhozes. Following this kind of event, it became customary to start an 
investigation to discover the so-called anti-regime elements and anti-state organizations. 
Consequently, "counter-revolutionary organizations" were discovered in Kazakstan. 
According to a native historian, some 10,000 Kazaks educated at various institutions 
were arrested and 31 anti-state organizations were "unearthed" in 1929, 82 in 1930 and 
80 in 1931.47 
Cleansing the party ranks from harmful elements was also carried out after 1931. 
Party members who made minor mistakes were expelled from the party and were accused 
of being collaborators of the rightists or those who supported Trotsky. The numbers of 
those expelled from the party in Kazakstan are as follows: 48 
1921 
21000 
1929-30 
58000 
1937-38 
9223 
1939 
154000 
Prominent political and literary figures were slanderously accused and executed 
during 1937-38. Particularly in 1937, some 105,000 people were subjected to NKVD 
47 Hamit Madanov, Qazaq Halqmmg Arg1-Bergi Tariyh1, Almah, 1995., p. 166. 
4H Qazaqstan Tariyhi., p. 340. 
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interrogation and 22,000 were shot in Kazakstan. 49 A second source claims that "more 
than 30,000 educated native Kazaks were shot and thousands went through the hell of 
labour camps. "50 Another source citing historian Mana~ Qoz1bayev claims that "during 
the Soviet rule, 101,000 educated Kazaks were subjected to interrogation and 27,000 of 
them were shot and only 40,000 of them were rehabilitated."51 Kazak science and culture 
was subjected to irreparable damage by the execution of the Ala~ intellectuals and those 
champions of the Bolshevik rule in Kazakstan. 52 
Saken Seyfullin was a well-publicized native Bolshevik figure. His commitment 
to party ideology ceased when the man-made famine of the early 1930s struck the steppe 
and killed millions of ordinary Kazaks. However, Saken Seyfullin's name remained one 
of the most acclaimed, loyal communist figures. This was done without disclosing the 
truth that his life ended during the late 1930s under the Stalinist terror of intellectuals. His 
life was not ended as a result of natural causes but he was reportedly attacked by dogs 
when he was in the labour camp. Nevertheless, the mysterious death of this leading native 
Bolshevik still needs to be researched. 
"Wives of many loyal Bolsheviks spent their term in 'ALJiR,' Aqmola Labour 
Camp for the Wives of Traitors. Among them were Kiilendam Qojanova, wife of 
Sultanbek Qojanov, the Second Secretary of the Kazkraykom; Dame~ Jiirgenova, wife 
49 Madanov, ibid, p.167. 
50 Mana~ Qoz1bayev, "Di.iniye Ji.izi Qazaqtannmg Qunltay1: Ata Tariyh1 Tuvrah Sir," Egemen Qazaqstan, 
p. 6. 
51 Abdijapar Abdakim, Qazaqstan Tariyh1, p. 261. 
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of Temirbek Ji.irgenov, the Commissar of Culture of the Kazak Republic; Mahinur 
Sarmoldayeva, wife of Qabllbek Sarmoldayev, the Press Manager of the Kazkraykom; 
Saq1pjamal Nazarova, wife of Zarap Temirbekov, the editor of Lenin~il Jas (Leninist 
Youth); Kiinjamal Maylina, wife of the well-known Kazak Writer, Beyimbet Maylin 
and Aziza Rlsqulova, wife of Turar Risqulov."53 
THE STATE OF SOVIET EDUCATION 
The so-called "cultural revolution" in the Soviet east among the toiling masses 
was evaluated by many as one of the major events in the history and the experience of 
creating the new man 'Homo Sovieticus.' Recent publications in the lands of the former 
Soviet Union reveal that the cultural revolution was one of the myths of 'socialist 
development.' Present-day Kazak social scientists seem inclined to blame this Soviet 
experience of creating the 'homo sovieticus' as the movement which destroyed 
traditional Kazak cultural life and the Kazak cultural stratum in the twentieth century. 
"The ideological hoop did not allow the free development of Kazak culture. The central 
control of material and the financial system required the periphery to ask permission of 
those "aqsaqals" in Moscow for every single movement in this respect. Heralding the 
Kazak culture, literature, and art to world public opinion was conducted in very difficult 
conditions. Activists in arts and sciences, who were under the strict supervision of the 
party, the related ministry and state security organs, were not able to make a single 
movement, a single statement. Every single representative aiming to visit a foreign 
country was required to promise to talk only about the achievements of the economy and 
culture of Kazakstan. He was to be listened to very carefully and was investigated 
thoroughly. Creative and scientific delegations used to be led by 'reliable' personnel of 
the Party, Soviet or Labour Unions. Free travel to foreign countries was strictly 
forbidden. Members of the social sciences were not allowed to establish contact with 
52 Qazaqstan Tariyh1., p. 341. 
53 Abdakim, ibid., p. 242. 
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each other or to exchange views about Kazak history and developments after the October 
revolution."s4 
One of the well-publicized Soviet achievements in Kazakstan was in the rate of 
literacy among the indigenous people. As early as 1920-21, there were 2412 literary 
courses at which 72,232 people were taught in Kazakstan. The rate of literacy reached 
25.2 percent in 1926 and rose to 83.6 percent of the total population in 1939.55 However, 
despite the impressive official statistical information, conditions in Kazak schools were 
not very favorable. "There were 746 Kazak primary schools out of a total 1779 and 168 
Kazak secondary schools out of a total of 701 in 1940. The majority of the primary and 
secondary schools were built in towns and in smaller settlement areas inhabited mainly 
by Russians."56 According to the Engbe~i Qazaq newspaper, there were 1600 Kazak 
schools in the republic, yet only 40 of them had adequate buildings in 1927. Most of the 
village schools lacked school-buildings, desks, books or many other necessary materials 
well into the mid-1960s. 57 Starting with the industrialization drive in the Soviet east, 
native people also began to be accepted to the newly opened facilities. Hard physical 
labour58 was the main profession of most of the Kazak workers due to their lack of 
training in any industrial enterprises previously. The percentage of native blue collar 
s4 Abdakim, ibid., p. 209. 
ss Madanov, ibid., p.172 
s6 Abdakim, ibid., p. 203. 
57 Madanov., p.173. 
58 The present President of the Republic of Kazakstan stated that the conditions at Temirtav Metallurgical 
Complex were unbearably harsh during the 1960s in his memoirs, partly published by the Republican 
Egemen Qazaqstan in 1991. 
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workers reached 33.8 percent only in 1939. Nevertheless most of them worked in the 
lowest rank of their professions and many as simple workers. 59 
A general improvement in the level of education in the Steppe region brought 
with it the improvement in the number of published books. There were 96 books (with a 
circulation of 443.000) published in 1925 and five years later this total reached more 
than 200. However, most of the books were devoted to propaganda and were for official 
purposes. 
THE CREATION OF "MANQURTS" 60 IN SOVIET KAZAKSTAN 
The losses of the Kazak Republic during thirty years under the Stalinist iron fist 
far exceeded the achievements of the republic, considering particularly those interests 
which were more important to the indigenous population. First of all, Kazaks lost almost 
all of their intelligentsia who had promised a brighter future and to improve the cultural 
and linguistic needs of this long-oppressed colonized people. A new generation of cadres 
was created from among the remaining drops of what was left, if anything, from the 
Kazak intellectuals. The most important character of the newly created cadres was their 
loyalty and their obedience to party policies. In the words of Chingis Aytmatov, many 
behaved like mangqurts( a person who became alien to his origin through the forceful 
measures taken by an outside force) of the party. 
59 Abdakim, ibid., p. 182. 
60 In his well-known novel, Chingis Aytmatov refers to an ancient story of a Kazak man enslaved by an 
invading enemy and through the torture he receives, he became a mangqurt who loses his memory and later 
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The bays with their thousands oflivestock and herds had been destroyed long ago. 
Traditional Kazak nomadic life was history already. The native intellectuals who cared 
for their nation were all eliminated. Those who dared to question or dared to think and 
understand what was happening to themselves and to the society were silenced, almost en 
masse. The dream of the nationalist native intellectuals of educating their society came 
true with a significant difference. The Kazak people were educated according to socialist 
requirements and the Kazaks took their place among the toiling masses of the east. They 
were mainly educated in Russian. They found no proper school or proper job that would 
enable them to live a better life if they were not educated in Russian language schools. 
Almost all of those who were born after W.W. II and during the last years of Stalin, 
began to find it easier to express themselves in Russian rather than their own mother 
tongue. The Kazak language was in its death throes. Agricultural and industrial 
establishments built on Kazak soil were run by Russians, and the products of those 
establishments were sent to the center by Russian hands, recorded as the achievement of 
the center, to be used firstly according to the needs of the center. The fear of the Stalinist 
terror penetrated into the bones and blood of every single citizen and lasted until their last 
breath, even long after Stalin died. Many died as the genuine mangqurts of Stalin. Even 
many of those Kazaks who remained in the west after W.W. II, and began a new life in 
the west, led a timid, crouching and cowed life. 
Stalin's end marked the beginning of the new era for the whole Soviet Union, 
although the remnants of Stalinist-era practices continued, until after the deaths of the 
kills his own mother by the order of his master: The Day Lasts More Than A Hundred Years, translated by 
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many party apparatchiks and government officials who survived for decades after his 
death. In one of the sources of the current native Kazak press, the Stalinist era was 
evaluated as the era of assertive terror, criminal political adventurism (avantyuristskiy), 
and ungrounded repression. The Hru~9ev period was the era of "voluntarist 
assertiveness" which sought to solve all the existing problems, rural or otherwise, by 
force rather than on reasonable scientific grounds, and which brought the whole country 
and the economy to the very edge of total destruction. The Brejnev years were the era of 
stagnation, mass-dispassionate behavior, as well as the time of criminal administrative 
officials who occupied all the positions. Brejnev~~ina resembled the time of Stalin, with 
a slight difference. The Stalinist experience was a tragedy, the Brejnev experience 
remained only a disgraceful farce. 61 During the whole seventy year period between 1922 
and 1992, it is quite easy to see the fruits of the Soviet policy toward nationalities, and of 
the domineering practices of the central organs, from the list of Party leaders in 
Kazakstan. 62 
Only three out of fourteen First Secretaries of the Communist Party of Kazakstan 
were native during the whole seven decades. $ayahmetov was ousted from his post due 
to Hru~9ev's accusation that he was contaminated by the "virus of nationalism." D. A. 
Kunayev twice assumed the job and the last, Nazarbayev, (the luckiest, for the time 
being) reached the years of independence. The other twelve First Secretaries of Soviet 
. 
John French; foreword by Katherina Clark .• Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1983. 
61 Abdijapar Abdakim, ibid., p. 276. 
62 Please see the list of the First Secretaries of the Kazak CP CC during the Soviet rule, in the attached 
appendix. Abdakim., ibid., p. 277. 
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Kazakstan were from a wide range of ethnic backgrounds from Russian to Polish, 
Georgian, Armenian, Jewish, Ukrainian, and Uygur. 
The new party secretaries Hru§9ev and Brejnev did not eliminate the injustices 
done to the Kazaks and to their land. During their times, the dilemma of the Kazaks 
exacerbated by new sources of exploitation of the Kazak Republic. The well-known 
leader of the Soviet Union during its stagnant years, Leonid Brejnev, followed 
Ponomarenko in administering the Kazak Republic. 
In the current independent press, the years between 1954-1985 are evaluated as 
stagnant years in Kazakstan. Undeniably there were some developments regarding the 
education of the masses, exploitation of agricultural resources and the establishment of 
some industrial enterprises. The native Soviet press, however, used to describe only the 
achievements of the then current regime. One of such materials can be found in the 
Qazaq-Sovet Entsiklopediyasz, which read as follows 63 : 
The economy in Kazakstan was that of a colonized country of an underdeveloped sort 
before the October Revolution. Despite its rich natural resources, it remained a country 
whose economy fundamentally was based upon agricultural products. Developments in 
industry were very slow. The main industrial enterprises were built on a small scale. The 
bays and partly-feudal classes ruled the nomadic Kazak society. Kazakstan become 
unrecognizable due to the achievements during the Soviet period. 
Unfair practices were carried out against the native people not only by the central 
• 
administration. The new cadres began to alienate the native people by creating their new 
sovhozes away from the native-inhabited avuls in order to prevent the natives from 
taking advantage of the central help devoted to the campaign. Besides, nobody thought of 
63 "Qazaq SSR." Qazaq Sovel Entsiklopediyasz, Vol. 6, p. 271-272. 
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returning to Kazakstan those Kazaks, living in other regions of the USSR, and who had 
left Kazakstan during the famine of the 1930s. 
The last three decades of Kazakstan up until 1986, were marked by the leadership 
of Dinmuhammed Ahmetuh Kunayev, with an exception of the years 1962-64 . He was 
the second Kazak appointed as the First Secretary of the Communist Party in the 
Republic's seventy years of Soviet history. He reigned in Kazakstan for more than a 
quarter of a century. He was elevated to the top Soviet leadership circle of the 
Politburo, as one of the eleven foremost Brejnevite leaders. 
MONOCULTURE OR THE VIRGIN LAND DEVELOPMENT 
The Virgin Land Campaign was publicized as one of the greatest achievements of 
Soviet administration. It started as a big campaign and, at the beginning, produced 
astonishing results. It was launched in Kazakstan at the expense of deterioration in the 
fertility of Kazak soil and at the expense of a decrease in traditional livestock breeding 
practices. This utopia of economic giantism, both in grain production, and in the increase 
in livestock and particularly cattle production, ended with the careless waste of Kazak 
soil. "The basic law of rational use of pastureland"64 was violated. 
64 Carol Kerven and Roy Behnke, "Impacts of Decollectivization on Rangelands and Livestock Marketing 
in Central Asia," A Paper presented at the Workshop on Central Asia Animal Production Regional 
Assessment, and been published in Central Asia Livestock Regional Assessment Workshop, Tashkent, 
Uzbekistan: Feb. 27-March 1, Davis, California: Management Entity, Small Ruminant CRSP, University of 
California, (? 1996), pp. 89-105, and in p. 91. 
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By the decision of Hru~9ev in 1953, the Kazak pasturelands were opened to 
agriculture. The Moscow administration believed that the lands which had been used by 
the Kazaks as grazing areas for their livestock for ages had been underutilized. During 
the last years of Stalinist rule, and at the beginning of the 1950s, production of grain in 
the Soviet Union became insufficient to meet the growing needs of the state. Grain 
production was 31 million tonnes in 1953 and grain consumption reached 32 million 
tonnes. Livestock production was also low at that time. Thus, grain production was 
particularly needed to meet the food-crisis in the country. During the February-March 
Plenum in 1954, the Communist Party Central Committee made a decision to improve 
grain production by opening the virgin lands to agriculture in Kazakstan, Siberia (the 
Altay and Krasnoyar regions), Ural, Povolje, North Caucasus, and the Far East. During 
the plenum, a decision was made to produce 14 to 15 tsentner (100 kilogramme) of grain 
per hectare in the virgin lands in Kazakstan and in some regions of Siberia as well as to 
increase grain production by another one billion two hundred million pood (one pood is 
about 20 kilogrammes) during the following couple of years after launching the 
campaign. 
The chief actor of the virgin land campaign, Nikita Hru~9ev wrote about how he 
came to the decision to open the Kazak pastureland to agriculture. The first step of 
Hru~9ev in putting his idea into practice was to fire the First Secretary of the Kazak 
Communist Party, ~ayahmetov from his post. Hru~9ev wrote the following: 
... I formed the opinion that he had political motives for trying to discourage the Virgin 
Lands campaign. It was my increasingly strong impression- and the other comrades in the 
leadership agreed with me- that Sayahmetov was infected by the virus of nationalism. 
Since Kazakhstan was underpopulated, he was afraid that the expansion of cultivation 
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would necessarily mean an influx (of non-Kazakh farmers) into his Republic. We decided 
to replace ~ayahmetov with Comrade Ponomarenko. 
We undertook certain organizational measures in the Virgin Lands, such as 
setting them aside as a separate region with its capital as Tselinograd. The Virgin Lands 
region was given administrative autonomy and funded directly by the All-Union 
government. We didn't want to channel out investment through the Republic government 
or a plarming commission because we were afraid that resources earmarked for the Virgin 
Lands might end up in other branches of the Kazak economy. 65 
The Virgin Land campaign was carried out hastily and at full blast like those 
campaigns of the then recent 'Patriotic War.' After launching the campaign, Kazakstan 
gave one billion or more poods (one pood is about 20 kilogrammes) of grain to the "state 
depot" six times. Those achievements, that once caused a great acclaim, were made only 
during those years when the climate was suitable. However, grain production 
considerably increased when one compares the periods 1949-1953 and 1959-1963. 
During the latter period, grain production on the Virgin Land in the whole country rose 
227 percent per year. The increase was 167 percent in the regions of the RSFSR. It 
reached 500 percent in the northern regions of Kazakstan where the campaign was most 
thoroughly carried out. Gradually Kazakstan became the provider of 60 percent of the 
grain, of the whole Soviet Union. 
During the first years of the campaign, Kazakstan shouldered the responsibility of 
providing people with grain and grain products and of stabilizing the grain balance in the 
Soviet Union. The campaign was thus carried out using intensive methods of agriculture. 
During those years, ploughing huge amounts of land was valued as the "great heroism" of 
the party and the people. On the eve of World War II, grain production in Kazakstan was 
4.3 tsentner per hectare of land. It reached 7.3 tsentner per hectare at the beginning of the 
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campaign between 1954-1958. However, this trend later fell to 6.1 tsentner per hectare 
between the years of 1961-1965. During the most active seven years (1954-1960) of the 
campaign, 25.5 million hectares of land in Kazakstan and only 16.6 million hectares of 
land in the whole RSFSR was opened to agriculture. Part of the virgin land territory was 
overploughed due to the decision of the party plenum in 1954, to further extend the 
amount of virgin and idle land development by 28 to 30 million hectares until 1956. 
Kazakstan fulfilled its plan of ploughing the virgin land one year ahead of the plan 
because of the careless work of overploughing three million hectares of land. Thus 
ploughing in the whole Union reached 29.7 million hectares by the year 1955. 
Kazakstan' s share reached 18 million hectares during this period. 
This was an unfortunate case, particularly for countries like Kazakstan whose 
people had traditionally used the land for animal husbandry. The eighteen million 
hectares of virgin land cost Kazakstan the loss of fertile soil for grazing land. Thus the 
prophetic words of Alihan Bokeyhanov, written as early as 1910, became a reality: 
During the continuos settlement of (Slavic) peasants on the Kazak steppe, it is quite 
possible to lose the fertility of the land by over-hasty policies before the whole farming 
collectives begin to use intensive methods. The Kazak land which will be stripped of its 
ages old soil fertility, and thus. will be arid and barren in the end. (The Kazak land) will 
stop giving fruitful results (in agriculture), if the current stage of agricultural technical 
methods continues to be used. 66 
The 20th Session of the CPSU (The Communist Party of the Soviet Union), 
decided that the Republic should improve its grain production to five times the then 
65 Khrushchev Memoir(Khrushchev Remembers), p. 120-121, and 124. 
66 Alihan Bokeyhanov's words were cited by Talas Omarbekov, "Tmg Tum~alagan $md1q," Juldzz, Vol. 6, 
1991, p.I 18. 
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current level by the year 1960. Kazak grain production was 4.750.000 tonnes in 1955. In 
other words, the center ordered Kazakstan to produce 19 million tonnes of grain in five 
years. This kind of illusory target was made by the center thanks to the misdirection of 
some local party leaders. During the second session of the USSR Supreme Soviet in 
February 1955, Leonid Brejnev claimed that the Republic was able to fulfill the plans for 
ploughing new parcels of land required by the center. Brejnev continued to boast about 
the future achievement of the Republic. During the All-Union Meeting of the Executive 
Officials of the Party and the Soviets in 1955 held in Moscow, Brejnev announced that 
Kazakstan would give 600 million poods of grain to the state in 1956. This was a rather 
over optimistic due to the reason that, during 1955, grain production in Kazakstan 
suffered from drought and wind erosion. 67 Brejnev believed in achieving this target even 
at the cost of ploughing new land. The next year, Soviet leaders were dizzied by the 
success of the Kazak fulfillment of the grain plan with 950 million pood of grain in 1956. 
This new achievement encouraged the top Soviet leadership to introduce more 
novelty. During the December Plenum of the CPSU in 1959, it was announced that the 
target of the Virgin Land Campaign was met by shifting the center of grain production 
from the West to East of the Soviet Union. Thus the Soviet leadership decided to limit 
grain production in the RSFSR, Ukraine, Byelorussia and the Northern Caucasus. The 
above regions were required, from that time onwards, to specialize in producing different 
types of agricultural products other than grain and to modernize animal husbandry 
methods, particularly to improve swine-breeding. Thus Kazakstan was turned into the 
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main provider of grain for those regions which did not prefer to remain grain producing 
areas. During the 1960s, Kazak grain quality proved to be very high and the cost of 
producing it became very economical for the whole USSR. Republics like Uzbekistan, 
Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Azerbaycan, Armenia, and Georgia sold their grain for 85 to 90 
roubles per ton, while one ton of grain was sold to 130 roubles in the RSFSR, Ukraine, 
Belorussia, and the Baltic Republics. Kazakstan, on the other hand, sold its wheat for 65 
roubles and 60 roubles per ton starting from 1965. 
The Kazak plight during the Virgin Land Campaign was not unknown to 
Sovietologists. They also wrote about the negative effects of the campaign upon the 
native people. A famous sovietologist Bohdan Nahaylo wrote the following: 
The Kazakhs experienced a second difficult period in the mid- I 950s, when 
Khrushchev launched his famous scheme to boost grain production by cultivating the 
huge expanses of virgin and arable land in Kazakhstan and southwest Siberia. This led to 
an influx of manpower from the European part of the Soviet Union, which soon 
threatened to swamp the Kazak.hs in a Russian-speaking sea. Local feeling was ignored. 
When anxious Kazakh communists and intellectuals began to express their concern their 
complains were dismissed as reprehensible vestiges of nationalism. 68 
67 Qazaqstan Tariyh1, p. 376. 
68 Bohdan Nahaylo, "Moscow Hears From The Kazakhs," Wall Street Journal, 22 December 1986. 
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Change in Demographic Composition 
During the Virgin Land Development, the whole union's interests, instead of 
regional interests was taken into account. The interests of the Kazak nation were 
sacrificed for the sake of the whole Soviet people. The spiritual development of the 
owners of the Virgin Land territory was not important to the Soviet masses and to the 
leadership at all. This time again another prophetic observation of a pre-Revolutionary 
intellectual proved to be right. Zeki Velidi Togan had written that some Russian 
Communists believed that "realizing the imperialist targets of bigger nations is more 
practical than realizing dispersed targets of small nations."69 
With the start of the Virgin Land Campaign, hundred thousands of Slavic people 
began to pour on to Kazak land. The soldiers of the Soviet Army who had previously 
received agricultural professional training were released earlier than their appointed 
military duty term in order to work on the virgin lands of Kazakstan. Many thousands 
from other parts of the Soviet Union were sent by the Party and on Komsomol orders. 
Convicts who had served most of their prison terms and who agreed to work on the 
Virgin Land were also sent to Kazakstan. Deported Volga Germans living in other parts 
of the Soviet land were also brought to Kazakstan. By the decision of Hru~9ev himself 
'girls' seeking for a husband and a 'job' came to Kazakstan as well. In his memoirs, 
Hru~9ev wrote the following about this: 
When I got back to }.loscow (after visiting the Virgin Lands in Kazakstan), I 
spoke to the leadership of the Communist Youth League about the complaint (of those 
single men on the virgin land) I had heard. "Make special effort to recruit more girls" I 
69 Zeki Velidi Togan, Hat1ralar, p. 305. 
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said. "Tell them they won't have any trouble finding either a job or a husband out there." 
70 
"Thousands of Party cadres from other parts of Soviet Union were brought to 
Kazakstan, to lend a hand to the campaign. All of them were cadres trained under the 
Stalinist repressive party discipline and alien to the regional, geographic and climatic 
characteristics of Kazakstan. Their number reached 25.000 during the first two years in 
Kazakstan. They were appointed to leading positions in the regional and oblast party 
committees as well as in the Central Committee of the Kazak CP and the related 
ministries."71 Directors of sovhozs and MTS-units were also drawn from those 
newcomers. Professional cadres to use the mechanized agricultural equipment were also 
brought into Kazakstan. Their number was 391,500. The Soviet administration did not 
think of the alternative of training native people instead of bringing non-natives to 
Kazakstan. 
The Virgin Land Campaign brought 'astonishing innovations' to the Kazak Land. 
The geographic, national, ethnographic, and ecological conditions on the Virgin Land 
changed irrecoverably. Hundreds of new settlement areas appeared on the geographic 
map.72 Almost all of them were named in Russian, such as Astrahanskiy, Gorkovskiy, 
Dnyepetrovskiy, Baumanskiy, Rostovskiy, Simferepolskiy, etc. The present capital of 
Kazakstan, Aqmola whose name has recently been changed to Astana was previously 
7° Khntshchev Memoirs, p. 124. 
71 Talas Omarbekov, "Tmg Tum~alagan ~md1q," Juldzz, Vol. 6, 1991, p. 118. 
72 Qazaqstan Tariyhz, p. 377. 
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called Tselinograd. During 1954 and 1964, more than 200 rural districts were renamed in 
Russian or newly established with a Russian name. 
Despite the high Kazak natural birth rate, the percentage of Kazaks among the 
population in the republic declined by eight percent during the 1950s. During the 1959 
population census, Kazaks made up only 30 percent of the Republic's whole population 
while the Russian percentage reached 42.7. The total non-native population on the Virgin 
Land of Kazakstan reached two million in 1965.73 This brought more hardship for the 
native Kazaks during the coming decades. When requests to make the Kazak language 
the official language of the Republic were made, counter-arguments were put forward 
that the majority of the Republic's population did not speak Kazak. Consequently, the 
number of those people who regarded the northern parts of Kazakstan as not belonging to 
the Kazaks began to grow. 
Environmental Degradation afttr the Campaign 
According to present-day native scholars, the Virgin Land campaign changed the 
ecological balance of northern Kazakstan as well. Many rare kind of birds and wild 
creatures were pushed out from the virgin land territory. Desiccation of the lakes and 
rivers in the area was hastened. Qostanay once had 5,000 lakes, of which only 500 
remained after the campaign. Some 56 small rivers once existed in the oblast; only 20 
remain today. One million hectares of land became useless after wind erosion in Pavlodar 
73 Khntshchev Memoirs, p. 124. 
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Oblast.74 At the same time, "in the whole Central Asia, 25 to 50 percent of the land is 
under severe threat of erosion."75 
Soviet authorities did not pay attention to the climatic conditions of the area. The 
continental climate in Kazakstan prevents intensive agriculture due to the low 
precipitation. Intensification of livestock-breeding meant an increase in the demand for 
fodder resources. More fodder meant violating the carrying capacity of the fields. The 
centrally-imposed policies of the Virgin Land development forced the people to use 
ecologically risky systems of opening large-scale feedlots and ploughing up huge 
amounts of fragile grazing fields for farming. Current scientific expeditions reveal the 
following, relying upon the findings of native agricultural specialists: 
For range-land degradation, the following is to blame ... Up to 60 % of arid areas of 
Central Asia are subject to desertification caused mainly by overgrazing and the cutting 
of fuel wood .... Others point to arable farming as the source of damage, particularly the 
Soviet policy of increasing the cultivation of marginal land subject to wind erosion and 
the removal of crop residues for livestock feeds, a practice which has reduced soil 
organic matter by an estimated 28 % in the last quarter of a century. 76 
74 Omarbekov, ibid., p. 127. 
75 Tjaart W. Schillhorn van Veen, "New Challenges for the Livestock Sector in Central Asia: Overcoming 
Old Legacies and Adapting to New Policies, Markets and Farmers," in Central Asia Livestock Regional 
Assessment Workshop, Tashkent, Uzbekistan: Feb. 27-March 1, Davis, California: Management Entity, 
Small Ruminant CRSP, University of California, (?1996), pp. 106-128. , in p. 109. 
76 Asanov, K. A., Alimov, I. I., and Smailov, K. S, "Effect of Grazing on Soil and Plant Covers in North 
Kazakstan," Problems of Desert Development, 1992, Vol. 2, pp. 7-13 and Y. Maul, V. Garmanov and S. 
Rikoon., "Soil Conservation and Agricultural Land Use Issues in Kazakstan," Journal of Soil and Water 
Conservation, 1993., Sept./October.. pp. 383-388. Both of these native sources were cited by Carol Kerven 
and Roy Behnke in ibid., p. 99. 
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THE DECLINE OF TRADITIONAL HUSBANDRY 
Traditionally raised Kazak livestock also suffered from the campaign. The 
number of sheep in the Republic decreased. The number of horses decreased to a third 
and the number of camel to fifth of the levels of the 1920s. The total number of sheep, 
goats, horses and camels was not more than 14 million. Between 1951 and 1965, the 
number of horses in the republic was only 365.700. Instead of these, swinebreeding rose 
to more than four times the previous level. The reduction of sheep-breeding on the Kazak 
land deprived it of its organic fertilizers. Chemical fertilizers replaced the organic 
fertilizer. The official target of the Republican administration set in 1959 hoped to 
achieve the number of animals in the first row of the following table. The actual 
achievement is given in the second row of the following chart: 
Sheep 
1959 Target 75 million 
1965 Achiev. 31.1 mill. 
Cattle Swine 
7.5 million 2.6 million 
6.8 million 1.7 million 
Horse 
1.8 million 
1 million 
Poultry 
30 million 
19.9 million 
Thus the Hru~9ev's claim that he would more meat and dairy products than the 
USA was not realized. The Soviet aim of reaching that target did not become possible 
during the Brejnev or even the Gorbachev time either. 
The Further Alienation of Kazaks from Native Culture 
In the course of the Virgin Land Campaign further russification of the Kazak 
society continued. Between 1954 and 1956, some 1500 teachers from other regions of the 
USSR came to Kazakstan. All found teaching positions in the Russian language schools. 
Closure of native Kazak schools, seizure of regional Kazak language newspapers and 
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journals, as well as their replacement with Russian language schools and Russian 
language newspapers and journals occurred during this period. All of these activities 
were valued as the "fruits of the principle of internationalism and of the peoples' 
friendship. " Those Kazak intellectuals who a couple of years earlier had been subjected 
to repression, were forced to praise the achievement of the Virgin Land Campaign. They 
were asked to glorify the Virgin Land, as the "planet on which one hundred languages" 
were spoken. 
A Soviet-supervised native Kazak source, the Qazaq-Sovet Entsiklopediyasz, 
praised the so-called achievements of the campaign as such: 
Present-day Kazakstan is an industrialized giant of a socialist republic where the 
agricultural sector is heavily mechanized ... The contribution of agriculture reached 25 % 
in the overall production of the republic ... Kazak agricultural achievements made an 
enormous contribution to the development of agriculture in our homeland (the Soviet 
Union). As a result of the Virgin Land Development between the 1954 and 1960,.with the 
help of the Soviet State and all of the Soviet people, 25.5 million hectares of land were 
opened to agriculture, and Kazakstan become one of the main agricultural producing 
regions. Kazakstan's place in producing grain has particularly become important. During 
the Eighth Five Year Plan (1965-1970), Kazakstan gave 61 million tonnes of grain to the 
(Soviet) state. During the first four years of the Ninth Five Year Plan (1970-1975) period, 
Kazakstan produced 96 million tonnes of grain. 77 
INDUSTRIALIZATION AND THE ECONOMY IN THE LATER SOVIET PERIOD 
Although Kunayev was criticized for serious mistakes in administering the Kazak 
Republic when he was finally removed from the post of First Secretary, the Kazak 
economy and industry, at least in officially given figures remained quite high. Kazakstan 
had produced electrical energy of 0.6 billion kW/h in 1940, this rose to 2.6 billion kW/h 
in 1950 and 10.6 billion kW/h in 1960. The Republic was producing 17.3 million tonnes 
77 "Qazaq SSR," Qazaq-Sovet Entsiklopediyas1, Vol. 6, p. 271-272. 
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of coal in 1950, which rose to 32.3 million tonnes in 1960. Coal production from 
Qaraganda and Ekibastuz by open-cast methods rose to 61 million tonnes annually in 
1970. The industrial potential of the Republic rose to twice the previous level between 
1961 and 1965. There were 729 big enterprises and 535 workshops before 1965. A 
further 445 big enterprises and workshops were opened after that time. Kazakstan began 
to produce 18.2 million tonnes of iron ore in 1970, which was three times higher than in 
previous years. Oil production was 3 million tonnes in 1965; it rose to over 10 million 
tonnes in the next five years before 1970. Nevertheless, some branches of industry, 
particularly the machine and auto-building industry, lacked the necessary investment. 
Seventy-two percent of the Republic's need for auto spare parts were brought from other 
regions of the Soviet Union. Kazakstan was dependent upon other regions and republics 
of the USSR for necessary auto spare parts, important instruments, electro-technical 
appliances and equipment. 78 Thus, " ... trade between Kazakstan and the rest of the USSR 
reflects some of the patterns of economic relations between colonial (or underdeveloped) 
countries and highly developed metropolitan countries. It also fits the classic Marxist 
(and Leninist) definition of colonialism. Most manufactured goods were neither owned 
nor produced by Kazaks .... non-Kazaks occupied the most important positions in towns. 
A similar pattern was typical of many new developments in northern Kazakstan, 
including those in the "virgin lands" area."79 With the launching of the Virgin Land 
Campaign, the percentage of Kazak workers among the overall workers in the Republic 
7R Qazaqstan Tariyh1, p. 360-364. 
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began to decline. Kazak workers in the Republic's industrial sector represented 17.4 
percent in 1957, a figure which declined to 11.7 percent by 1973. The number of Kazak 
workers were higher only in two sectors of industry. At the beginning of the 1970s, the 
number of Kazaks working in the oil production sector was 69.5 percent and in the 
natural gas production sector the figure was 53.6 percent. The number of Kazak workers 
in the Republic's oil refineries was 36.7 percent, in printing houses 27.8 percent, in food 
production 20.3 percent, in lumberjack stations and carpentry only 28.8 percent. The 
number of Kazak workers in energy equipment production was only 2.2 percent, in 
enterprises for appliances and spare parts 4.7 percent, in enterprises for electro-technical 
equipment 6.6 percent, and in the textile industry and tailoring trade 13.6 and 15.7 
percent respectively.80 
The major reason for the poor Kazak participation in the industrial production 
sector was the decline in the overall Kazak population as a result of famine, war, 
repression and forced collectivization, worsened by the bringing of massive numbers of 
settlers to the Kazak land, particularly during the 1950s and 1960s. Those changes altered 
the ethno-demographic balance in the Republic and drastically reduced the Kazak 
chances of taking their place in all sectors of the economy. There were no official 
administrative measures taken to reverse the decline in the Kazak percentage of workers 
in various sectors of the economy. Particularly, the central administrative departments' 
neglected to train native specialists to work in the industrial sector of the Republic. The 
79 Zev Katz, "Kazakhstan and the Kazakhs," Handbook of Major Soviet Nationalities, New York 1975., p. 
215. 
Ko Qazaqstan Tariyhi, p. 370-371. 
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central organs in the Soviet Union found it much easier to bring such specialists from 
other parts of the USSR. 
KAZAKSTAN TOW ARDS THE END OF THE SOVIET UNION 
During the first five years of the 1980s, the top leadership of the Soviet Union 
changed three times. When Brejnev died in 1982, Konstantin Chernenko and later Yuriy 
Andropov assumed the post of the First Secretary of the Soviet Communist Party within 
three years from 1982 to 1985. However, the two old leaders both died soon and a rather 
young leader, Mikhail Gorbachov, was appointed as the First Secretary of the Soviet 
Communist party. Gorbachov left his mark in Soviet Union by his much publicized 
attempts to reform the country's economy and to remove some old practices of 
censorship in the Soviet media. 'Glasnost' (Openness) and 'Perestroyka' (Re-
structuring) were the words used to describe these moves. In order to address the 
country's grave problems of economic decline and political stagnation, Gorbachov 
launched radical political reforms by removing the control behind the forces of 
democratization and decentralization. When he came to power in March 1985, 
Gorbachov began sacking hundreds of officials connected with Brejnev, whose rule from 
1964 to 1982 was condemned as a period of stagnation in. every sphere of life in the 
Soviet Union. 
The Kazak Republic also received its share of criticism. The Soviet press began to 
criticize the top party leadership in Kazakstan for poor performance in management 
during the previous five years from 1980 to 1985. When Gorbachov visited Kazakstan in 
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September 1985, m Tselinograd (the former Aqmola and the present Kazak capital 
Astana) he refused to accept the 'bad-weather' excuse for the poor performance of the 
Republic's agriculture. The 'socialist republic's' obligation was to achieve the production 
of 29 million tonnes of grain for Kazakstan while, in reality, only 24 million tonnes of 
grain was collected from the fields in 1985. Following Gorbachov's visit to Kazakstan, 
western sources began to report the removal of party officials in Kazakstan. 81 The 
Seventy-four year-old Kazak Party chief, Kunayev, was removed from his Republican 
party post as first secretary in December 16, 1986. He was famed as one of the men close 
to Brejnev, and the new Party Secretary of the USSR, Gorbachov, criticized him for 
serious shortcomings in administering Kazakstan. Kunayev was blamed for blatant 
corruption and poor economic performance in Kazakstan. The management of industry 
was described as a dismal failure and housing and food supply as grossly inadequate. 
Western news agencies and correspondents reported at that time that Kunayev's removal 
was a further move for the new Soviet leader Gorbachov towards consolidating his power 
and to bringing his own men to run the Soviet Union. 
Kunayev's removal from the Kazak party leadership instigated a national riot led 
primarily by Kazak students in Almatl, then Alma Ata. It was mainly sparked by Kazak 
81 R. M. Brongasser, "Gorbatschow greift in Kasachstan rigoros durch," Die Welt, 21 December 1985. 
Under the subtitle 'Kopfe rollen', the German newspaper wrote the following: 
Den als jetzt des Plenum des ZK der KPdSU von Kasachstan tagte, wurden die 
Konsequenzen gezogen. In einem knappen Beschluss wurde der Bevolkerung mitgeteilt, 
dass der Sekretaer and das Mitglied des ZK-Buros K.K. Kasybajew seiner Pflichten 
entbunded und ihm andere Aufgaben ubertragen worden seien. 
Gleiches widerfuhr dem ZK-Mitglied K.M. Auchadijew. Ebenfalls seiner 
Pflichten entbunden und in den Ruhestand entlassen wurde das ZK-Mitglied B.A. 
Ashimow. Und der ehemalige Erste Sekretar des Stadtparteikomitees von Alma Ata, 
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anger over the replacement ofKunayev with a Russian, Gennady Kolbin, who had had no 
previous contacts or any working experience in the Kazak republic. On December 1 7 and 
18, 1986, demonstrations in Almatt were also fueled by long standing social discontent. 
The riot in Almatl was unusual because of its political character and because of the 
Soviet authorities' willingness to report it to the Soviet public and the world media. It 
was reported then that hundreds of Kazak students went shouting "Kazakstan for 
Kazaks!", "America is with us, Russians are Against Us!'', "True Representation of 
Kazaks at the United Nations!" etc. 
The outstanding Soviet expert and historian Richard Pipes reasoned that 
Gorbachov's move of appointing a Russian as the First Secretary of the Kazak 
Communist Party, was a "recognition of the fact that Kazakstan has ceased to be a 
"Moslem" republic, now that its Slavic inhabitants outnumber Kazaks."82 Although the 
real reason behind Gorbachov's decision might be different than the above statement, it 
was a danger sign for the native Kazaks that their land would be recognized as part of 
Russia. However the reactions of the native Kazaks proved that they did not agree with 
the idea of the top Soviet leaders at that time. A well-known western Sovietologist, 
Bohdan Nahaylo, wrote the following in the pages of The International Edition of the 
Wall Street Journal; 
... The protests provide a dramatic reminder of a fundamental fact about the 
Soviet Union too often overlooked in the West. The Soviet Union is the world's largest 
multinational state and its last great empire. The disturbances in the Kazakh capital also 
highlight the intractable and potentially explosive nature of the nationalities problem in 
the Soviet Union generally, and in Central Asia in particular. 
A.D. Koischumanow; wurde sogar wegen "Falschung seiner Personalien, 
Unbeschaidenheit und Amtsmisbrauch aus der KPdSU ausgeschlossen. 
82 Richard Pipes, "the 'Glasnost' Test," New Republic, February 2, 1987. 
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The Soviet Union is, essentially, the former Russian empire, recast in a Soviet 
mold. Despite Soviet claims that the nationalities problem inherited from the czarist 
"prison of nations" has long been successfully resolved, and a harmonious federation of 
"free and equal" peoples established, important decisions are still made in Moscow. The 
Russians, who constitute barely half of the Soviet Union's population of 280 million, 
retain a position of political and cultural dominance . 
... Tensions and resentment are exacerbated by Moscow's disregard for national 
sensibilities of non-Russians, particularly by the manner in which Russian is promoted. 
Nevertheless, under the leadership of Dinmukhamed Kunaev, who was the 
Kazakh party chief for over two decades, the Kazakhs gradually began to come into their 
own again. Regarded as a Brejnevite crony by observers in the west, Mr. Kunaev in his 
own republic appears to have been something of a paternal figure. His removal was not 
entirely unexpected, but the tactless manner in which he was replaced by a Russian was 
interpreted as an insult to resurgent Kazakh pride. 83 
When Kazakstan was struggling to overcome its problems related to mal-
administration and to the declining economy in the Republic, she was not alone. The 
Soviet state and its top leaders were also seeking ways to improve the Soviet economy. 
By 1990, crises stemming from further political disintegration and a failed reform for the 
recovery of Soviet economy from the collapse threatened the USSR. Decentralization 
gradually gave way to a more quicker phase of the power shift from the central 
governmental bodies to those in the republics. The dominant position of the Communist 
Party and the prestige of the Soviet armed forces began to decline drastically which led to 
the failed coup in August 1991 in Moscow. It has accelerated the process of 
disintegration and had the opposite result to that which the coup makers planned to 
achieve. They wanted to restore authoritarianism again. The Communist Party and its 
central administrative organs began to be dissolved and the USSR Supreme Soviet 
suspended the party's activities. The attempt to force the republics to bend before the 
center's authority had undermined its credibility. Starting with the declaration of 
RJ Bohdan Nahaylo, "Moscow Hears From The Kazakhs," Wall Street Journal, 22 December 1986. 
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-independence by the Baltic Republics on September 6, 1991, Armenia, Georgia and 
Moldavia followed. 
This trend was opposed by another group of Soviet republics that preferred to 
renew their partnership by creating a transitional government that lasted for only three 
months. Its main function was to cut further the authority of the central administration 
including its ministries and agencies. In December 1991, it was announced that the 
Commonwealth of Independent States was to be created in the place of the Soviet Union. 
Thus decision concerning the destiny of one of the most important superpowers of the 
twentieth century and its hundreds of millions of people were taken by a meeting between 
the Slavic leaders of the Russian Federation, Ukraine and the Byelorussian Republic. 
Those republics were three out of the four original signatories of the treaty that created 
the Soviet Union in 1922. Except for the Baltic Republics and Georgia, the rest of the 
former Soviet Republics later joined the newly established CIS, each having varying 
degrees of economic, military and other reasons for interdependence with each other. The 
main reason for joining this new association stemmed from the necessity of coordinating 
future policies in the military field, in economic, banking, energy, transportation and 
cultural affairs. 
That action brought extraordinary challenges for all fifteen Republics of the 
USSR. It was particularly striking for the leaders of the Central Asian republics, who, 
except for the Klrg1z president Akayev, were part of the nomenklatura that had ruled their 
regions according to orders from above. Although the USSR had collapsed, in certain 
respects, most importantly in economic and in military fields, the republics remained 
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totally dependent on each other. Leaders of the Central Asian Republics were under 
pressure from unavoidable burdens for which none had any previous preparation to 
prevent or overcome. In the simplest sense of the word, they were forced to become 
independent. 
Most resistant among all of the republican leaders, was Kazakstan's Nursultan 
Nazarbayev. He proved to be the most active leader in the attempt to revitalize or restore 
the lifeless-putrescent corpse of the USSR. This of course partly resulted from 
Nazarbayev's lack of assertiveness in seeking genuine national independence. Seven 
decades of Soviet rule left Kazakstan virtually the most interdependent of all the fifteen 
Soviet Republics with Russia. Thus the high level of subordination to the center made 
Kazakstan' s road to independence a much tougher path. 
KAZAK IDENTITY IN THE TWENTIETH CENTURY 
Almost a century after the emergence of the Ala~ movement, in the present-day, 
intellectuals in the Kazak society began to search new ways towards their future path. 
There are at least three ways, similar to the choices faced by the Kazak intellectuals prior 
to the October revolution. Today's independent Kazakstan can choose to become a state 
associated with its regional Islamic and Turkic identities; secondly, a country closer to 
the western ideas of democracy and freedom, as well as preserving its Turkic and 
Muslim character; thirdly a country closer to the Russian world and perhaps inclined 
towards forming more intimate political, military, economic and cultural links with 
Russia and, in the future, through further integration, to become a part of great Russia. In 
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order to define the most suitable way towards their future, present-day Kazak 
intellectuals started a move to re-evaluate their history and build a new nation from the 
ruins left after the Soviet demise. 
Since the Kazaks of the present day, at least most of the intellectuals, declare 
themselves both to be patriots and as "ultjand1" (nation-lovers not nationalist), in 
applying the concepts and explanations of most of the Kazaks towards their fatherland, 
"atameken," one finds some confusing remarks. Any mature adult regardless of his 
nationality seem to find it difficult to define himself as a patriot in the now-old Soviet 
sense and nationalist by his ethnic origin and loyal citizen of his newly independent state. 
When the discussion came to this point, the preferences of the "ultjand1"-
nationalist Kazaks and ethnic Russians supported by Russified native elements began to 
form a clearer picture. The nationalist Kazak intellectuals wanted to restore the former 
native political and intellectual figures and their ideas. They supported the native claims 
about the declining status of the Kazak language. They began to criticize, during the 
years of Glasnost (openness) and Perestroyka (restructuring), the earlier policies carried 
out by the Soviet administration towards nationalist intellectuals and towards the Kazak 
masses. Before the end of the Soviet Union, a move had already started in Kazakstan to 
rehabilitate those Ala~ intellectuals. This was the beginning sign of the new nationalist 
trend paying tribute to the memories of and later, the ideas of the former nationalist 
intellectuals. 
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CHAPTER FOUR: THE STATE-BUILDING PROCESS AND THE SOVIET 
LEGACY IN INDEPENDENT KAZAKST AN 
The following chapter will further explain the dilemmas that the new Kazak 
Republic faces in trying to overcome the burdens left after the Soviet demise. The 
Republic of Kazakstan entered independence as one of the most problematic republics. 
Problems stemming from the Soviet military, political, social and environmental policies 
will be the subject of discussion. This chapter will reveal the difficulties of the Kazak 
route towards independence. 
Military matters, including the issues of nuclear arms and space installations, as 
well as their division between the old center and the Republic of Kazakstan, will be 
discussed first. Kazakstan is also facing problems related to its multi-ethnic demographic 
composition. This is another Soviet legacy. Discussion of current matters related to the 
use of the native language and the Russian language can also be found in this chapter. 
Environmental problems in Kazakstan, which were largely a result of Soviet centrally-
controlled policies, is another issue to which this new republic seeks a solution. 
Understanding the military, economic and cultural dependency of Kazakstan is 
the aim of the following chapter. The reactions of forces inside the republic, as well as its 
current ties with the former center, Moscow, both at governmental level and between the 
two major ethnic groups, the Russians and Kazaks, will also be investigated. New trends, 
particularly among the native population, and its interaction with the other part, the Slavic 
group, is included in the hope of defining the problems of society in Kazakstan. 
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As for the native intellectual elite, they are a group of writers, scholars, scientists, 
journalists and teachers of Kazak language and history. The famous Kazak writer and 
poet, Oljas Silleymenov himself, advocated a confederation with the Russian Federation 
and rejected the grant of official status to the Kazak language. As the president of the 
People's Congress Party, Siileymenov attempted to win the votes of the Russian-speaking 
population in 1994. 1 However, his support of confederation with Russia and his rejection 
of granting the Kazak language official status reveals the conflicting ideas of even native 
intellectuals. This is also to state that some native Kazak intellectuals are inclined to 
make public announcements to achieve political gains as well. This is especially 
significant for those current native administrative officials in Kazakstan in order to draw 
criticism from non-native circles. Regarding the past professional careers of most of the 
leading native administrators, as the tools of the former Soviet administrative system, 
such moves are understandable. They are the tools of indirect Russian rule in Kazakstan. 
They were trained during one of the most formidable colonization processes in the area 
under the Russian overlordship. 
The current native nationalist intellectuals writing in the Kazak language have 
many similarities with those Ala~ intellectuals at the beginning of this century. They are 
supporting and advocating similar concerns related to the survival of the Kazak nation. 
They are praised to become one of the strongest currents in Kazakstan, not only for the 
present day but for the future as well. Most of the Kazak language media are controlled 
1 Oljas Siileymenov, "Bizding Muratim1z Tag1 da Sol-Tavlard1 Alasartpay Dalam Asqaqtatuv," Qazaq 
Adebiyatz, No. 7, 18 February 1994, pp. 6-7. 
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by them. They are publishing newspapers, books, both academic and otherwise, journals 
and even making movies in order to tell the Kazak plight of today and past. Most of their 
work is intended to educate future generations and most of these nationalist intellectuals 
are following a similar path to that of the Ala~ intellectuals in voicing the concerns of 
their native people. 
PROBLEMS INHERITED FROM THE SOVIET PERIOD 
Military: Nuclear Arms, Nuclear Power and Space Installations 
The process of the dissolution of the Soviet Union, particularly after the 1991 
August coup attempt, brought a new phenomenon to world history. For the first time in 
the history of mankind, a military nuclear power and its whole nuclear might and 
potential was going to be distributed among the disintegrating Soviet republics. This fact 
has encouraged many military, political and administrative organs of the states of the 
world to attempt to find a solution. Most important for the world's security was the fact 
that four former Soviet republics possessed nuclear weapons or other types of nuclear 
stocks and installations on their soil: the Russian Federation, Ukraine, Byelorussia and 
Kazakstan. 
Thus the most important function of the CIS was to find a suitable way to control 
the nuclear weapons and their proliferation to the world. Although the biggest portion of 
the nuclear stock was vested in the Russian Federation's hand-some 70 percent,-
Kazakstan was among the other three Republics possessing some 25 percent of the 
former Soviet Union's nuclear force. In other words, "Kazakstan has about 3 percent of 
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the identified former Soviet Defense industry facilities, the largest military-industrial 
sector outside the Slavic republics." (Uzbekistan has only one percent, Byelorus has 5 
percent, Ukraine 15 percent: 
According to the Kazak Minister of Industry, the Kazak defence industry 
comprises over 50 enterprises. A plant in Petropavlovsk produces the SS-21 SRBM. 
Other Petropavlovsk plants produce ballistic missile support equipment, torpedoes, and 
naval-communications-equipment. Another major torpedo producer is located in Almat1. 
All these plants rely on inputs of components from other states, primarily Russia. A plant 
in Ust-Kamenegorsk produces nuclear power reactor fuel and beryllium products, and a 
plant at Aqtav(Sev9enko) processes uranium ore. In addition, Kazakstan has the only 
known plant outside Russia designed for production of chemical and biological materials. 
Kazakstan's roughly one percent of the known former Soviet military R.D.T & 
E (Research, Development Technic and Equipment) facilities are much more significant 
than the count indicates. Kazak test ranges have played a vital role in the development 
and production of aerospace systems. The range at Vladimirovka is used for integration 
of aircraft with airborne weapons, the center at Sar~1ganaq is used for development and 
flight testing of strategic air defense missile and ballistic missile defence systems, and the 
center at Emba performs similar functions for tactical air defence missile systems. The 
facility at Tyuratam(Toretam) is used to launch spacecraft (including all manned 
missions) and to test liquid-propellant ICBMs. The Semipalatinsk Nuclear Weapons 
Proving Ground is one of the two facilities in the former Soviet Union where nuclear 
weapons were tested; in 1991, Kazakstan banned further nuclear testing and a~ounced 
plans to convert the installations to civil uses. 
Kazak plants are key suppliers of such strategic materials as titanium, 
magnesium, tantalum, niobium, gold, silver, and alimuna. Up to 1984 at least, the Soviets 
imported ore-probably from Australia- for the Ust-Kamenogorsk titanium-magnesium 
plant, apparently in part because of delays in developing the nearby Qaraotkel ilmenite 
deposit. A plant in Pavlodar is one of the three largest producers of alumina in the NIS,-is 
a major supplier to Russia's aluminum plants in Siberia. 2 
Already in 1993, Kazakstan joined the CIS agreement to place its strategic nuclear 
forces under the control of the joint CIS command. As early as 31 January 1992, "the 
press service of the president of the republic has distributed an announcement which says: 
People in Kazakstan approve of the statement on Russia's policy in the area of limitation 
and reduction of weapons, since it corresponds to the interests of the people and the 
2 Donald Creacey, 'The Defense Industries of the Newly Independent States of Eurasia," in The Former 
Soviet Union in Transition, Richard P. Kaufman and John P. Hardt eds., Armonk: M. E. Sharp, 1993, pp. 
783-790, and in p. 787. 
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republic .... It has come about that Kazakstan is a nuclear power, and not by its own will. 
For decades nuclear weapons were produced there as part of the USSR; test complexes 
and appropriate infrastructure were created."3 All tactical nuclear weapons on Kazak soil 
were to be carried to Russia by 1992. The official decision to become a nuclear-free state 
is already an endorsed decision of the Kazak Supreme Council. Kazakstan signed the 
START (Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty) treaty on May 23, 1992 to relinquish all 
strategic nuclear missiles before the century ends. Two days after signing the ST ART I, 
Kazakstan and Russia concluded a bilateral treaty that affirms existing borders and 
creates a united military and strategic zone. After signing the treaty, Nazarbayev said that 
Kazakstan was under "Russia's nuclear umbrella." With this treaty, Kazakstan and Russia 
strengthened their ties and proved their partnership that was documented a week earlier in 
Ta~kent. The heads of states of the CIS countries met in Ta~kent on 15 May 1992 to sign 
a collective security agreement, assuring each other that they would provide military 
assistance in case of aggression against any one of them. Kazakstan was also home to the 
Soviet space launch facility at Baykongur/Toretam and the San~1ganaq test site for anti-
ballistic missiles and the Soviet air defense system. Right after the Soviet disintegration, 
military analysts wrote that Kazakstan had 104 SS-18 intercontinental ballistic missiles 
(ICBMs) with 1040 warheads, in Derjavinsk and Jang1z Tobe. This type of missile was 
the largest Soviet type, carrying ten 550kt (kilotonnes) warheads. The Semey nuclear site 
was home to 40 Tu-95 Bear bombers.4 The Kazak parliament ratified the nuclear Non-
3 SWB, SU/1294 Al/4, 3 February 1994. 
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Proliferation Treaty on December 13, 1993, when they received the necessary assurances 
for the development and adoption of a Convention for the Strengthening of Guarantees of 
Non-Nuclear States' Security.5 Together with the removal of the last vestiges of nuclear 
power from the territory of Kazakstan in 1995, the attention of the outside powers, such 
as the USA, began to shift from Kazakstan. From that time onwards, the Kazakstani 
officials felt abandoned in their struggle to maintain economic security and social 
stability in their Republic. 6 
Not the last, but an important matter which brought misery to the lives of the 
inhabitants of Kazakstan, was the Soviet testing of military-nuclear weapons on Kazak 
territory. A testing zone for military nuclear weapons was created in the region among the 
Semey, Pavlodar and Qaraganda ob lasts, by the decision of the Council of Ministers of 
the USSR in 1948. The first nuclear testing was organized on August 29 1949 in the 
Soviet Union. According to the Soviet Ministry of Defense, there were 113 nuclear bomb 
tests carried out in the Semey polygon (the nuclear testing site) between 1949 and 1963. 
Each bomb's capacity ranged from a couple of kilotonnes to 100 kilotonnes. Soviet 
nuclear testing practices were carried out underground only after 1964. From that time 
onwards, 343 tests were carried out and each bomb's capacity reached 150 kilotonnes. 
Kazak medical personnel were aware of the increase in radiation in the regions 
4 Bogdan Nahaylo, Encyclopedia of Conflicts, Disputes and Flashpoints in Eastern Europe, Russia and the 
Successor States, London: Longman Current Affairs, 1993, p.172. 
5 Philip Petersen, "Security Policy in Post-Soviet Central Asia," European Security, Vol. 4, No. I (Spring 
1995)p.160. 
" Murat Laumullin, Foreign Policy and Security of the Republic of Kazakstan, Almati: The Eurasia 
Foundation, 1997, p. 7. 
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neighboring the nuclear testing site, yet were forbidden to state the diagnostic medical 
results for those who died of ionized radiation.7 Thus one of the first pressing issues for 
the Kazak government was to stop the Soviet nuclear testing site in Semey during the first 
year of independence, and to declare the regions poisoned by radiation to be ecological 
disaster areas. Six rayons and two cities in Semey (Semipalatinsk) oblast, one city in 
~1g1s Qazaqstan oblast, and two rayons(region) each in Qaraganda and Pavlodar Oblasts 
were listed as disaster areas. Together with Semey nuclear testing site and Ural Oblast as 
well as other Soviet nuclear and other forms of mass destructive weapons testing sites, 
the disaster areas occupied 18 million hectares of Kazak land by the year 1980. The 
Semey nuclear testing site alone covered 8372 square kilometers of land. The Kazak 
argument stemmed from the fact that the central organs of the Soviet Union had occupied 
those areas for the use of the Soviet military without the consent of the Republican 
government or of the people in the Republic. According to the specialists' accounts, some 
500,000 inhabitants in Semey Oblast were subjected to poisonous ionized-radiation 
during the years of nuclear testing. The number of people dying from oncological 
diseases increased seven times between 1975 and 1985 in the Semey region alone. There 
were 38 nuclear tests of varying capacity conducted in 27 spots in Kazakstan. A testing 
site in Atirav Oblast was used 17 times, the Ural region eight times, and the Aqtobe, 
Aqmola and Southern Qazaqstan regions were also used for Soviet nuclear testing 
purposes. Barsakelmes Island in the Aral Sea was a site for testing bacteriological 
7 Qazaqstan Tariyh1, p. 359. 
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weapons.8 The native press in Kazakstan evaluates that Kazak independence played a 
key role in preventing further nuclear testing on Kazak soil. The Kazak public, led by the 
famous writer of Az I Ya or the tale of Prince Igor, Oljas Siileymenov, used the 
opportunities of Glasnost to form the Nevada-Semey antinuclear movement for rallying 
opposition to the Soviet testing of nuclear weapons. 
As early as April 13, 1992, President Nazarbayev declared that the former Soviet 
nuclear test center near Semey was going to be a scientific research center. "A decree by 
Kazak president Nursultan Nazarbayev said the center's vast network of underground 
tunnels would be used for the destruction of missiles in accordance with the US-Soviet 
Treaty reducing long-range nuclear weapons. It said the center could also be used for 
specific industrial projects, such as the production of artificial diamonds by means of 
non-nuclear explosions."9 This Kazak stance was confirmed by a bilateral Kazak-Russian 
treaty, signed in Fall 1992, which read as follows: 
The Republic of Kazakstan and the Russian Federation will pursue a 
coordinated policy in the sphere of security, disarmament and arms control. They 
recognize the continued need for joint command over strategic forces and the retention of 
single control over nuclear weapons. 
Recognizing the need for the maintenance and development of the scientific-
technical potential created at the Baykonur cosmodrome, the Semipalatinsk testing 
ground and other defence installations in both states, the Republic of Kazakstan and the 
Russian Federation will coordinate their scientific and production activities in the interest 
of science, the national economy and the maintenance of security. Both states will 
conduct a coordinated policy in the sphere of military cooperation, including the 
conversion of defence enterprises, the development of dual-purpose high-tech production 
facilities and the export of defence goods. IO 
8 Qazaqstan Tariyhz., p. 401. 
9 RFE/RL Archive Material, CNO 119, 13 April 1992. 
IO SWB; SU/1510, B/4, 13 October 1992. 
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Political: Problems of a Multi-Ethnic Society 
After the declaration of independence, Kazakstan was left with an ethnically 
mixed population of Kazak, Russian, German, Ukrainian, Korean, Uygur, and in total, 
some one hundred different nationalities in their republic. Most analysts regard it as 
sufficient to write about the difficulty of the ethnic composition in the Republic, relying 
mostly on the Russian language sources. The Kazak argument about the native rights over 
their fatherland was not given any strong voice in western literature about Kazakstan 
written after 1991. The only priority in explaining the native attempt to restore their 
historical, cultural and linguistic legacy was to raise the alarm about the coming so-called 
pan-Turkism before a snickering pan-Slavism that was experienced during the last 
decades of the Tsarist time and after the Soviet demise. Kazakstan was publicized as a 
country whose majority of inhabitants were of Slavic origin. This fact gave a simple 
reader the perception that Kazakstan belong to the Slavic world of nations rather than to 
its Turkic and Muslim world. It was supported by the fact that about 40 percent of native 
Kazaks are fluent in Russian and were well-adapted to the Russian style of living. 
Kazakstan's captivity to its political geography forced the new Kazak government 
to try hard to keep good relations with its neighbors, particularly with Russia. Thus, the 
elites in Kazakstan wanted to secure their independence by means of stressing territorial 
integrity in the face of a large number of Slavic settlers in the republic. The primary 
national security objective was given as the guarantee of independent status. The political 
danger of the unification of all the non-Kazaks against Kazaks was the point in 
maintaining the inter-ethnic consensus in the security field for the new Kazak state. 
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Ethnic 'self-determination' of non-natives was opposed by the Kazaks, as expressed by 
Omirserik Kasenov, Director of the Center for Strategic Research in Almat1, "self-
determination for Kazakstan means decolonization, not special rights for ethnic groups 
that came to our territory as colonists."11 
Another problem lies in the definition of the status of those Slavic settlers m 
Kazakstan. There seem to be an important confusion about their orientation of identity. It 
is important to determine whether they recognize themselves as the Russian diaspora, still 
feeling close to Russia rather than Kazakstan, as an ethnic group whose origin belongs to 
another state and thus who prefer to keep up their ethnic and cultural ties with the citizens 
of the Russian Federation. Slavic settlers on Kazak territory used to live this kind of life 
during the Soviet period and thus yearn for their lost former status, despite the fact that 
this will undermine their loyalty to the current independent Kazak country where they 
are recognized as Kazakistani citizens. The Cossack claim of one-third of Kazak 
territory( as their ancestral homeland due to its occupation by the Slavic population during 
the last three centuries) thus seems an unacceptable demand. Although the Russian 
Federation officially does not support any ethnic separatism on the territory of Kazakstan, 
individual unofficial demands do so are made both in Kazakstan and among Russian 
society outside the Republic. Justification is thus given to the Slavic settlers' status and 
their rights on account of their previous undermining the rights and status of the 
indigenous people. 
11 Omirserik Kasenov, an interview with him was carried out by a correspondent of Egemen Qazaqstan, 16 
October 1996. 
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Correction of past mistakes or the mismanagement of the Tsarist and the Soviet 
administrations was thus downplayed by recent scholars' analysis of society in 
Kazakstan. On the one hand, some western scholars claim that 'transnational themes such 
as pan-Turkism' are very unlikely to be recognized due to the acceptance and loyalty of 
each native citizen of the Central Asian Republics towards their distinct identity as 
Kazak, Kirg1z or Uzbek. On the other hand it is ignored that the Slavic population, 
despite being citizens of Central Asian independent states, do not accept their newly-
evolved status, as the loyal citizens of each new state. Thus they consider themselves and 
were counted by nationalist Slavic analysts as the Russian 'diaspora' and are justified in 
supporting pan-Slavism, under the disguised label of the rights of 'ethnic minorities.' If 
one speaks of a growing Kazak nationalism in Kazakstan, it is difficult to neglect the 
growing pan-Slavic tendencies or the Russian nationalism of ethnic Russians in 
Kazakstan and their loyalty to the Russian state. Seventy years of Soviet rule aimed to 
create an international society according to its ideological principles, but achieved many 
multi-ethnic states in which the Slavs were considered by the native people as 
"staygrants" or "sojourners." 
President Nazarbayev's move to train Kazak cadres, who had been deprived of the 
basic right of assuming responsibility in administering their land, is also 'publicized' by 
western scholars and press as the 'nativization' or 'Kazakization' of the independent 
Kazak government, as if it were a sin equal to what the former administrations of the area 
carried out under the name of "internationalization." The present day policy of 
nativization of the cadres is not enough to eliminate all the remnants of the Soviet past 
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and cannot restore a genuine Kazak nation state. It does seem to arouse panic in the eyes 
of the world public. Western political scientists depict the present political and cultural 
elites of these republics as one hundred percent Turkic and as those who try to develop a 
purely Turkic cultural identity for their republics, 12 Nazarbayev is not a prophet for a 
movement to correct the historical injustices done to Kazaks, but he is the best of the 
worst in the eyes of the Kazak nationalists, for the time being. "Many Kazaks think that 
their national interests are not being asserted clearly enough vis-a-vis the ethnic 
minorities."13 Objection to the current Kazak leadership is based on its rather cautious 
policy of not alarming the non-native part of the population and those who seem to 
support them outside the republic. Kazak President Nursultan Nazarbayev's reluctance to 
issue the Kazak declaration of independence was the result of his concern about, or fear 
of, disturbing the balance between the Kazaks and the Russians in the Republic. He was 
also critical of any Russian move to annex Kazakstan' s northern territories to the Russian 
Federation. Recognition of the Slavic citizens of Kazakstan, or of any other non-Slavic 
republic, as the Russian diaspora thus seems to be an asset in the hands of the Russian 
Federation to push and pull the former Soviet Republics to obey its decisions whenever it 
suits them best. It is necessary to be very careful to avoid overstatement of the facts, in 
either blaming Pan-Turkism or Pan-Slavism. Concerning this, a well-known Iranian-
American scientist wrote the following: 
12 Shireen T. Hunter, "The Muslim Republics of the Former Soviet Union: Policy Challenges for the United 
States," The Washington Quarterly, Vol. 15, No. 3, Summer 1992, p. 60. 
13 Sylvia Gressler, "Kasachstans schwieriger Weg in die Unabhangigkeit," Berichte des Bundesinstituts fiir 
ostwissenschaftliche und internationale Studien, No. 12/1993. p. 35. 
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Western policies adopted on the basis of an inaccurate reading of the historical, 
ethnic, and cultural realities of these new states, or founded on an exaggerated 
preoccupation with one element in the overall situation, or prompted by short-term 
expediency without adequate attention to long-term consequences, would make the 
realization of worst case scenarios more likely. 
By the same token, the opposite approach would diminish such dangers. 
Unfortunately, there is a real risk that current Western policies toward these republics are 
moving in the less fruitful of these two directions. Two conceptual underpinnings of 
Western policy stand out as especially wrong-headed. These are, first, inordinate fear of 
so-called Islamic fundamentalism and of Iranian expansionism, and, second, a reading of 
the ethnic, cultural, and historical realities of the ex-Soviet Muslim states that emphasizes 
only the Turkic element and consequently, a strategy based on Turkey to an excessive 
14 degree. 
The Kazak president Nazarbayev, on the other hand, described a Kazakstani 
citizen whose mother is Russian and father a Kazak, an image that posits a new breed or 
race that evolved from the melding of the European and the Kazak nations. It is partly 
true for the homo sovieticus type, one who cannot feel utterly loyal to either of the 
current official states, the Kazak or the Russian. He thinks, speaks and even dreams in 
Russian but yet due to his paternal ancestors considers himself a sort of Kazak. This type 
usually comes from the industrial-administrative towns and cities, where Russians and 
other Europeans are in the majority and modern city culture is the norm. If they feel 
closer to the Russian side, they are labeled by the nationalist Kazaks as mangqurts. Their 
definition of identity will decide the future path of the republic. 
The second type of Kazakstani citizen constitutes those people who live on the 
"Virgin lands" to the north and east of the republic, inhabited mainly by Russian and 
other Slavic settlers, living on the large, mechanized state farms where Slav peasant 
culture is predominant. This group can be classified as the Kazakstani citizens who are 
ethnically closer to Russia and considered by the Russian Federation as their 'diaspora.' 
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This type of people is not assimilated to the host's identity. It is this kind of tendency that 
will create a sense of irredentism and certainly will bring the surface a possible ethnic 
clash. What Nazarbayev is failing to count on is the level of loyalty of Soviet nationalities 
to their country. This loyalty, or what was termed as "Soviet patriotism," proved to be 
weak in the face of nationalism, including that of the Russian people during the last years 
of the Soviet Union. Nazarbayev is expecting the Slavic citizens of Kazakstan to be loyal 
to the new Kazak state and to display at least a certain level of patriotism to the Kazak 
land, which the Slavs have used as a home for at least two generations. If we accept 
Walker Connor's judgment that "nationalism customarily proves to be a far more 
powerful force than patriotism,"' 5 Nazarbayev's expectation from the Slavic population in 
Kazakstan will not be successful. 
The third type of Kazakstani citizens comes from traditional Kazak areas where 
extended families (which once were organized into brigades) and village culture still 
flourish. They are the homeland people and believe themselves to be the 'sons of the 
soil.' Thus they feel that "their culture merits a privileged position relative to the 
interlopers." 16 This is the group that support the moves of the present-day nationalist 
Kazak intellectuals. The independence era gave them the opportunity to express their 
long suppressed nationalist feelings. Ahmet Baytursun described this native psychology 
in his letter to Lenin in 1921 as the following: 
14Hunter, ibid, p. 57-58. 
15 Walker Connor, ibid, p. 196. 
I~ ibid. p.,78. 
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.. .It is possible that the natives might once again bury their enmity under their patience as 
they were doing it for ages. However, this silence might continue to the day when an 
opportunity arises for the natives to voice their disagreements in certain ways ... 17 
Thus, during the seventy years under the Soviet star, three demographically and 
culturally distinct "Kazakstans" have developed on the "Golden Steppe of the Kazaks." 
People have also begun to be divided into three groups in the shape of their opinions, 
language and lifestyles. The Kazaks, the Russians and the Mangqurts. Their political 
choices will define the future state of Kazakstan as time evolves. 
Another materialized cleavage in Kazakstan primarily concerns the matter of 
dual-citizenship for the Slavic population. They are pressing hard to achieve it. This is 
also a prime example of the lack of loyalty of those Slavic groups to their newly-
established independent state,. Kazakstan. This is largely emanating from the fact that, 
" ... the Russian population of Kazakstan is relatively newly-arrived; 38 percent of the 
present Russian population was born outside the republic, while the great majority of the 
remainder are either first- or, at most, second-generation." 18 This also reveals another fact 
that, almost half of the Russian population in Kazakstan have relatives in other parts of 
the former Soviet Union. This Russian population, who by themselves or via their 
17 Central State Archive of the Kazakstan Republic cited by Mana~ Qoz1bayev, Qazaqstan Tariyhz, p. 100-
105. 
IR Matiha Brill Olcott, "Democratization and the Growth of Political Participation in Kazakstan," in 
Conflict, Cleavage, and Change in Central Asia and the Caucasus, edited by Karen Dawisha and Bruce 
PaITot, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997, p. 207. Actually the western scientist are not in 
agreement with the date of the Slavic population in Kazakstan in considering the date of their arrival to the 
Republic. Ian Bremmer stated that "Not only do Russians represent a majority of the north's population, 
but few of those who live there are newcomers." in his article entitled "Nazarbayev and the North: State-
building and Ethnic Relations in Kazakstan," Ethnic and Racial Studies, Vol. 17., No. 4, October 1994, pp. 
619-635, and in p. 620. 
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ancestors were not directly involved in the process of the land occupation carried out by 
the Tsarist government, presently claim ownership of the Kazak land as their historic 
homeland. Their claim is based on the simple fact that the northern regions of Kazakstan 
were inhabited by Russians. Definition of the Russian population as a group whose 
settlement to Kazakstan goes at least a couple of generations back or whose settlement is 
a rather recent phenomenon will bring clarity to the genuine desire for irredentism or 
ethnic separatism in Kazakstan. It largely stems from a deliberate move to tum the ethnic 
issue into a political issue. 
Social: Problems of Education and Language 
The foremost Kazak writer Oljas Siileymenov stated, during the years of 
Perestroyka, that "When I was in school in Alma Ata in the 1950s, we studied the history 
of Greece and Rome, but not a word about the history of the Kazaks ! .. When I was in first 
grade, there weren't any schools in Alma Ata which taught in Kazak. .. Who knows that 
there were six million Kazaks on their territory at the end of the 1920s, but only three 
million after collectivization!" 19 As the above-statement shows the level of linguistic 
Russification is very strong in Kazakstan. During 1989, some 60 percent of all the 
inhabitants of Kazakstan considered themselves as bilingual. The educated classes and 
the majority of the Kazak elite is more comfortable in Russian than Kazak. The Soviet 
lifestyle created the necessity for an educated Kazak to speak fluent Russian and use it in 
19 Sally Newman, "Suleimenov Promotes Study of Kazakh History," RFE/RL Archive Material, June 14, 
1988. No. F-532-533. 
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every sphere of life. Despite the Soviet claim of equality of all nationalities, the Kazak 
language was always given a second-class status throughout Soviet rule. Any 
disagreement with this policy was considered a "nationalist inclination," and was 
subjected to punishment. Many unsuccessful moves were made to restore the declining 
popularity of the Kazak language during the later part of the Soviet rule. Kazaks who 
were aware of this situation pressured the administrative organs to declare Kazak to be 
the official language of the state. This has of course had the political consequence of 
rousing ethnic Russian concerns and claims that Russian has been placed in an inferior 
status. 
Another socially pressmg issue m independent Kazakstan is education. The 
overall assessment of the Soviet educational system was addressed in a number of studies 
in the west. 20 Although literacy had become widespread in Kazakstan during the Soviet 
period, the Kazak educated classes were subjected to Russification. The native population 
was forced to depart from their traditional culture and heritage, first by the imposed 
changes in their alphabet from Arabic to Latin in the late 1920s and about a decade later 
from Latin to the Cyrillic. Stalinist terror and execution deprived the Kazaks of their 
educated intellectuals. The following generation was professionally elevated to a higher 
status in so far as they adapted to Russian criteria, culturally and mentally. Native 
language schools drastically decreased and towards the end of the Soviet era some 40 
percent of native Kazak youth were not able to communicate in their mother tongue. In a 
2° For a thorough study of this subjects, please see, Harley Balzer, "Science, Technology and Education in 
the Former USSR," in The Former Soviet Union in Transition, edited by Richard Kaufman and John P. 
Hardt, Armonk: M.E. Sharpe, 1993. pp. 889-908. 
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way, the Soviet Union succeeded in its policy of creating a so-called 'international' 
society at the expense of the Kazak culture. Kazak cadres were not given opportunities in 
high security jobs. Russians in Kazakstan were usually the number one preference of the 
administrators to assume positions in important sectors of the Republic. The 
administration of sectors such as energy was directly ruled by Moscow. Native Kazaks 
were not given any important representation or opportunity to run the foreign affairs of 
the republic, even relations with neighboring republics were carried out via Moscow. 
Environmental Problems: Nuclear and Industrial Pollution 
"Kazakstan was the junk heap where Russia threw its garbage," said Oljas 
Siileymenov, who organized the movement that called itself Nevada-Semipalatinsk, as a 
way of linking the Soviet nuclear testing ground to the site in the United States. "Moscow 
decided that it could, with complete impunity, send all of its filthiest industries to the 
east. What's more, 93 percent of the industries here belong to the center. So we suffer, 
but we don't even profit. We are left deserted with poisoned land."21 " .•• the city of 
Semipalatinsk in Kazakstan, and its inhabitants lived hard by a top-secret-site where, 
from 1949 to 1962, the Soviet military conducted approximately three hundred nuclear 
weapons tests without telling the civilian population that fallout might result and expose 
them to danger. After atmospheric explosions were banned under the Soviet-Anglo-
American Limited Test Ban Treaty negotiated in 196322, the blasts continued 
21 Murray Feschbach and Alfred Friendly, Ecocide in the USSR: Health and Nature under Siege, N.Y.: 
Basic Books, 1992. p. 22-23. 
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underground, still hush-hush, but supposedly engineered to preclude any dangerous 
releases of radioactivity .... "23 In Suleymenov's words, "Mothers in Kazakstan are 
drinking water so contaminated by mercury that their babies die. Our people can't wait 
any longer for the government to help them. It can destroy. Only we can create. "24 
The problem of Kazak exposure to the ill-effects of radiation as a result of the 
Soviet nuclear testing was addressed by the international media as well. The following 
was published as early as 1993. 
The power of that first Soviet bomb was 18 kilotons. Its radioactive cloud-one 
of the biggest in the history of nuclear explosions-drifted over eastern Kazakstan and the 
Altai Mountains, and thousands of people were exposed. 
The exploison was set off at Semipalatinsk, an 18,000-square kilometer test site 
built in 1948. It's biggest and best known of the many military testing grounds in 
Kazakstan-and the republic has plenty of them. Picture this: At 2.7 million square 
kilometers, Kazakstan's land mass is equal to about four Frances; and, in aggregate, one 
of these "Frances" is completely occupied by military proving grounds. Some observers 
have calculated that half ofKazakstan's arable land is monopolized by proving grounds. 
All in all, the Soviets conducted 26 ground-explosion tests. Each explosion 
spread radiation over more than 800 Kazak settlements. The radiation level sometimes 
reached hundreds of rems at an output of 200 roentgen per hour. The Soviet Union's 
Ministry of Health kept increasing the acceptable exposure limits for Soviet citizens ..... 
Roughly one of every three explosions accidentally vented emissions into the 
atmosphere. In 30 cases, deadly radiation penetrated beyond the test site into populated 
settlements and areas where nomads herded sheep .... Radiation has been discovered in 
soil, food, water, and dwellings. Tests for the presence ofradioactive particles in milk in 
Semipalatinsk show rates exceed the accepted norm by 25-530 times. The presence of the 
same particles in bones of animals exceeds the norm by 4.7-30.9 times. 
The number of leukemia patients in the Semipalatinsk area grew by 2.3 times 
within eight years-from 51 people in 1980 to 118 in 1988 ... .In 1988 the infant mortality 
rate around Semipalatinsk was 34.4 per thousand; the average for the republic was 29.9 
25 per thousand. 
22 The USA, the USSR and the United Kingdom of England signed the Partial Test Ban Treaty prohibiting 
nuclear explosions in the atmosphere, in outer space and under water on August 5, 1963. 
23 Victor Kianitsa, "Test Anxiety," The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, Vol. 49, No. 8, 1993., pp. 37-39 
24Murray Feschbach and Alfred Friendly, Ibid., p. 239. 
25Kianitsa. ibid. 
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Semipalatinsk is the most publicized region in Kazakstan used for the Soviet 
nuclear testing purposes. As was mentioned before, there are other nuclear testing sites in 
the western part of Kazakstan as well. Atirav region is one of the kinds where millions of 
hectares of land were used for various types of Soviet nuclear weapons testing. It has 
been reported that, in western Kazakstan, the radiation level is several times higher than 
that of the Chernobyl area, in Ukraine. 
Apart from the damage done to the Kazak population and the Kazak land by 
nuclear tests, other heavy industry sites also pose a serious danger to human health and to 
the environment in Kazakstan. The harmful effects of heavy industry sites are poisoning 
the local population. " .. sulphur and nitrogen emissions in 1993 in Kazakstan Ob lasts 
ranged from 4kg in Almat1 to 483 kg in Pavlodar and 957 kg in Jezqazgan. The 
population of the Aral Sea basin has been affected by a combination of the desiccation of 
the sea, the release of salt, dust and sand into the food chain and water pollution from the 
inflow of herbicides, fertilizers and pesticides; the Caspian Sea has been affected by oil 
seepage; 1.5 million hectares of Kazak land was 'virtually destroyed' by missile launch 
emissions of heptyl. "26 
PROBLEMS OF MAINTAINING POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC INDEPENDENCE 
The Republic of Kazakstan shared some common characteristics with the other 
CIS states after its declaration of independence in its attempt to maintain free statehood. 
26 Michael Kaser, The Economies of Kazakstan and Uzbekistan, London: The Royal Institute of 
International Affairs, 1997., p. 20. 
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First and foremost, political independence depended largely on economic independence, 
which proved to be the greatest barrier to a more self-directed rule in Kazakstan. Most of 
the problems stemmed from the Soviet legacy. The local elite had little experience in free 
decision making both in political and economic matters. All of the former Soviet 
Republics had an economic life isolated from the realities and practices of the global 
economy. Each former Soviet Republic ended up with a large dependency on inter-
republican trade. Particularly the peripheral dependency on the center made the new 
independent republics vulnerable to the fluctuations of Russian economic policy. The 
"NIS inherited highly militarized and energy-wasteful industrial structures and enormous 
environmental degradation. The scale of environmental degradation, especially in Central 
Asia, has no counter-part in either the European NIS or Eastern Europe. There is also a 
great lack of a transportation network to link the new economies."27 This makes it 
particularly difficult for landlocked Central Asia to sell its rich natural resources. 
Inefficiencies in running the economy cripple the republics rich with natural resources, 
such as Kazakstan. Due to Kazakstan's strong position in energy sources, one would 
expect the country to jump to a much higher level of development after the Soviet Union 
unleashed it. Although it is a net exporter of crude oil and coal, and a republic nearly self-
sufficient in natural gas resources, Kazakstan is powerless to meet the needs of its 
citizens. Kazakstan does not have 
27 Bartholomiej Kaminski, "Introduction," in Economic Transition in Russia and the New States of Eurasia, 
edited by Bartholomiej Kaminski., N.Y.: M.E. Sharpe, 1996. pp. 3-10. and also please see the extensive 
research conducted by Gertrude Schroeder, "Economic Transformation in the Post-Soviet Republics: An 
Overview," in ibid., pp. 11-41. 
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enough refining or electric power capacity to satisfy its requirements and so must import 
petroleum products and about 15 percent of its electricity ... Because former Soviet 
planners built energy facilities with little regard for republican borders, however, 
Kazakstan is more dependent on other republics than its net export figures indicate. Most 
of its natural gas-primarily the sour gas from the Qara~1ganaq field in the western part of 
the country-is exported by pipeline to a gas treatment plant in Russia. The gas is used 
regionally on both sides of the Russo-Kazak border after treated. Most domestic 
consumers of natural gas, however, are situated in central and eastern Kazakstan and rely 
on imports through pipelines from Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan. Similarly the crude oil 
pipeline system built by the Soviets forces Kazakstan to export much of the oil it 
produces in the western part of the republic to Russia and to import oil from Siberia for 
its refineries in the east. Kazakstan's electric power system faces a similar situation-
northern Kazakstan is part of an electric power grid controlled in Moscow, while the 
remainder of the republic is supplied by a grid controlled in Tashkent, in neighboring 
Uzbekistan. 28 
Moreover, worse than all the other former Soviet republics, Kazakstan's economic 
sovereignty is under siege by the center. Moscow used to control 90 percent of the 
republic's enterprises. The other branches of the economy, namely agriculture, occupied a 
major place in the economy of Kazakstan. More than 1. 7 million people were employed 
in the agricultural sector in Kazakstan in 1991. In other words, some 18 percent of the 
labor force worked in the agricultural field. 29 The agricultural-industrial economy of 
Kazakstan produced mainly raw materials. The Moscow-controlled Kazak industry 
produced raw materials or at most only semi-processed products.30 Agricultural output 
also consisted of primary raw-materials. The economy of Kazakstan, at present, suffers 
from its remote location and its weak transportation network to the outside world, and 
thus lacks access to global markets. The Soviet Union exploited the natural resources of 
28 Jeffrey W. Scneider, "Republic Energy Sectors and Interstate Dependencies of the CIS and Georgia," in 
The Former Soviet Union in Transition, pp. 477-489. 
29 Richard Pomfpret, The Economies of Central Asia, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1995., p. 80. 
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Kazakstan by using very primitive technology. The "Soviet system assigned Kazakstan 
only the task of initial processing, after which the raw materials were shipped outside the 
republic."31 Central administrative organs ignored measures to protect the environment 
and the equipment necessary to produce consumer needs. The Kazak economy has a very 
low level of efficiency. Its only function was to supply raw materials. The standard of 
living is among the lowest in the whole former Soviet Union. Social and ecological 
problems threaten public safety and health throughout the republic. 
Kazakstan faced difficulties in foreign trade after its declaration of independence. 
She did not have any hard currency to support economic development and to stabilize her 
monetary system. There were no trained professionals to work in foreign trade policy 
matters or experienced personnel for running the complicated international trade and 
payment mechanisms. Only on November 15 1993 was Kazakstan able to issue its own 
national currency, the tenge.32 Thereafter, it became possible for Kazakstan to conduct an 
independent economic policy and other necessary procedures of foreign trade 
transactions. The heavy burden of the Soviet demise forced Kazakstan to give priority to 
economic policy over politics. 
30 Anstan Esentugelov, " Kazakstan: Problems and Prospects of Reform and Development," in Central 
Asia in Transition: Dilemmas of Political and Economic Development, edited by Boris Rumer, Armonk: 
M.E.Sharpe, 1996, pp. 198-225. 
31 Anstan Esentugelov, ibid., p. 200. 
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THE FORMATION OF A NATIONAL ARMY AND STATE/TERRITORIAL 
SECURITY 
First and foremost, Kazakstan is dependent on Russia for its state and territorial 
security matters. Despite its declaration of independence in political terms, Kazakstan is 
heavily dependent upon Russian help for military equipment. This was confirmed as the 
number one subject immediately after the disintegration of the Soviet Union. 
The Kazak Ministry of Defense and the Kazak armed forces were created in May 
1992. The primary decision to form a small national guard with 2.000 soldiers had been 
made earlier that year. "By decree of the president of the Republic of Kazakstan the guard 
has been set up with the aim of ensuring sovereignty, the protection of citizens' 
constitutional rights and freedom and also other vital interests of life. The republic of 
Kazakstan's republican guard will be a special military force and a reserve of the armed 
forces. The republican guard will be subordinated to the president of the Republic of 
Kazakstan. Direct command will be given to the commander of the republican guards. 
The manning of the republican guard is to be carried out in accordance with current 
legislation on a voluntary basis from those citizens of the Republic of Kazakstan liable 
for military service." 33 During the following months, it was announced that the border 
troops also were placed under Kazak command (August 1992). Kazakstan also assumed 
control of the Jerzinskiy Military School of Border Troops, that was based in Almat1, in 
1992. It was reported that the school and the native border troops units would be 
subordinate to the Kazak National Security Committee. 
32 RFEIRL Daily Report, No. 219., 15 November 1993. 
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"In March 1993 President Nursultan Nazarbayev restructured the Kazakstan 
armed forces into a smaller and leaner force which was less dependent on the USSR Line 
of Battle theory .... Kazakstan has its own air force, the Air Defense Corps based at 
Almati. The 79th Strategic Air Division is based at Semipalatinsk... Details of 
Kazakstan's military establishments are unavailable, although in Autumn 1992 the 
Russian forces stationed there numbered 63.000 ground troops. "34 Other sources claim, 
by citing Kazak military officials, that the Kazak armed forces consist of at least 50,000 
personnel.35 According to the IISS Military Balance 1997-98, the total number of Kazak 
army is 35,100 and the term of service is 31 months. Kazak Army is consist of 20,000; 
the navy is 100 and the Air Force is consist of 15,000 soldiers.36 
A native Kazak source admits that Kazakstan still has difficult problems in 
forming its own national army due to several factors. The most important is the fact that 
all commanding officers of the former Soviet Army now serving in Kazakstan were 
supposed to return to Russia according to an intergovernmental agreement. This mass 
exodus of military staff seems to have caused concern among the Kazak administration. 
Kazakstan was also deprived of a previous practice of selecting junior officers from other 
former Union republics. The Kazak problem of maintaining an acceptable number of 
junior and senior officers for its new national army stems from this old Soviet practice. 
33 SWB, SU/1335, C4/4, 21March1992. 
34 Bogdan Nahaylo, Encyclopedia of Conflicts, Disputes and Flashpoints in Eastern Europe, Russia and 
the Successor States, London: Longman Current Affairs, 1993., p.172. 
35 Countries of the World and Their Leaders Yearbook 1993, Detroit: Gale Research Inc., 1993., vol. I., p. 
767. 
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The Soviet armed forces had only marginal Central Asian participation in its officer 
corps. Armed forces in Central Asia were effectively dominated by Russians and other 
European Slavs. Thus the percentage of Slavic officers and technical specialists in all of 
the local contingents in Central Asia was thus very high. In Kazakstan only 3 to 4 percent 
of officers were ethnic Kazaks.37 
THE REVIVAL OF NATIONAL HERITAGE AND THE EMERGENCE OF KAZAK 
NA TI ON AL CONSCIOUSNESS 
With the coming of Glasnost, the Soviet press and Soviet intellectuals began to 
press for more freedom of publication, particularly regarding the Soviet past. Mikhail 
Gorbachev himself supported this movement by announcing that "there should not be 
any forgotten names and blank pages in Soviet history."38 Kazak writers and scholars 
were also encouraged by this movement and began to demand rehabilitation of key 
literary figures in their history. Oljas Silleymenov, the then First Secretary of the Kazak 
Union of Writers supported the move and stated his hope of republishing the works of 
Magjan Jumabayev and Sakerim Qudaybergenov as early as 1987. Both of these Kazak 
/ 
poets were executed by the Stalinist administration during the 1930s. It was the first sign 
of the Kazak intellectuals' attempt to rehabilitate the past by using the opportunity 
offered to them by Gorbachev's campaign of glasnost and of the trend towards removing 
36 The JISS Military Balance 1997-98, London: Oxford University Press, 1998., p. 156. 
37 Murat Lavmullin, Foreign Policy and Security of the Republic of Kazakstan, Almati: The Eurasia 
Foundation, 1997, p. 19. 
38 Ann Sheehy, "Call for Rehabilitation of Two Kazak Poets," RFE/RL Archive Material, 9 June 1987. 
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the blank spots in history. Particularly, the Kazak demand to have Magjan rehabilitated 
was astonishing due to the fact of his association with the nationalist Ala~ Party. The 
following year, articles began to appear in the native Kazak press calling for a return to 
native toponyms. For example a certain place in Qostanay was named after Golo~9ekin 
until 1988 and a Kazak writer, S1rbay Mavlenov, drew attention to this fact. 39 Golo~9ekin 
was the First Secretary of the Kazak CP during the collectivization drive in Kazakstan 
and was the foremost agent of Stalin's brutal killings on the Kazak steppe, and the creator 
of artificial famine in the 1930s. During 1988, a play written by ~erhan Murtaza about 
Turar R1squlov's attempt to prevent artificial famine on the Kazak land by his appeal to 
Stalin was also put on the stage. Turar R1squlov, the most prominent native communist 
figure, rose to a very high position in Kremlin during the 1930s and worked close to 
Stalin shortly before being executed. The Kazak intellectuals' attempts to rehabilitate 
native intellectuals victimized by the repressive Stalinist administration did not stop with 
these preliminary attempts. The next poet to be rehabilitated was Jusipbek Aymav1tov, 
who had written the "national anthem" of the Ala~ Orda. This trend was only the tip of 
the iceberg buried for decades deep in the hearts of Kazaks who sought to remedy the 
past injustices done to them. From 1988 onwards, this trend continued with further 
rehabilitation of past literary and political figures of Kazak history. Particularly 
important was the rehabilitation of the chief Ala~ activists, Alihan Bokeyhanov, Ahmet 
Baytursm, Mirjaq1p Duvlat and others. Academicians, writers, newspaper correspondents 
and the whole Kazak people supported it through publishing articles and sending letters 
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to the press. As early as 1987, the late Kazak writer Anvar Alimjanov wrote in the pages 
of the Kazak literary weekly, Qazaq Adebiyat1 the following: 
To say the least of it we should be able to compile a truthful history of our 
culture for the last seventy years since the Great October Revolution. Ultimately we must 
give a clear and precise evaluation of the creative work of representatives of Kazak 
culture whose names could not be mentioned up to now. Not to mention their names 
shows our irresoluteness and weakness in the face of the truth. Such a situation has 
always led to falsehood. One should not fear the truth. The creative work of these people 
is also our heritage from the past. 40 
From the years of Glasnost onwards, the native Kazak press became very active in 
reassessing their history, reevaluating many unuttered matters related to the Kazak past. 
The colonial period and the Kazak struggle against the Tsarist administration first 
appeared earlier in the form of a novel, Han Kene (1971), written by ilyas Esenberlin and, 
later, another three-volume novel depicted the struggle of the nomadic Kazaks during the 
time of Abilay Han entitled Ko$pendiler(1979) again by ilyas Esenberlin. Native Kazak 
intellectuals increased their search for the Kazak past, particularly after the disintegration 
of the Soviet Union. Specifically, concerning the pre-Revolutionary activities of the Ala~ 
intellectuals, hundreds of articles and tens of books began to appear in Kazakstan. Many 
young scholars spent their years in the archives of the former Communist party searching 
for the traces of Kazak political and literary figures who perished during the Stalinist 
purges of the 1930s. 
The declaration of independence in Kazakstan strengthened the native Kazak 
attempt to rehabilitate their past. This trend of re-evaluation of the native past arose from 
the necessity of the search to find a national identity among the Kazaks. This historical 
39 John Soper, "From the Kazak and Kirg1z Press," RFE/RL Archive Material, 15 July 1988. 
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self-criticism was also needed to form the future for the sons of the steppe. Many native 
Kazak intellectuals understood this move as a resurrection of the souls of the steppe. It 
was an answer to those claims of Kazak surrender to a much bigger and greater culture of 
Russians. Kazak disagreement against Russian overlordship was expressed very strongly, 
particularly in Kazak traditional poems. Poems of popular Kazak poets during the time of 
Tsarist annexation of the Kazak land began to appear in the Kazak press. Understanding 
and reading them reveals the strength of Kazak inner resistance to any outside power 
overlordship. This is important particularly for the assessment of the native Kazak 
reaction to any possible outside claim on Kazak territory in the future of the republic as 
well. 
A well-known Kazak historian, Prof. Kenges Nurpeyisov, evaluated the 
understanding of history as a necessary process for the understanding of the present and 
future of a people. Another famous Kazak historian, Mana~ Qoz1bayev, stated that 
"scholars at the Institute of History and Ethnography of the republican Academy of 
Sciences began to concentrate on many matters related to Kazak history. The complicated 
problems of the Kazak people from its emergence to the present day, the origin of the 
Kazaks, the establishment of the Kazak state, Kazak nationalist freedom movements, 
problems related to the Kazak annexation by Tsarist rule, the Ala~ Movement and the 
Ala~ Orda Government, Stalinist political purges in Kazakstan, and the tragic results of 
forced collectivization on the Kazak land were all matters to be re-evaluated in present-
40 Quzuq Adebiyatz, 24 April 1987 cited by Ann Sheehy, in ibid. 
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day Kazakstan."41 Kazak social scientists wrote the following books, both in Russian and 
in Kazak, entitled: 
1. History of Qazaqstan: Blank Spots, 2. History and the Present-day, 3. Kazakstan 's 
Traditional Structure, 4. History of Kazakstan from Earlier Ages to the Present, 5. Social 
and Demographic Development in Kazakstan, 6. The Route of Caravans, 7. Ethnic 
Territory of the Kazaks, 8. Forced Collectivization and the Famine in the 1930s, 9. 
Cossacks in Kazakstan, JO. (Bozdaqtar) The Great Citizens, II. (Azalz Kitap) The Book 
of Sorrow. 42 
Kazak historians concentrate on the following problems when they evaluate the 
Soviet period. They are the problems of "historical geography, the transformation of the 
Kazak land into a mass all-Union prison camp, the history of peoples deported into 
Kazakstan, the consolidation of the prison camp economy, the tragic destinies of the 
activists of the state, the party and culture, national mentality during the Soviet times and 
problems of religion."43 Kazak intellectuals in present-day Kazakstan, led by 
academicians, journalists, teachers and by men of letters began to produce mounting 
numbers of articles and books devoted to the evaluation of the native past, both during 
the colonialist Tsarist times and the Soviet period. The works of Prof. Dr. Mana~ 
Qaba~uh Qoz1bayev, the outstanding Kazak historian; Dr. Muhtar Magavin, well-known 
writer and the editor of the Juldzz literary journal; Prof. Dr. Rlmgali Nurgaliyev, Chief 
41 "Tariyh Taghm1," Egemen Qazaqstan, 25 September 1996. 
42 Mana~ Qozrbayev, "Otkennen G1ybrat Alsaq, Kele~egimiz de Ayqm," Egemen Qazaqstan, 19 Qangtar 
(January) 1996. 
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Editor of the Kazak Encyclopedia and editor of a number of other voluminous official 
publications ; Prof. Mambet Qoygeldiyev, one of the most skilled and thorough 
researchers in present-day Kazakstan, Prof. Kenges Nurpeyisov, a well-known historian 
of Soviet Kazakstan, and political activists such as Hasen Qoja-Ahmet, Sabetqaz1 Aqatay, 
Mekemtas Mirzahmetuh, Qoy~1qara Salgarauh, moved the first key wheels to start this 
trend. Revival of the Kazak past, reinterpretation of their history with a more freer 
perspective, and the rehabilitation of the Ala~ intellectuals, started with the works of the 
above intellectuals. Fallowing the Kazak declaration of independence, a younger 
generation of scholars, such as Talas Omarbekov, Abu Takenov, Tursm Jurtbay, Saken 
Ozbekuh Sozaqbay, and Marat Muqanov made important contribution in removing the 
"dark spots" in the history of the Kazaks. Many of the above spent months and even years 
in the party archives and in the libraries to clarify important matters related to the Kazak 
past. Many valuable articles and books were published in Kazak since the years of 
perestroyka and glasnost. Yet many did not reach the outside world. The inability of 
present-day Kazak intellectuals to reach a wider audience on the global scale is partly due 
to their lack of any foreign language skills other than Russian. The second obstacle was 
the corresponding inability and sometimes disinterest of foreign and western scholarly 
circles in using the native sources. 
During the second year of independence, the Kazak parliament made a decision to 
undo some Russian toponymic changes made during the Soviet period. According to the 
273rd Decree of the then Supreme Soviet of the Republic of Kazakstan, Russian names 
43 ibid. 
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such as Blagodarnoye, Novoalekseyevka, Bessarabka, Oktiyabr, Prudki, Karl Marks, 
Sergeyevka, Roslavl, Kirov, Novorossiysk, Kalinin, Telman, Podgomoye, Budennovka, 
N ovoivanovka, Golovanovka, Andreyevka, Vosto9noye, <;::istiyakovskoye, Zaborovka, 
Komsomol, Lenin, Voro~ilov, <;::ernovodsk, Stepnoye, Udarnik, Blinkov, Voznosenovka, 
Vladimirovka, ilyinka, Voenka, Antonovka, Vtsakoye, Budenn1y, Kranokutskiy, 
Jidkovka, Jdanov, ~eremetyevka, Terenteyevka, Makovka, Marinovka, Nikolayevka, 
Voznesenovka, Yubileymy, Novotroitskoye, irinovka, Troitskoye, Pokrovka, Pokrovka, 
Uritskoye, Veseloye, were replaced with their original Kazak names.44 
44 Qazaqstan Respublikas1 Jogargz Kengesining Jar~1s1, No.I 1-12 {2157), Decree No. 273., 30 
(Mavs1m)June. 1993. In AQTOBE OBLAST, Blagodarnoye Selo became Qtzdjar, Novo alekseyevka 
Selo became Qaragand1say, Bessarabka became Sanqobda, Oktiyabr became Qaynar; in ALMATI 
OBLAST Prudki became Aqqaynar, Karl Marks became Qaraar~a, Sergeyevka became Besmoynaq, 
Kuybi~ev became Qarasay, Roslavl became Matibulaq, Kirov became Umbetali, Novorossiysk became 
Qas1mbek; in JAMBIL OBLAST, Kalinin became Kokdonen, Telman became Jaqs1hq, Oktiyabr-Carva 
became Qaraqat, Podgornoye became Qumanq, Sverdlov became Botamoynaq, Budennovka became 
Tiiymekent, Novo-ivanovka became Jetibay, Golovanovka became Qostobe, Andreyevka became 
BOltirik; in KOK~ETAV OBLAST, Volodor became Ayirtav, Vostoi;:noye became Egindi-aga~, 
Zaborovka became Aydarh, Cistiyakovskoye became Alqaterek; in ONGTUSTiK QAZAQST AN 
OBLAST (Southern Qazaqstan), Lenin became Qaz1qurt, Jerzinskiy became AI-Farabi, Voro~ilov 
became Qurmanata, Kirov became Qazibek Biy, Karl Marks became Mahambet, QlZlltang became 
Qaqpaq, <;ernovodsk became Qarasuv, Stepnoye became Aqjar, Udarnik became Qultuvma, Blinnikov 
became Tasanq, Voznesenovka became Tastums1q, Vladimirovka became Jtland1, ilyinka became 
Kereyit, Kalinin became Qayir~aqn, Antonovka became Ker~etas, Voenka became Qogah, Kuybi~ev 
became Aqbiyik, V1sokoye became ~aqpaqbaba, Budenmy became Jalangtos; in PAVLODAR 
OBLAST, Krasnokutskiy became Aqtogay, Ermak became Aqsuv, Jidkovka became San~1ganaq, 
J1danov became SuvatkOl; in SEMEY OBLAST, Kriu~i became Ar~ah, ~eremetyevka became Janqtas, 
Terenteyevka became Qaratobe, Makovka became Salqmtobe, Marinovka became Btlqtldaq, 
Nikoleyavka became Kengtarlav, Voznesenevka became Birlik, Aleksandr Nevskiy became Qaraqoja, 
Yubileymy became Boke, Predgomoye became Altln~oq1, irinovka became Kokozek, Troitskoye became 
Salqmtobe, Pokrovka became Qarajal; in TALDIQORGAN OBLAST, Andreyev became Uygentas, 
Kirov became Koksuv, Uritskoye became Aqbastav, Kirov became Tasqud1q, Pokatilovka became 
Ekia~a, Antonovka became Qoyhq, and Veseloye became ~atlrbay. Please also see SWB, SU/1490, B/4 
19 September 1992, for a minimal list of the restoration of ancient place names in Kazakstan. 
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NATIVE PARTICIPATION IN THE ADMINISTRATION 
The call for the rectification of past injustices done to the indigenous people is 
getting stronger among the native Kazak community and particularly in native intellectual 
circles. Although Kazakstan had no preliminary preparation for achieving independence 
from the former center, the resurgence of Kazak hopes of building a Kazak state and 
activities aimed at achieving such a target have begun. The so-called "kazakhization" of 
the administrative cadres is seen by many natives as the establishment of natural social 
order. As the true "sons of the soil" Kazaks consider themselves to be the leaders of the 
administration by right. Despite Russian official and unofficial belief, and the western 
scholarly assessment of Kazakstan as a multi-ethnic society, the sense of Kazak 
ownership of the Republic of Kazakstan is getting stronger. The so-called 'Kazakization' 
of the republican administration has been labeled, particularly by non-natives, as a move 
to prevent non-natives from assuming administrative positions in the republic. None of 
the critics of the 'Kazakization' policy seem to understand the essence of the native 
move. According to the natives, the increasing Kazak participation in political 
administrative positions is the natural right of the Kazaks. The Kazaks were subordinated 
to outside rulers for centuries since the time of the Khanate. Examination of Tsarist 
administrative practices and the Tsarist educational policy reveals the inferior positions 
inflicted on the Kazak administrative elite. During the twentieth century, the Tsarist 
administration prohibited the freely elected Kazak deputies from participating in the 
imperial Russian parliament the Duma. The same attitude continued after the Soviet 
maintenance of power. Native intellectuals with any kind of political and administrative 
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ambition or with any inclination towards his native origin was immediately labeled with 
the "virus of nationalism." It is the duty of any objective scholar or reader of the Kazak 
history, politics and administrative works to remember the injustice done to the natives in 
Kazakstan, before assessing the current administration's policy of "kazakization" in the 
Republic of Kazakstan. 
KAZAK NATIONALISM VERSUS RUSSIAN NATIONALISM 
Kazak nationalism emerged as a reaction to foreign rulers on their land. The root 
of many problems thus lie in the past with the coming of the Tsarist colonial regime to 
the Kazak steppe. The infiltration of Tsarist rule into the Kazak land resulted in Kazak 
resistance, led by nineteenth-century freedom fighters such as Kenesan Kas1mov, Smm 
Datov, Mahambet Otemisov, etc. Kazak resistance to the Tsarist administration flared 
with the settlement of Russian peasants on the Kazak land en masse during the late 
nineteenth century. The national awakening of the Kazaks in the late nineteenth century 
was coupled with the overall Turko-Muslim intellectual activities in Tsarist lands, as well 
as the events and activities that followed the 1905 Japanese defeat. Blocking Kazak 
entrance to the Russian state Dumas (excluding the first and the second) accelerated the 
Kazak tendency to publicize their grievances by other means, such as using other Muslim 
representatives at the Duma. Kazak sorrow under Tsarist Russian rule did not end with 
the coming of the Bolshevik regime. Thus part of the present-day Kazak claim of 
atrocities done to themselves has its roots in the Soviet period. 
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Kazak nationalism is rather a reactionary and defensive move against recurrent 
Russian nationalism both in Tsarist times and during the Soviet period. The escalation of 
Kazak nationalism usually emerged only after Russian pressure on the native Kazaks and 
after Russian claims related to the traditional Kazak land were made public. This is true 
for present day Kazakstan as well. The Russian attitude of belittling the now-independent 
Kazaks, who were the subjects of once big Russia, is due to the "eurocentrism" of some 
in Moscow who cannot digest the changed circumstances.45 One positive result of the 
forced Russification of the Kazaks appears as to be their perfect understanding of all the 
details and nuances of the Russian language. As a result of this fact, it is not possible for 
the Kazaks to misinterpret or misunderstand any nationalist claims of the Russians. The 
Kazaks do not miss the original message in any Russian text even if it is written between 
the lines. 
However, it is not always necessary to spend an extra effort to understand the very 
direct Russian claims. An interview with the Russian writer Aleksander Soljenitsm, 
appearing in the pages of the Komsomolskaya Pravda on April 19, 1996, instigated strong 
reaction in Kazakstan. Soljenitsm claimed that the majority of the population in 
Kazakstan was Russian and thus Russians should have a stronger voice in the country and 
feel free to realize their aims of breaking up certain regions of Kazakstan to join Russia. 
Soljenitsm also claimed that the current Kazak administration is isolating the Russians, 
preventing them to be elected to the parliament, cutting them off from Russian culture 
45 Akim Tarazi, "Avz1 Q1ys1q Bolsa da ... Soylesin be?" Qazaq Adebiyat1, No. 36, 3 Q1rkiiyek 1996, p. 3. 
222 
and impeding them contacting the Russian media.46 Aleksander Soljenitsm reportedly 
encouraged the ethnic Russian in Kazakstan to be more demanding, stating the following: 
Your (the Russian) departure from Kazakstan is scandalous. You are the 
majority in Kazakstan. It is dangerous that Kazakstan is a unitary state. But, at the same 
time, Russians are 82 percent and were a federative republic. We are letting the 
minorities have an autonomous state. You should not be afraid of this fact and use every 
possibility to develop your social organizations. I know that there is a very hard regime 
there, but I also know that the Cossacks are fighting. In Semirechie region, they are in a 
difficult position. They found power to fight. You have to fight for your rights and to 
unify. You are deprived of having access to the national parliament... It is .. chauvinistic 
policy. Nazarbayev understands that he cannot eat this 60 percent Russian people. 47 
According to materials of the current Kazak press, many claims of the ethnic 
Russians in Kazakstan are supported by nationalist, neo-imperialist and chauvinistic 
Russian circles, if not openly by the official administration. The Kazak policy of 
declaring the native language to be the language of the state was evaluated in some 
Russian journalistic circles as a degrading move towards the Russian-speaking population 
in Kazakstan. An article in the pages of the main Kazak newspaper, Egemen Qazaqstan, 
stated the following Russian complaint, citing an article in Nezavisimaya Gazeta: "It is 
not possible either for the Russians or for other non-native people in Kazakstan to be 
hopeful of assuming any position in the Republican administration, due to the fact that 
the "Kazakization" of the country is being carried out." 48 Another Russian journalist, G. 
Stan;:enkov wrote in Aziya I Afrika Segodniya complaining about the Kazakization of the 
46 Egemen Qazaqstan, 4 May (Mam1r) 1996. 
47 "Qazaqstan Jazuv~nlar Odagmda: Soljenits1nnm Sandirag1 ma, aide Zan ma?" Qazaq Adebiyat1, No. 18, 
30 Kokek 1996, p. 2.; "Kereng de Kerdeng Savegeyding Sand1rag1 Bite me?" Egemen Qazaqstan, 24 
Savir(April) 1996.; and "Bizdi E~kim de Janjaldastlra-almayd1," Egemen Qazaqstan, 4 Mamir (May) 1996. 
48 Berik Abdigaliyev, "S1rttan Soy1l Soguv Areketteri: Sergek Boluvd1 Talap Etedi," Egemen Qazaqstan, 
16 Mam1r 1996, p. 3., cited S. Kurginiyan's article in the Nezavisimaya Gazeta, 7. April, 1994. 
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media, the newspapers, journals, radio and television programs.49 Nationalist circles in 
Russia continued further in their propaganda of agitation by supporting the irredentist 
claims of the Cossack groups in Kazakstan, supporting the establishment of Cossack 
Autonomy on the Kazak steppe and the formation of a Cossack Army that aims to join 
the Russian armed forces. 
The transfer of the Kazak capital from Almatl to former Aqmola, the present-day 
Astana, is another subject that excites ethnic tensions in Kazakstan. This transformation 
is interpreted in certain circles as a means of preventing the annexation of the northern 
Kazak provinces by the Russian federation. Nevertheless, the geostrategic, ecological and 
economic reasons for the move never comes into discussion. Some materials appeared in 
the Russian media aiming to increase tension, not only in the relations between ethnic 
groups, but to relations within each ethnic group as well. This can clearly be observed 
from the discussion of a so-called tension between the three Kazak hordes. The current 
president's origin in the Great Horde is depicted, by some Russian journalists, as the 
dominance of this Horde over the other two, the Middle and the Lesser Hordes. 50 Articles 
in izvestiya and in MoskovsA."iy Komsomolets claim that the transfer of the capital to the 
north will gradually increase the influence of the Middle Horde and diminish the 
influence of the other two. 51 It was made public in the Kazak press that "those who 
wished to conquer the Kazaks from the time immemorial used to exploit Kazak tribal 
49 (This is only a one page article and thus page number is the same as in) ibid. 
so ibid, citing Nezavisimaya Gazeta, 7 July 1994. 
si Moskovskiy Komsomolets, 21 September 1994, cited by Berik Abdigaliyev in ibid. 
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division and conflicts by evil design and set fire among the Kazaks in order to subjugate 
the whole while they were in the throes of death. Those historians working on Kazak 
history and particularly on the Tsarist colonial period well understand the intricacies used 
by the outside powers over Kazak tribal differences and divisions. Tribal life is a method 
of state organization on the steppe, and is a necessity of communal life and an ages long 
tradition for saving the health of future generations. Now it is aimed to be used as a tool 
to divide up this nation."52 
The native Kazak press sees attempts m the Russian media to destabilize 
Kazakstan, and claims that it aims to strengthen Russian influence and drive the attention 
of western countries away from Kazakstan. The article in Egemen Qazaqstan reads as 
follows: 
Authors who report the irredentist act1v1ties in Kazakstan aim to put into 
practice mainly two scenarios: firstly, the Tajik version that plans to establish Russian 
dependent agents by leaning on the support of the Russian forces; secondly, the 
Moldavian version, which aims to form a Russian protected autonomous Slavic republic 
through strengthening and supporting the irredentist tendencies in Kazakstan. Those 
Kazakstani groups that aim to escalate tensions in the republic have the following 
purposes: first, they attempt to change the political situation in the Republic by imposing 
pressure upon the leadership; second, imposing pressure upon the government; third, 
winning support and coming to the power with the help of Russia by deliberately 
. . fu h 53 aggravatmg tensions rt er. 
Mana!? Qoz1bayev, an academic of the Kazak Academy of Sciences, wrote that 
"Kazaks are one of the nations that have been broken on the wheel of fate and survived 
after many disastrous periods. It is possible to say that there is no poison that the Kazaks 
52 Erjuman Smay1l, "iritki Saluv~1hq Bastald1," Egemen Qazaqstan, 24 Savir(April) 1996. 
53 Berik Abdigaliyev, "S1rttan Soyil Soguv Areketteri: Sergek Boluvd1 Talap Etedi," Egemen Qazaqstan, 
16 Mamir 1996, p. 3. 
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have not tasted. In this century, let alone the past, Kazaks have suffered from many 
difficulties. They were deprived of half of their population only during the 1930s and 
1940s. There are thousands of sons and daughters of our people still buried under the 
frozen earth at hundreds of prison camp sites built in the Siberian region alone ... Since 
our declaration of independence and since the demise of the Soviet empire, those self-
identified inheritors of the colonialist still bark at us from different directions. They do 
not only bark, but snap or even sink their teeth and spill our blood. They do not even 
suffice to snap, but hit on the head and trip up from the heel and drive in the new 
colonialist system ... Russian historians A. N. Saharov and V. i. Buganov pointed to the 
nomads of the steppe as their historic enemies in their book devoted to 10th grade 
students as the history textbook for Russia."54 
Kazak historians such as Talas Omarbekov,55 Director of History and Political 
Sciences at El Farabi State University in Almati, wrote that it is not an easy job to 
establish democratization and a lawful social state in a country such as Kazakstan which 
has suffered under the bloody fist of a totalitarian administration. The foremost condition 
for reaching this target is to create a unifying all-Kazakstani state ideology and replace 
with it the dogmatic Leninist ideology that arrested our thoughts and sensibilities. 
Secondly it is a must to replace the authoritarian Soviet political system with democracy. 
The third condition is to depart totally from the centrally controlled and administered 
system into an independent market economy. It is an absolute must for the peoples of this 
54 Mana~ Qoz1bayev, "Sagmgd1 Smar Kiin Tuvd1," Egemen Qazaqstan, 28 Navnz(March) 1996. 
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republic that have been deprived of an independent existence for ages to form a national 
state that will establish relations on equal terms with the international community of 
states. If history is an example, the experience of those countries which transformed their 
regimes from authoritarian to democratic regimes sets forth the model that there is a 
necessary work of "de-ideologization" for us to carry out... The de-ideologization 
process has not reached its maturity in Kazakstan, just as in all the other CIS countries. 
The immaturity or shallowness of Leninist-Stalinist ideology- its conservatism, its 
bigotry and demogogism-still need to be clearly stated, publicly." This move, wrote the 
Kazak author, further requires to a reassessment of all the past injustices. Departure from 
previous ideology is the prior condition to establish full-democracy. 
" ... In order to accomplish such a task, the economic life of the country has to be 
straightened up and political stability should be preserved ... In our opinion, the retention 
of social stability does not, as some claim, stem from the current equality of the native 
and the so-called European population, in number, in Kazakstan. The basic cause of 
social stability in Kazakstan is in the character of the Kazak nation who are un-
shunning, honest, lenient and good-natured people ... Another vital matter is the creation 
of patriotism unique to Kazakstan. The decades old concept of "Soviet patriotism" cannot 
be simply replaced by "Kazakstani patriotism" due to the fact that the Soviet principles 
of proletarian internationalism and Soviet patriotism were originally Russification, but 
nothing else for all those non-Russian citizens of the former Soviet empire. Kazaks felt 
that they were equal to all those nations and nationalities in the Soviet empire but the 
Russians due to their self-imposed superior status as "aga haiLq" (the big brotherly 
status). Russian people in Kazakstan are still suffering from the psychological 
misadaptation of this fact and thus are in the midst of spiritual and political crisis. They 
see three ways of overcoming this difficulty. 
l. Returning to their historical homeland to start everything from scratch, 
2. Recognition ofKazakstan as their own homeland and recognition of Russia as 
their historic homeland, 
3. Acceptance of the Kazak language, Kazak history and culture and accepting 
to co-exist with the original owners ofKazakstan, the Kazaks. 
Native Kazak intellectuals put the responsibility of building a genuine patriotism 
for all of the citizens of Kazakstan partly on the shoulders of non-native people as well. 
55 Talas Omarbekov, "Otpeli Kezengning Otkir Maseleleri," Egemen Qazaqstan, 16-17 Aqpan (February) 
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Native scholars request particularly from the ethnic Russian population that they "not 
look to their historic homeland timidly and repeatedly." The Kazak elite is asking the 
non-natives to work and fight earnestly for Kazakstan in the same way as the Kazaks do. 
At the same time, native scholars have improved their ideas about the methods of 
building a democratic society. The presidential administrative power now ruling 
Kazakstan is supported by the native intellectuals in the same manner as the Ala~ 
intellectuals did earlier in this century. Talas Omarbekov wrote that: 
the democratic intellectuals led by Alihan Bokeyhanov, at the beginning of this century 
sought to establish a presidential republic and a democratic and federative form of 
government under the leadership of the State Duma and thus entered this principle in the 
draft programme of the Ala~ Party... In order to transfer the political system to a 
parliamentarian democratic rule, the strong presidential rule in Kazakstan should 
facilitate the growth of the political parties in parliament and it has to elevate and 
improve the role of the political parties. According to the experiences of the nations of 
the orient, a step backwards from this-democratic- stand will downgrade the influence of 
the political parties. The current presidential rule, then might tum into an authoritarian 
system. Another tendency common to the nations of the east is to concentrate the power 
at a single center. The practice of western nations on this matter is the reverse method: 
that is the division of power and authority. Although Kazakstan declared its intention of 
following the western experience in this regard, she still needs to accomplish this task by 
putting it into full practice."56 
1996., p. 3. 
56 Talas Omarbekov, "Otpeli Kezengning .. " p. 3. 
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CHAPTER FIVE: INDEPENDENT KAZAKSTAN AS A MEMBER OF THE 
INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY OF STATES 
RUSSIA'S 'NEAR ABROAD' POLICY AND ITS IMPLICATIONS FOR 
KAZAKSTAN 
The independence period is the beginning of an unprecedented era for Kazakstan. 
It marks the entrance of Kazakstan into the international society of states. Never before, 
in its entire history, was Kazakstan able to establish diplomatic, economic and cultural 
relations with such a number of member states of the world community. The native elite 
hope that this will help guarantee Kazakstan's independent status. Native intellectuals 
are aware of the fact that any kind of state against state conflict involving Kazakstan will 
be the subject of international law. Thus the interference of international institutions, in 
any future trouble regarding Kazakstan and any outside power, would lead to a fair 
solution. This also reveals a historic Kazak concern of being pushed into a comer by a 
superior power, without being able to ask help from outside and for the fair judgment of 
objective world public opinion. 
The Soviet disintegration deprived the Russian people not only of its "big-
brotherly" superior status over the other Soviet peoples and nationalities but caused the 
end of its status as a colonial power after more than 200 years. This new reality forced the 
Russian government and the Russian people, regardless of the place they resided, to adapt 
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themselves to new circumstances. It required the reassessment of the concept of the new 
Russian state, new Russian borders and new Russian interests. Russia's own security 
matters and the security of its immediate neighbors in the south alarmed the Russian 
administration. On the one hand Russia wanted to preserve its dominant sphere of 
influence on its former periphery, and on the other hand, she wanted to play the role of 
being a responsible partner, with reasonable security concerns, on the international scene. 
Russian difficulty in adaptation to the changes instigated the re-emergence of its ages-old 
colonial instincts under the name of neo-imperialism. This controversy was apparent not 
only over individual political decisions, but over the political system and over the 
external relations of the country, including relations with the former peripheral countries. 
This controversy stemmed from Russia's indecisive stand over the future identity that 
would shape the country's foreign policy priorities. 
In particular, Russian relations and policies concerned the members of the CIS, to 
which the term 'near abroad' was applied. One of the most important countries for Russia 
in the south, in the Central Asian region, is Kazakstan. Both of these countries, Russia 
and Kazakstan, have vital ties concerning their bilateral relations in many fields, from 
ethnic matters to security and economic matters. Kazakstan is one of the countries that 
plays the role of buffer between Russia and its giant and most important neighbor, China. 
Kazakstan is also important for Russia as a gateway to the Central Asian region and 
further to the South in Asia. The ethnic Russian presence, half of the population in 
Kazakstan, is another strong bond between the two countries. Kazak ownership of rich 
natural resources and their sale on global markets involves considerable Russian 
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interference. In other words, Kazakstan is Russia's "metaphorical 'underbelly."'57 This 
vital Russian interest, whether under geostrategic, political or economic labels, forced the 
Russian administration between 1993 and 1996 to return to its traditional power politics 
of keeping its former periphery of the "near abroad" under close Russian supervision and 
control. This policy shift became apparent with the replacement of the: liberal and 
western-oriented former foreign minister of Russia, Andrey Kozirev, with a much 
tougher strict defender of Russian interests, Yevgeniy Primakov. According to the 
Russian view Central Asia, including Kazakstan, is the most important area for Russian 
security interests. This reflected by the following excerpt from an article that appeared in 
the Russian International Affairs. 
The Central Asian states of the CIS are located "in the underbelly" of Russia 
along a stretch of thousands of kilometers of its southern borders. This is an extensive 
region with an area of 4 million square kilometers and with a population of 50 million 
people. The geography itself and the multi-century history of this region are prompting 
conclusions about the principal, strategic importance of this region for Russia's national-
state interests ... 
The Central Asian zone of the CIS is located in the so-called "area of 
instability" that includes the southern borders of the Commonwealth and separates Russia 
from the bloodshed of Afghanistan and Tajikistan, from the strengthening of Turkey, 
Iran, and Pakistan, all part of the "Islamic belt," and from a rapidly developing but over-
populated and nuclear-armed China. Therefore, military-political cooperation with the 
countries of this "buffer region" in the interests of long-term prevention of real and 
potential threats along its southern borders is certainly to Russia's benefit... 
The Central Asian zone is also a shock absorber from the point of view of the 
penetration of the theory and practice of militant Islamic fundamentalism and extremism. 
The secular nature of the ruling elites in the states of Central Asia that has allowed and 
even encouraged Islam's expansion in its moderate forms is itself antagonistic to Islamic 
fundamentalism. This is also important when considered with the Islamic population of 
20 million in Russia. 
Military-strategic reasons, viewing Russia as a guarantor of the security of 
regional stability and the balance of force necessary to counteract through joint efforts 
the waves of destabilization rolling up from the South. 58 
57 Dmitriy Vertkin, Kazakstan Security and the New Asian Landscape, Bailrigg Paper 26, The Center for 
Defence and International Security Studies. Lancaster University, 1997 ., p. 26. 
58 Sergey Razov, "New Developments in Central Asia," International Affairs, Vol. 43, No. 3, 1997, pp. 55-
64., and in p. 59-60. 
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In order to put all of the above into a nutshell, it is safe to state that Russian policy 
makers believe that the former Soviet republics and the present independent CIS states 
belong to Russia's sphere of influence and Russia will not agree to permit any external 
influence in these regions. Besides, both China and Russia are two military giants on the 
borders of Kazakstan and will not tolerate any militarily or economically self-sufficient 
country very easily. Both sides will view this kind of development as a threat to their 
national interests in the area. Liberation from the Tsarist Governor-General or from a 
Communist Party Secretary did not help Kazakstan to escape from Russian control. 
Presently there is another type of overlordship lingering over the heads of Kazaks, "the 
Russian rouble and Russian energy."59 A new type of financial, economic and military 
yoke has started for this newly independent state. 
THE REVISION AND RENEWAL OF ECONOMIC, MILITARY AND POLITICAL 
TIES WITH THE OLD CENTER AND THE NEIGHBORING STATES 
The Soviet Union collapsed as a result of decades old economic inefficiencies that 
piled up throughout the Soviet period. Economic relations were the most important and 
vital link tying the former periphery, Kazakstan and Central Asia, to its former center 
Russia. Thus, the decline in the economic system was felt more strongly in Central Asia 
than in any other former Union republics. The gross national product of Kazakstan fell 
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from 83 percent to 63 percent from 1990 to 1995. The volume of industrial and 
agricultural production fell by 50 percent and the standard of living declined by 27.7 
percent during the first half of the 1990s. The economic shock faced by Kazakstan in 
particular and Central Asia in general affected Russia, which is still the biggest economic 
partner of all "five" in the region. However, the region continues to be important for 
Russia, if the following is of any proof: 
The Central Asian "five" has an important place in the production of many 
kinds of industrial and agricultural production that are of interest to Russia. In 1995, for 
example, they mined 33 million tons of oil (including gas condensate), 87 billion cubic 
meters of natural gas, 87 million tons of coal; produced 675 million square meters of 
fabric, 5.9 million tons of cotton (95 percent of the cotton production of the CIS), and 
significant volumes of grain, meat and vegetables. 60 
Top Russian officials thus believed that economic integration of the former Soviet 
republics was inevitable. This position, however, was opposed by another fact that the 
national identity of the former Soviet Central Asian republics is now a fact that cannot be 
denied. Thus the systemic transition of the former Soviet republics from communism has 
already started. Seven years after the declaration of independence, Kazakstan still face 
difficulties of adjusting to the new conditions of economic administration. The new 
Russian foreign economic policy also aggravated the problems of economic life of the 
newly independent states. The Russian decision to drive the newly independent states 
from its rouble zone also forced these countries to issue their own national currencies. 
Along with the decreasing Russian presence in the region, the role of global (the 
US, Japan, Germany, Great Britain) and regional (Turkey, Iran, and Pakistan) states has 
become noticeably more active... Russia still remains for all (without exception) 
countries of the Central Asian region their most important neighbor and partner in all 
59 Drnitriy Vertkin, ibid., p.32. 
60 Sergey Razov, ibid., p. 59. 
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parameters. It is a weighty guarantor of regional stability ... Sovereignty and the gaining 
of political independence for the states of Central Asia didn't mean an automatic 
appearance of conditions for their economic independence. The structural specialization 
of the economy of the Central Asian region, which had existed within the framework of 
the USSR, was not remarkable for its rationality and suffered from being one sided: 60 
percent of the volume of industrial production was in areas that produced raw materials 
and semi-finished products, and 65 percent of industrial resources were concentrated on 
5 percent of the territory of the republics of Central Asia and Kazakstan, while other 
territories, primarily with labor surpluses, were much less involved in industrial 
production. 
Today, due to geography, particularly the absence of direct access to the sea, 
and due to the remaining orientation of the regional infrastructure, the main volume of 
export-import transactions of the Central Asian states still remains with Russia and other 
countries of the CIS. For Kazakstan, for example, this amounts to 53 percent of its 
exports and 69 percent of its imports . 
. . . the states of Central Asia will still experience close tightness to Russia, and 
often even dependence on it in many strategic, political, economic, military and other 
fi 1 . 61 parameters or a ong time. 
Kazakstan and Russia signed an agreement of friendship and cooperation on May 
25 1992; an economic protocol on economic collaboration, particularly for the year 1993, 
was signed by Andrey Nechayev, Russia's Minister of Economy .and Tilevhan 
Qabd1rrahmanov, Chairman of the Kazak State Committee for the Economy on 
September 15 1992.62 Another joint declaration to further develop cooperation was signed 
between the two sides on January 20, 1995. Kazakstan and Russia signed still another 
agreement, on military cooperation, on March 28 1994 in Moscow, ratification of which 
by the Kazak parliament was made public on 1994. 63 The latest agreement signed 
between the two countries was on April 27 1996 in Almati. It was announced as the Joint 
Kazak-Russian (Almat1) Declaration. It has defined the Kazak and Russian positions 
regarding the legal status of the Caspian Sea and about a decision to form a joint 
61 Sergey Razov, ibid., p. 57. 
62 SWB, SU/1489, C2/I, 18 September 1992. 
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commission over the administration of the Bayqongir Space station.64 During the Spring 
of 1992, a Russian-Kazak intergovernmental meeting led by the First Deputy Chairman 
of the Russian Government, Gennady Burbulis and the Kazak Prime Minister, Sergey 
Tere~c;enko, discussed "the preservation and expansion of economic ties between 
Kazakstan and Russia and interaction in the political and military areas."65 During this 
meeting the two sides signed a package of 16 documents on economic cooperation, a 
price policy and on the problems of the armed forces. The meeting was described as "a 
new step in strengthening military-political and economic cooperation between two 
fraternal states."66 On October 10 1992, Kazak President Nursultan Nazarbayev and 
Russian President Boris Yeltsin met in Kokc;etav and exchanged a ratified document for 
the treaty on friendship, cooperation and mutual assistance between the two sides. It 
declared the following: 
1. The Republic of Kazakstan and the Russian Federation will continue to attach the 
utmost importance to full-scale economic cooperation on the basis of the coordination of 
economic ties, a common customs and economic area based on the principles of free 
trade, monetary and credit policy, a single currency - namely the rouble- the elimination 
of unscrupulous competition in two-way trade, a coordinated protectionist policy, the 
arrangement of direct ties between economic organizations in both states, and the 
creation of diversified technological concerns and complexes. 
Trade and economic cooperation between the Republic of Kazakstan and the 
Russian Federation is to be coordinated by a bilateral intergovernmental commission. 
Both states will grant each other most favored nation status in the sphere of mutual 
cooperation and guarantee entrepreneurial freedom in the marketing, acquisition and 
movement of goods and services, coordinated use of air space and railway rolling stock, 
and coordination of customs duties and transit duties. 
Bearing in mind the importance to each state of expanding foreign economic 
ties, the Republic of Kazakstan and the Russian Federation will not allow actions which 
63 Qazaqstan Respub/ikas1 Jogarg1 Kengesinin Jar~1s1, No. 16-17 (2186), 1994. 
64 "Qazaqstannmg Aymaqtiq Strategiyahq Jagday1," Egemen Qazaqstan, 13 May 1996. 
65 SWB, SU/1338, B/1, 25 March 1992. 
66 SWB, SU/1338, Bil, 25 March 1992. 
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encroach upon the other side's interests on the world market. This will be accomplished 
by the implementation of coordinated foreign economic activities .... 
5. In view of the historical tradition of good-neighborliness between our 
peoples, the Republic ofKazakstan and the Russian Federation reaffirm the maintenance 
of the territorial integrity of states and the immutability of existing borders. They 
recognize the need for each other's interests to be heeded in the process of resolving 
conflict situations on the territory of the CIS. 67 
Relations between the former Soviet Republics also have changed. Thus 
Kazakstan, began to renew its ties with her neighboring republics and with other ex-
Soviet republics. The leaders of Kazakstan and the other Central Asian states met in 
Bi~kek on April 22 1992 to discuss cooperation and to create a market economy 
infrastructure simultaneously, in order to coordinate policies for restructuring their 
economies.68 The leaders of Kazakstan and Uzbekistan signed a mutual assistance treaty 
on June 25 1992 in the city of Turkestan. Both sides agreed on cooperation on political, 
economic, cultural and ecological issues. The Kazak and Kirg1z President~, Nazarbayev 
and Akayev, signed a bilateral agreement on June 8 1993 in Almat1, to officially renew 
their ages-old ties in every field as well. 69 A Byelorussian government delegation led by 
Viya9eslav Kebi9, the then Chairman of the Byelorussian Council of Ministers, visiting 
Almatt, signed a number of agreements to maintain bilateral economic cooperation. The 
package of agreements included matters on deepening and further the development of 
economic and cultural relations, agreements on price-fixing policy, and mutual deliveries 
of goods and commodities.70 During 1993, Kazakstan signed agreements with Tajikistan, 
67 SWB, SU/1510, B/4, 13 October 1992. 
68 SWB, SU/1363, B/l, 24 April 1992. 
69 Qazaqstan Respublikas1 Jogarg1 Kengesinin Jar~1s1, No. 18 (2163), 1993. 
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Armenia, Georgia, Moldova, Turkmenistan, Lithuania and with the People's Republic of 
China and North Korea to renew its diplomatic and economic ties as well. 71 
THE FORMATION OF FOREIGN DIPLOMATIC AND ECONOMIC TIES 
Starting from the very first days of the year 1992, diplomatic and official 
representatives of many countries began to pour into Almati. One of the first visitors to 
visit the Kazak capital was the Chinese Deputy Foreign Minister Tian Zengpei. After this 
visit, it was announced that Kazakstan and China had established full diplomatic 
relations. A decision to open ties at the ambassadorial level was made public by a joint 
communique issued in Almati.72 Later on August 17 1992, the then Kazak Foreign 
Minister Tolevtay Siileymenov went to China and there signed seven intergovernmental 
documents related to developing Kazak-Chinese cooperation.73 At the· beginning of 
January 1992, it was announced by the US State Department that the then US Deputy 
Secretary Robert Fauver would go to Kazakstan to discuss economic cooperation 
between the USA and Kazakstan. On January 25 1992, French Foreign Minister Roland 
Dumas visited the Kazak capital. Foreign ministers of Kazakstan and France signed a 
protocol to establish diplomatic relations between the two countries. During the same 
month of 1992, Iran's Deputy Foreign Minister visited Alma ti and ordered arrangements 
to be made to open Iran's Embassy there. Japan also sent its group of economic experts to 
70 SWB, SU/1489, C2/l-2, 18 September 1992. 
71 ibid and also No. 21-22(2167),1993. 
72 RFE/RL Archive Material, CN0056, 4 January 1992. 
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Almatl, in order to meet officials in charge of economic affairs, on February 4 1992. The 
Afghan government has established diplomatic relations with Kazakstan by signing a 
protocol during a visit by Afghan Vice President Abdulrahim Latif to Almati on February 
14 1992. The Kuwaiti Finance Minister, Nasir Abdallah Al-Rudan visited Almat1 on 
February 29 1992 and expressed hopes of expanding economic relations with Kazakstan. 
Kazak president Nursultan Nazarbayev visited India and Pakistan during the last part of 
February 1992. Foreign diplomatic ties were established by Kazakstan with both India 
and Pakistan during this visit. The following month, in March 1992, countries like 
Bangladesh, Libya, and Oman established diplomatic relations with Kazakstan, by their 
official representatives visiting the Kazak capital. On March 1 1992, the Republic of 
Kazakstan and Iran signed a transport cooperation agreement to ship goods between 
Caspian Sea ports and an air agreement to link Teheran and Almati. The establishment of 
these ties later led Kazakstan and Iran to sign a total of nine bilateral agreements covering 
the fields of transportation, communication, energy, agriculture and banking on October 
25 1993. Federal Chancellor Helmut Kohl and Kazak President Nursultan Nazarbayev 
signed a joint declaration in Bonn, to cooperate closely in future in the political, 
economic and cultural spheres, on September 22 1992. The next day, the Kazak 
president went to Paris to meet Francois Mitterand and signed the Paris Charter for a New 
Europe and a treaty of friendship, cooperation and mutual understanding between the two 
countries. 74 
73 SWB, SU/1464, Al/I, 20 August 1992. 
74 SWB, SU/1495, Al/I, 25 September 1992. 
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Starting fr.om 1993, the official organ of the then Supreme Soviet of the Republic 
of Kazakstan began to publish international agreements ratified by the Kazak parliament. 
A Friendship and Cooperation Agreement between the Republic of Kazakstan and France 
signed on September 23 1992 in Paris; a protocol between China and Kazakstan to open 
diplomatic representation signed on August 10, 1992 in Peking; a protocol between 
Germany and Kazakstan on financial investment matters signed in Bonn on September 22 
1992; an agreement between the Byelorussian Republic and Kazakstan about custom 
duties signed in Almat1 on September 16 1992, and an agreement between Turkey and 
Kazakstan about the protection of investment signed in AlmatI on May 1, 1992 were 
ratified by the Kazak parliament. 75 
Relations between the Republic of Turkey and the Republic of Kazakstan 
occupied a special place in the agendas of the two countries at the beginning of the 
l 990s76 . Hikmet <;::etin, the then Turkish Foreign Minister spent six days in Central Asia 
and the Caucasus early in March 1992 and offered training for diplomats, administrators 
and company managers and help in reforming the banking system of the newly 
independent states. Establishment of diplomatic relations between the two countries was 
documented by signing a protocol in Almatl on March 2 1992. Agreements on transport 
(including air and high-way transport), communication, education, science, culture, 
tourism, banking and sport were signed by officials of the two countries during the first 
eight months of 1992, altogether 14 different agreements and protocols. However, the 
75 Qazaqstan Respublikas1 Jogargz Kengesinin Jar~1s1, No. 4 (2149), 1993. 
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western media was partly responsible for exaggerating the Turkish role as a new model 
for the newly independent Central Asian and Caucasian republics. Starting from the first 
months of the year 1992, articles devoted to the role of Turkey in the former Soviet 
Muslim and Turkic republics began to feed new ungrounded hopes for the world public. 
Articles appeared attributing new labels to Turkish policy towards Central Asia, such as 
the "Stem des Orients,"77 "The Bosporus Bridgehead,"78 "Pantiirkismus als 
Menschenrecht?"79 "Panti.irkismus Oder Europa?"80 "Der Traum Von Turan Per 
Satellit,"81 "Der Blick nach Osten,"82 "Ein Commonwealth von 200 Millionen Tiirken?"83 
"Wird das 21. Jahrhundert 'das Jahrhundert der Tiirken' ?"84 "Klinkenputzen am 
Bosphorus,"85 "Eine Briicke nach Westeuropa,"86 "Bright Horizon in the east beckons 
76 Agreements between the Republic ofKazakstan and the Republic of Turkey began to be published in the 
Turkish Official Newspaper, the Resmis Gazete, from 1992 onwards. 
77 "Stern des Orients: Die Turkvolker der ehemaligen Sowjetunion suchen Hilfe am Bosporus-Aufstieg der 
Ti.irkei zur neuen Fi.ihrungsmacht?"' Der Spiegel, February 10, 1992. 
78 "The Bosporus Bridgehead," The Wall Street Journal, February 17, 1992. 
79 Bassam Tibi, "Pantilrkismus als Menschenrecht? Die Muslime Mittelasiens auf der Suche nach Identitat," 
Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, March 19,1992. 
80 Wolfgang Gunter, "Pantilrkismus oder Europa?" Frankfurter A/lgemeine Zeitung, April 27, 1992. 
81 Rudolp Chimelli, "Der Traum von Turan per Satellit," Suddeutsche Zeitung, May 6, 1992. 
82 Bassam Tibi, "Der Blick nach Osten: Pantiirkismus und Politischer Islam-Bi.irde oder Aufwertung?" Die 
Welt, May 19,1993. 
83 
"Tiirkei: Auf den Spuren des Grossreiches; Ein Commonwealth von 200 Millionen Ti.irken?" Die Presse, 
August 12, 1992. 
84 Almuth Baron, "Wird das 21. Jahrhundert 'das Jahrhundert der Tilrken'?" Frankfurter Allgemeine 
Zeitung, November 2, 1992. 
85 Maria Huber, "Klinkenputzen am Bosporus," Die Zeit, July 10, 1992. 
86 Georg Hartmut Altenmilller, ·'Eine Bri.icke nach Westeuropa: Wie die Tilrkei ihr Verhaltnis zu den 
mittelasiatischen ehemaligen Sowjetrepubliken sieht," Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, April 21, 1993. 
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Ankara."87 On his official visit to Kazakstan on April 29 1992, the then Turkish Prime 
Minister Si.ileyman Demirel, as the first western leader to come to Central Asia since its 
independence,88 offered 200 million dollars of credit to Kazakstan.89 The Turkish Prime 
Minister was accompanied by 200 people including members of parliament, officials, 
bankers, businessmen and reporters on his visit to Kazakstan and other Central Asian 
republics at that time. The Turkish Prime Minister also opened the first Turkish Embassy 
in AlmatI and in other capitals of the Central Asian republics. Earlier than this, a group of 
70 Turkish businessmen, led by the then Turkish Minister of Industry, Tahir Kose and 
State Ministers Ekrem Ceyhun and Mehmet Batalh, went to Almatl to seek opportunities 
for joint investment in food, mining, construction, agriculture and transport. In addition to 
all of these, a Turkish attempt to form a satellite television broadcasting to Central Asia 
was supported by many who argued that Turkey was going to play a major role in Central 
Asia. It was interpreted at that time that this move would improve Turkey's linguistic 
and cultural advantages in Central Asia. "From the Azerbaijan capital of Baku across the 
Muslim-dominated Central Asian republics of Uzbekistan, Kazakstan, Turkmenistan, 
Tajikistan and Kirghizia, Turkey is providing the model of a democratic nation-Muslim 
in spirit but secular in state- that, to the great relief of the West, most of the region wishes 
to emulate."90 Another western newspaper stated the common language used by both the 
87 Hugh Pope, "Bright Horizon in the East Beckons Ankara," The Independent, June 1, 1993. 
88 John Murray Brown, "Turkish Premier to Bolster Links with Central Asia," Financial Times, 27 April 
1992. 
89 SWB, SUI 1371, A4/l, 4 May 1992. 
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Turks in Turkey and the Turks or Turkic people in the former Soviet Republics.91 
However, after six years of independence, the Central Asian states' ties with Turkey have 
not become as impressive as was foreseen during the first years of Central Asian 
independence. The Turkish satellite television attempt were not successful, and the move 
to encourage the Central Asian Turkic people to switch to the Latin alphabet reached its 
targeted aim in other Central Asian republics, but not in Kazakstan. The western news 
media, citing Turkish officials, publicized these attempts with a much exaggerated tone: 
"Thanks to the satellite feed and the agreements that Ankara has secured with all the 
Muslim republics for local broadcast, Turkey clearly has the edge in the alphabet war. For 
three hours each weekday and nine hours on Saturday and Sunday, Turkish television 
plans to run Latin alphabet subtitles with its programs."92 This Turkish attempt was 
ruined by the mismanagement of the Turkish television agency staff who 'did not have a 
clear cut policy in airing or transmitting good programs, and also, by the broadcasting 
time allowed to Turkish television in Central Asia, which was not at prime time. There 
are still many unsolved issues regarding the much discussed and debated oil pipeline 
project as well. A Turkish education project to receive one thousand university students 
from each of the four Central Asian republics and Azerbaijan also proved to be only 
partly successful. Some students from Central Asia returned home without completing 
the academic programs and some found it difficult to adopt to the Turkish lifestyle. The 
90 Tony Allen-Mills, "Turkish Trucks Blaze a Trail to Soviet Asia," Sunday Times, January 19, 1992. 
91 
"Fiihrungsanspruch der Tiirkei in Zentralasien," Neue Zurcher Zeitung, 30 January 1992., stated that "Die 
56 Millionen Tilrken in der Tilrkei spraechen dieselbe Sprache wie die rund 60 Millionen Einwohner der 
zentralasiatischen Republiken und teilten eine gemeinsame Geschichte und Kultur." 
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western vision of Turkey's role in Central Asia began to fade away as early as 1993. 
Turkish diplomacy towards Central Asia was found by the westerners to be: "hesitant, 
reflecting a deep fear of being drawn into Central Asia's ethnic strife."93 Official Turkish 
foreign policy followed a cautious policy regarding pan-Turkist and pan-Islamist 
tendencies between the two sides and feared entering into a conflict with Russia, as the 
biggest power in the region. 
In the words of Kazak President Nazarbayev in an interview given to a 
correspondent of the Nezavisimaya Gazeta, as early as May 1992, Kazakstan was as 
follows: 
Kazakstan declared its independence on 16th December of last year. Whether 
we like it or not, before that we were loyal to the centre. During these past five months it 
has become clear that it is time for the republic to determine its geopolitical place and the 
strategy of its own development. If we do not determine these aims, we will be 
preoccupied with details and we will make mistakes. We now have to think about this 
subject and take advice from scientists and political experts. 
So, what is our place in the world? China is our eastern neighbour and. we now 
have a railway linking the two of us. The latest treaty, signed in Beijing by our premier 
Sergey Tere~i;:enko, promises good prospects of close cooperation and the possibility of 
access to the Asia-Pacific region via the shortest railway route. Relations with the East 
also mean relations with Japan and Korea. My trips to India and Pakistan in themselves 
testify to the importance of these regions for us. 
We are also aiming to maintain good relations with European states, many of 
whom want to work in Kazakstan. In the past, all routes to the East went through 
Moscow. Now, however, I am sure that the route will increasingly frequently pass 
through Kazakstan. We have air communications with Frankfurt-am-Main, Istanbul and 
China. We are holding talks about opening up air routes through Beijing to Seoul and 
Tokyo. We are also making progress with our agreements with Iran and Turkey on 
linking up the main railway route I have already mentioned. That way a direct route to 
the Mediterranean Sea will be opened. We can have access to the ports of Iran through 
the Caspian Sea. We are working on a plan for an oil and gas pipeline into the Persian 
Gulf area. In this way we consider ourselves to be part of the whole world. 
Now something about relations with our neighbours-the former union republics 
in particular. We attach the highest significance to ties with Russia. And that is 
understandable. For many years we lived side by side and we have many common tasks 
which we have to work on resolving. I believe that such good-neighbourliness is in the 
interests of both Russia and Kazakstan. As for the Central Asian republics, which are our 
spiritual kinsmen and share our roots, there is nothing to divide us at all. 
92 Blaine Harden, "Turkey Pushing Eastward- By Satellite," The Washington Post, 22 March 1992. 
93 Alan Cowell, "Turkey Seems Incapable of Filling Post-Cold War Central Asian Power Vacuum," The 
New York Times, 4 August 1993. 
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As you know, the Kazak people are a Turkic people, they are Muslims. So the 
fact that they are attracted to Turkey and the Arab states is natural. Soviet power barred 
us from a culture, a history and a language that are close to our hearts. That is why the 
process of rapprochement is natural. 94 
MEMBERSHIP OF INTERN A TI ON AL ORGANIZATIONS 
Not more than a month passed after the declaration of its independence before 
Kazakstan had applied for membership in the United Nations. The Kazak letter to David 
Hannah, the then Security Council President arrived on January 4 1992.95 The second 
attempt of Kazakstan was its application for membership in the International Monetary 
Fund. A letter from the then Kazak Prime Minister, Sergey Tere~<;enko on January 12, 
1992 sought to open ways for Kazakstan to receive financial credits and economic advice 
from the international organization. Thus Kazakstan became the 11th .former Soviet 
Republic to apply for membership to the IMF and the World Bank.96 The Organization of 
the Islamic Conference also proved its interest towards the newly independent Central 
Asian Muslim republics. "Information ministers from the 46 member states of the 
Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC) have called for increased cooperation with 
the Muslim republics of the former USSR."97 The then CSCE, the Conference on Security 
and Cooperation in Europe, also admitted ten members of the CIS, including Kazakstan 
as members on 30 January 1992, thus increasing its membership from 38 to 48. 
94 "Nazarbayev on the CIS, Kazakstan, the Future," SWB, SU/1380, B/1-6, 14 May 1992. 
95 RFE/RL Archive Material, CN0009, 4 January 1992. 
96 RFE/RL Archive Material, CN0104, 29 January 1992. 
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Only after three years of its independent existence, some 114 countries of the 
world have recognized Kazakstan's independence. By 1995, Kazakstan had established 
diplomatic relations with 83 of them. Some 33 countries of the world have opened their 
embassies in the Kazak capital. 
Thus, for the first time in its history, Kazakstan became a full member of the 
international community of states. This is a source of great pride particularly for native 
Kazaks and of their intellectuals. They believe that if their political administrators remain 
firm, Kazakstan will never suffer and become a victim in any conflict of international 
scale. "Those times,-wrote a native intellectual Qabde~ Jumadilov,- are already history. A 
giant country like Kazakstan whose flag is among the nations at the United Nations and 
as one who has been diplomatically recognized and has economic ties with many 
countries of the world, is a huge piece to be swallowed easily."98 
97 RFE/RL Archive Material, CNOOlO, 17 January 1992. 
98 Qabde~ Jumadilov, "Bola~aqti Boljaganda," Qazaq Adebiyatz, No. 13., 1April1994., p. 3. 
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CONCLUSION AND PROSPECTS FOR AN INDEPENDENT KAZAKSTAN 
The present-day recognition of Kazakstan as a multi-ethnic society reflects the 
ages-old forceful policies of an outside power, Russia. Thus, Kazakstan is also 
recognized by some western academicians as a country whose indigenous people have 
had no state tradition. A study of native Kazak history, however, reveals an opposite 
conclusion. Nation formation in Kazakstan, or at least attempts to establish law and order 
on the steppe were interrupted by Russian occupation and colonization. The emergence of 
Kazaks starts in the fifteenth century. The Kazaks had survived in Central Asia and on the 
steppe and had led a life under the leadership of their hans and rulers according to their 
traditional customs and lifestyles. Arguments that the nomadic Kazak were the wandering 
people of the steppe not obeying any ruler, cannot be a correct judgment for those who 
have studied the Central Asian history. The earlier Kazak Hans spent their lives in 
struggling to keep the unity of the Kazaks and combating other competing powers that 
cast their eyes upon the territory of the nomadic Kazaks. The emergence of hordes 
dividing Kazaks into three jiiz was a necessity in defending and administering their 
pasturelands and population. The Jongar/Mongol invasion interrupted this process and 
forced the Kazak to seek a stronger power in their fight against the enemy. Russian 
penetration into the Kazak land thus started with the so-called Kazak acceptance of 
Russian overlordship. However, it was but an individual agreement made by the han of 
the Lesser Horde, Ebulhay1r, in 1730. 
A map attached to the biography of Kenesan Han and a list of the Kazak tribes 
participating to the national-liberation struggle of the Kazak tribes against the Tsarist 
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administration in the nineteenth century is the proof of Kazak rejection of the political, 
military domination of an outside power. It is included to display the Soviet 
misinterpretation of historical facts. 
Russian colonial pressure began to be felt by the Kazaks through limitations on 
traditional pasturelands when they were forced to move to less fertile areas as a result of 
the construction of Russian army garrisons and forts all along the Kazak border on the 
west and north of their territory. Russian administrative measures to annex the Kazak 
lands and further subjugate its people politically and militarily began at the beginning of 
the nineteenth century. From the mid-nineteenth century onwards, Russian colonialists 
seized further Kazak lands, this time not for military or security reasons but for the 
settlement of landless Cossacks and newly emancipated Russian serfs. Political and 
administrative measures were also taken to control the Kazak societ)r as a whole, 
including education and culture. 
Until the beginning of the twentieth century, Kazaks together with other non-
Russian subjects of the Tsarist Empire were deprived of their political rights and of any 
other intellectual activities. Only after the 1905 Revolution were Kazaks relatively free to 
engage in political discussion, and to enjoy the religious freedom granted to the 
minorities on the Tsarist lands, with the April 17 1905 imperial decree. In spite of this 
fact, Kazaks were not allowed to be represented at the State parliament, the Duma. 
Despite the severe restrictions, forces struggling for more freedom were unleashed by the 
1905 revolution, and this gave opportunities to several Kazak intellectuals to improve 
their political understanding and the overall political awareness of their native brothers. 
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During the years when Russia was engaged in W.W. I and when later Russia was 
experiencing one of the biggest changes in her history, the Bolshevik revolution, Kazak 
intellectuals were busy in preparing the ground for a freer form of rule, for a possible 
opportunity arising in Russia. When Tsarist rule collapsed, the Bolsheviks realized that 
the handful of Kazak intellectuals, the leaders of the Ala~ Movement, had become 
successful in gaining the trust of natives and thus cooperated with them to maintain 
Bolshevik control on the Kazak steppe, after their defeat and failure to receive support 
from either outside powers or from the Tsarist loyalist White forces. This native 
intellectual movement of the Ala~ activists is now being studied by the current native 
Kazak scholars, academicians and writers, most probably with the hope of finding the 
most suitable form of administration for the people in Kazakstan. If mere words are any 
example, the Ala~ intellectuals preferred the future political form of Kazak government to 
be a democratic federative state. Ala~ intellectuals, moreover, did not totally reject any 
form of acceptable cooperation with the Russian government. Thus, after they understood 
the impossibility of an independent survival, they agreed to cooperate with the Bolshevik 
power. Despite their disagreement with the Bolsheviks, all of the Ala~ intellectuals except 
Mustafa <;okay chose not to leave their homeland, only to be killed less than two decades 
after the revolution. 
Liquidation of the native intellectuals, regardless of their political preference, was 
another unfortunate tragedy for the political maturation of the Kazak society during 
Soviet times. Although this liquidation was not limited to the native peoples, it was 
particularly devastating for nations that have a small number of intellectuals comparing to 
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other nations in the Soviet Union. A nation deprived of the cream of its intellectual 
potential suffered also from the seizure from the people of their physical, material, 
religious, and spiritual wealth. Under the labels of collectivization, industrialization, de-
nomadization and education, Kazaks were robbed of all of their valuables. Even ordinary 
people, who made the slightest hint of disagreement with the Bolshevik power and later 
with party policies, were punished by execution. 
When Stalin died and Hru~9ev came to power, another phase of Kazak sorrow 
started with the Virgin Land Campaign. The fertility of the soil was damaged and the 
traditional animal husbandry was almost destroyed. It resulted in the closure of the 
Kazak language schools which led to the further russification of the native population 
who sought to improve their social, political and economic status by becoming integrated 
into the so-called "international" but, in reality, Russian way of life. After the Virgin 
Land Campaign, the land once called the home of Kazaks was unrecognizably changed 
even on the map's surface due to the russification of toponyms according to the wishes of 
some further two million Slavic settlers in Kazakstan. 
On the eve of its independence, Kazakstan was one of the countries that suffered 
most from environmental degradation caused by the nuclear and industrial as well as 
agricultural enterprises in the republic. The land, water and the human beings living in 
those areas were heavily contaminated by the toxic waste of all those nuclear and other 
branches of industry and agriculture. 
Kazakstan, on the eve of its declaration of independence was a country that lacked 
any political experience in running a free country as an equal member of the international 
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community both in internal and external administration of state affairs. It did not have 
any means to prepare to defend its borders. Cadres in every sphere of administration 
lacked any kind of acceptable training for running a free country. Departure from the 
already collapsed former system left all perplexed in Kazakstan. 
Kazak economic life after the collapse of the Soviet Union resembled very much 
that of a post-colonial country that had just achieved its independence. They used to live 
an economic life totally isolated and away from the realities and practices of the global 
economy. Kazakstan was a periphery in the true sense of the word in that it was militarily 
and economically dependent upon the former center, Moscow. Many of the industrial 
facilities had been built disregarding the republican boundaries during the Soviet period, 
which after independence left Kazakstan quite vulnerable to the policy and system 
changes in neighboring areas. An example of this was the Kazak government's inability 
to provide for the needs of its citizens with natural gas. In addition to this, and unlike the 
other Central Asian republics, half of the population in Kazakstan was ethnically Russian. 
This forced the country to be more subordinate to Russia. Soviet policy for seventy years 
had been to keep Kazakstan mainly as a supplier of raw-materials and semi-processed 
products. Thus, Kazakstan lacked advanced technology to process its rich natural 
resources. 
The maintenance of an independent life, the formation of new and free relations 
with other states and international organizations as well as the attempt to overcome 
economic and military difficulties are the current processes taking place in Kazakstan. 
Despite being a rich country in natural resources, after seven years of independence, 
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Kazakstan still cannot eliminate barriers to make the economic breakthrough which is 
essential for improving social stability. The remote location of Kazakstan from 
international markets and a weak transportation network built in the republic during the 
Soviet time prevents this young republic from effectively using the opportunities which 
come of having many important raw materials to sell on the global market. 
Kazakstan never intended to become a nuclear state and it is very unlikely that 
this republic will threaten any of her neighbours by becoming a military giant, due to the 
simple fact of being busy enough maintaining its current territory. Kazaks are not in 
search of "lebensraum." No future offensive is expected from this country due to its 
geographic location between two of the world's giant states, Russia and China. The 
present-day Kazak administrators feel more comfortable in realizing their long-desired 
status of being a member of the international community of states. In case of any conflict 
between Kazakstan and any of her neighbours, the issue becoming a subject in 
international law seems to have had the effect of reducing anxiety in the hearts and minds 
of the current administrators. 
The strong dependency on its neighbouring countries in many fields forces the 
current leadership in Kazakstan to follow a timid strategy. This seems however, an 
expected outcome experienced by most of the ex-colonial countries of the world. As time 
progresses, this generation will eventually pass from the scene and be replaced by 
another. The coming generation of administrators and leaders in Kazakstan will certainly 
be free in spirit and in action due to their different educational background compared to 
those leaders who had experienced the Soviet way of behavior, education, thinking and of 
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running their life. The declaration of independence in Kazakstan accelerated the trend in 
this country to have the opportunity to receive education. The contact and influence of the 
new generation of Kazakstani students will have a beneficial effect upon their country's 
progress. 
Besides this fact, the strength and endurance of native disagreements and concerns 
over their land was not stopped by eliminating a whole generation of Kazak intellectuals 
in the 1930s. A quick glance to the biographies of a number of Kazak political, military, 
intellectual elite in the appendix will reveal this fact. The present-day nationalist native 
intellectuals, working at various positions in today's Kazakstan were those who were 
born during the 1930s when Stalin carried out his persecution of intellectuals in 
Kazakstan and in the Soviet Union. It is the influence of this generation that the trend 
over many concerns regarding the indigenous population is becoming stronger in the 
country. 
The problems of building a free society out of an ex-colonial land will continue 
for some time. The possibilities for this newly independent country to establish a stable 
order and to offer its citizens an acceptable life as well as to maintain economic, political 
and social progress also depends upon the practice of the current administration. 
Problems inherited from the colonial past are all big enough issues to tackle, let alone the 
possibility of the creation of new problems by the current leadership. If one such 
problem is the possible imposition of an authoritarian one-man rule in the country, the 
second, but not less important one, is the criticism of only one of the ethnic groups in the 
republic, the Kazaks, for their ambition to correct the past injustices done. 
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APPENDIX: 
1. A CHRONOLOGY OF THE KAZAK HANS: 
Kerey( Around 1456-1473) 
Janibek [1473-1480] 
Munnd1q or Bunnd1q [1473-1511 
Qas1m Han [1511-1518] (born in 1455) 
Mama~ Han (1518-1523) 
Tahir Han [1523-1533] 
Buyda~1 Han [1533-1534] 
Qoja Mahmut (1534-1535) 
Tog1m Han (1535-1537) 
Aqnazar(Haqnazar) Han (Qas1m's son) [1538-1582] 
$1gay Han (descendant of Janibek) [1580-1582] 
Tavakkul Han (Tavekel) [1582-1598] 
Esim Han [1598-1628] 
Jengir(Cihangir) Han [1628-1680circa] 
Tavke Han [1680-1718] famous for his Jeti Jarg1 (Seven Pillars) 
Bolat Han (1718-1726) 
Hans of the Lesser Horde 
Ebulhayir( 1718-1748) 
Nurah(l 748-1786) 
Erah(l 791-1797) 
Esim(l 795-1797) 
Ay~uvak(l 797-1805) 
$ergaz1(1805-l 824) 
By the Tsarist Decree on March 11, 1801, the Khanate of the Lesser Horde was divided 
into two. A new Inner Horde, or the Bokey Horde, was created. 
Bokey(l 801-1815) 
$1gay(l815-1823) 
Jengir(l 823-1845) 
Hans of the Middle Horde 
Qayip(l 716-1719) 
Sameke(l719-1734) 
Ebilmembet( 1734-1 771) 
Ab1lay(l 77 l-1781) 
Vah(1781-1819) 
In 1815, the Tsarist rule has divided the Middle Horde into two with the purpose of 
humiliating Veli Khan who had not obeyed the Tsarist order, using as an excuse the 
growth of population in the Middle Horde. 
Bokey(l 815-1819) 
**** ***** 
Kenesan(l 841-1847). 
Qoy~1gara Salgarauh, Handar Kestesi, AlmatI: Jahn, 1992, p. 39-40. 
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2. A CHRONOLOGY OF THE KAZAK HISTORY: 
1456 
1465 
1470 
1510 
1511-1520 
1525 
1579 
1583-1589 
1598-1643 
1643 
1644 
1690 
1714 
1717 
1723-1725 
1728 
1730 
1730 
1731 
Formation of the Kazak Khanate. 
Population reached 200,000 under Kerey's rule 
Kerey and Janibek Hans Return to Sir (Darya) Region 
Kazak Control in Str region maintained 
Qas1m Han's rule started and the Kazak population reached a 
million. The Straight Custom of Qas1m Han was created. 
The Kazak-Jongar Fight started (and lasted for two centuries) 
Haqnazar Han occupied Turk1stan and Savran 
Tavekel Han defeated Baba Sultan of Ta~kent. Kazak Khanate 
reached the peak of its political/military strength 
Esim Han's rule started. Ta~kent city was returned to Kazak rule. 
City of Turk1stan became the Kazak capital. "Esim Hannmg Eski Joh," 
the Ancient Way of Esim Han, was created. 
Major Jongar Invasion of the Kazak and Kirg1z territories. 
Salqam Jangir Han interfered into Jongar-Buharan fight. 
"Jeti Jarg1," the Seven Pillars have been composed. 
Jongar defeat of the Kazaks 
Kazak forces led by Qay1p and Ebulhayir Hans were defeated by the 
Jongar forces at the Battle of Ayagoz. 
Major Jongar defeat of the Kazaks. Turk1stan, Savran, Ta~kent cities 
and the whole southern territories of the Kazaks were invaded by 
the Jongars. "Aqtaban-Submnd1" started. 
The Battle of Bulant1. Jongar/Oyrat forces were driven out of 
Sanarqa (the Golden Steppe). 
The Battle of Angiraqay. 
Influence of tribal leaders and the Hans of each Jliz began to grow. 
Ebulhay1r' s acceptance of Russian overlordship, together with his 
people consisted of some Ki~i Jilz and Orta Jiiz tribes. 
1733 
1741 
1757 
1771 
1801 
1801-1822 
1820 
1822 
1822 
1838-1847 
1868 
Kazak forces under Ebulmambet Han defeated the Jongar and 
twenty-years-old Abilay sultan began gain fame. 
Abilay Han defeated Jongar forces 
Kazak and Chinese diplomatic representatives made the Ayagoz 
treaty, Abilay Han send his representatives to Peking. 
Abilay Han was elected as the Han of all Kazaks in Turkistan. 
Establishment of the Bakey Horde under Russian control. 
Southern Kazakstan was occupied by the Khokandian rulers 
Abolishment of the status of Khanate in Ki~i Jiiz 
Abolishment of the status of Khanate in Orta Jiiz. 
Tsarist Decree on the Siberian Kirg1z(Kazaks) 
Abilay Han's grandson Kenesan's fight. 
Temporary Decree on the Administrative Principles of Ural, Torgay, 
Aqmola and Semipalatinsk(Semey) Oblasts. 
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1886 
1891 
1905 
1913 
1914 
1916 
Feb.1917 
July 21-26 
Oct. 
Dec. 5-14 
May 1919 
June 10 
October 
March 5 
Aug. 1920 
1924 
1926-29 
1929-31 
1931-33 
1930-1938 
1953 
1960-1962 
and 
1964-1986 
Dec. 1986 
Dec. 1991 
Imperial Decreee in Reference to Kazak Land in Sirdarya 
Decree on the Administration of Aqmola, Semey, Jetisuv, Ural and 
Torgay Oblasts 
Russo-Japanese War. Russian defeat by the Japanese. 
New hopes for non-Russian people of the tsarist land. 
The Qazaq newspaper began to be published 
WWI 
Steppe Revolt 
The February Revolution in Russia 
The First All-Kazak Congress and Formation of the Ala~ Party. 
Bolshevik Revolution 
The Formation of the Ala~ Orda Government. 
The Ala~ Representative A. Baytursun went Moscow to talk 
Lenin and Stalin 
The Kirrevkom created by Lenin. 
Decree of Turkistan Revolutionary Military Committee 
Pardoning Ala~Activists. 
Liquidation of Ala~ Orda by the Kirrevkom Decree. 
Formation of the Kazak Republic under the name of 
the Kirg1zASSR. 
End of the Nomadic Tradition Begin 
Industrialization in Kazakstan and Sovietization of the Kazak A vul. 
Collectivization Campaign Carried Out Full Speed. 
Famine in the Kazak Steppe. 
Persecution and Elimination of Kazak Elite 
Virgin Land Development. 
Kunayev Era in Kazakstan 
The Alma Ata Riots 
Declaration of Independence. 
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3. SHORT BIOGRAPHIES OF KAZAK MILITARY, POLITICAL AND 
INTELLECTUAL ELITE DURING THE LAST THREE CENTURIES 
TRADITIONAL POLITICAL/MILITARY ELITE OF THE SEVENTEENTH 
Ai"\fD EIGHTEENTH CENTURIES 
ABILAY HAN ( 1711-1780) Han of the Orta Ji.iz. His political influence was recognized 
by all the Kazak Hordes. A native source evaluated Abilay Han's role highly in his 
attempt to eliminate inter and intra-tribal conflicts between the Kazak society and uniting 
the Kazaks under one central rule (Abay Entsiklopediyasz, p. 59). His name can be found 
among the wise-politicians and diplomatic figures in the history of the Kazaks. His fight 
against the Jongar invaders of the Kazak land in the eighteenth century resulted in many 
legendary tales about Kazak life. The oral Kazak literature and heritage reveal the strong 
impact of Abilay Han over his people. The support that this Han received from the Kazak 
elite and from the people became symbolic to display Kazak unity during the times of 
hardship. He lived among the Jongars as a prisoner-of-war in 1940-41. He had a distant 
relation with the Russian power and tried to preserve an equilibrium by maintaining close 
ties with the other super power, China. Abilay Han's influence is still strc;mg among the 
Kazaks. The current Kazak President was honored by some native writers as a Kazak 
leader who have similarities with Abilay Han in order to motivate the latter to protect 
Kazak sovereignty and independence. (An interview with Nursultan Nazarbayev, "Elding 
Jayi Meni Qatt1 Mazalayd1,'' Qazaq Adebiyatz, No. 37, 16 September 1994, p. 2 and 3.) 
QARAKEREY QABANBA Y(Erasil, izbasar) (circa 1691-1969) A traditional military 
leader. One of the most famous warriors of Abilay Han in the eighteenth century. One of 
the organizers of the Kazak fight to drive the Jongar invaders out of the Kazak territory. 
He fought with the Jongars until 1758 that marks the demise of the Jongar Khanate. His 
bravery is legendary due to his public duel before several Kazak-Jongar battles when he 
killed famous Jongar warriors Oljejirg1l, Dalangqara, and Arsalang. Qabanbay's life and 
his services to his people lived among the Kazaks because of the oral literary figures such 
as Buhar J1rav, Aqtamberdi, Dmbetay, Duvlat and Tatiqara aqms. 
QANJIGALI BOGENBA Y BA TIR (1690-1775) A traditional military leader and one of 
the most famous warriors of Abilay Han. He is from Qanj1gah sub-tribe of Argm tribe of 
the Orta Ji.iz. He was elected as the Commander-in-Chief of the whole Kazak in 1710 in 
Qaraqum to lead the Kazak fight against the Jongars. He led the Kazaks in Angiraqay 
(1730) and Talqi Battles (1756-1758) against the Jongars. He was distinguished with 
eloquent speech and well-manner and thus been sent as the representative of Abilay Han 
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to establish diplomatic relations with China. He went to Urum9i with a Kazak diplomatic 
delegation led by one of the Abilay Han's sons, Adil in 1760. He died on his way back 
from Urum9i. 
SAQSAQULI JANiBEK (JANiBEK TARRAN QOSQARULI) (1693-1752)A famous 
Kazak military warrior and leader who achieved distinction through his extraordinary 
bravery against the Jongar invaders in the eighteenth century. He killed a famous Jongar 
warrior at a public duel in 1710 when he was 17 years-old. He fought at the Kazak-Jongar 
Battles in 1717 in Ayagoz, in 1723, in 1723-1725. His bravery became legendary after his 
exceptional courage during the Ang1raqay Battle in 1730. When Abilay Han was made a 
prisoner-of-war of the Jongars in 1940-41, it was Janibek Batlf who freed him through his 
personal contacts with Ebi.ilmambet Han, Ebulhaylf Han and through the mediation of the 
regional Russian officials. He cooperated with Ebulhaylf Han of Ki~i Jiiz in accepting 
Russian protection and was rewarded with the title of Tarhan (Knyaz-prince) by a special 
decree of the Russian Tsarina Elizaveta Petrovna in 11 July 1743. 
EBULHA YIR HAN (died in 1748) Han of Ki~i Jliz, and a strong military leader who was 
ambitious to lead all the Kazaks. He is famous with his acceptance of the Russian 
overlordship on behalf of all the Kazaks by his personal decision. He played a leading 
role as a military leader during the Kazak-Jongar Battles before 1730. He was killed by 
one of the members of the Kazak aristocratic family, Baraq Sultan in 1748. 
BUHAR JIRA V ( 1685-1777) The royal-court poet of Abilay Han. He was also a political 
and social activist. One of the organizers helping Abilay Han to unite the Kazak hordes 
against the Jongar invaders of the Kazak land. His poems are not only an account of the 
Kazak history but also contain philosophical wisdom and social sensibility. 
QAZDAVISTI QAZIBEK (1665-1765) The most famous traditional judge of Kazaks in 
seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. His fame began to grow at his rather young age 
and thus participated into the traditional political life during the time of the Kazak Hans 
as Tavke Han, Sameke Han, Ebulmambet Han and Abilay Han. He became the public 
voice and inspirator of the Kazak unity against the invading Jongar army. He participated 
into the Advisory Council (Biyler Kengesi) of Tavke Han during the composition of Jeti 
Jarg1, the Seven Pillars. He preferred to maintain peaceful relations with Russia and 
China. 
AYTEKE BiY (AYTIQ BAYBEKULI) (1682-1766) The leading biy (judge) ofKi~i Jiiz. 
One of the advisors to Tavke Han, and one of the influential members of the Han Tavke's 
Advisory Council (Biyler Kengesi). "He participated into the unifying activity of the 
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Kazaks together with Tole Biy and Qazibek Biy. He worked in this attempt to unify 
Kazaks by eliminating tribal and sub-tribal conflicts by his fair judgment. He participated 
to collect the Seven Pillar of Tavke Han." (Abay Entsiklopediyasz, p. 117). 
TOLE BiY (ALiBEKULI) (1663-1756) The most famous judge of Ulu (Great) Jiiz. He 
participated into the unifying activities of Tavke Han of the Kazak society. One of the 
influential members of the Advisory Council of Tavke Han. He played an active role in 
compiling the Seven Pillars, Jeti JargL 
POLITICAL/MILITARY ELITE DURING THE TSARIST RULE 
SIRJM DATOV(l 783-1797) Smm Datov is another figure who led the reactionary armed 
struggle against the measures taken by the tsarist colonial administration. His main 
objective was to regain the land of Ki~i Jiiz occupied by the tsarist forces on the western 
side of the Kazak territories. His struggle lasted a decade from 1780s to 1790s. 
iSA TAY TA YMANOV( died in 183 8) The leader of one of the most important organized 
resistance against the tsarist colonial administration in the nineteenth century. 
MAHAMBET OTEMiSOV(1804-1846) He was one of the traditional poets of the 
nineteenth century. He participated in the reactionary struggle of the Kazaks led by isatay 
Taymanov against the tsarist rule. After isatay died in one of the battles, he continued his 
reactionary anti-colonial activities through his poems. Although this move did not bring 
any successful result, his poems remained in the memory of the Kazak people. 
KENESARJ QASIMOV( 1802-1847) The most famous Kazak freedom fighter of the 
nineteenth century. His main target was to restore the Kazak state to its position in the 
time of Abilay Han. His struggle delayed the maintenance of Russian colonial control on 
the Kazak land for two centuries. Kenesan Kasimov entered into history as the great 
figure who attempted to carry out the work of the Great Kazak Han Abilay, his 
grandfather. Then, in spite of the Russian military and administrative measures much of 
the Kazak territory was still free, though tsarist officials were threatening this freedom of 
the nomadic Kazaks and had begun to invade their lands. 
Kenesan Han managed to unite the three hordes under his flag. 1 The aristocratic 
leadership of all the Kazaks led by almost all the leaders of the Middle horde participated 
in the Kenesan movement. Kazak historian Ermuham Bekmahanov provided the readers 
1 Qazaqstan Tariyh1, p.227. 
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with the following chart to show the wide support Kenesan received from Kazak society, 
in his famous work, as follows: 2 
Tribal Names 
Sekti 
Kete 
Al~m 
Tabm 
Tama 
Some key 
Somi~ti-Tabm 
Tortqara 
Sekti(incl.Jaqay1m, 
Tilevqabaq) 
Qarakesek 
Jagalbayh 
Altm 
The Horde 
Lesser Horde 
Jappas(incl.Qalqaman, " 
Suvmunn, Saltaq) 
Kerey 
Serke~(Al~m) 
Baganah 
Altay Middle Horde 
Qarp1q(Argm) Middle Horde 
Teme~(Argm) 
Ar gm 
Aydabol 
Qozgan(Argm) 
Pasture lands 
Summer and 
North-West Aral Sea 
BigBorsuq 
Borsuq Sand 
Winter 
Banks of Ural River 
Banks of Emba 
Banks ofQaraqum, Banks ofTobtl and 
S1rdarya and Quvangdarya. Olkeayaq. 
Banks of Sirdarya Banks of Irg1z and 
Mugaljar mountain. 
South of Aral andBank of Or and Embi 
banks of S1rdarya. 
Banks of Or, Suvand1q 
and Irg1z. 
Banks of Srrdarya, 
Quvangdarya, Qaraqum. 
Banks of Sirdarya 
Banks ofTob1l and 
Torgay Rivers. 
Banks of Caspian and 
area around Atirav. 
Left Bank of Ertis. 
and Irg1z. 
Upper Oral, banks of 
Irg1z and Or. 
Torgay, Banks of 
Olkeayaq and Tobi!. 
Between Tobtl and 
Torgay, Troitsk area. 
Banks ofTob1l, Ohagan 
and Tog1zaq. Lived with 
Argm and Q1p9aq tribes. 
Banks of Qald1qayta and 
Buntura. 
Aqmola, Aqkol and 
Tay~ankol. 
Qaraqong1z basin Around Esil, South of 
and lower Sansuv Atbasar station. 
Aqtav and banks of Upper Esil, Nura, 
Atasuv. Siderli, and Sansuv. 
Middle part of Sansuv 
and Betpaqdala. 
Banks ofTorgay 
Qmltav and Dalba 
mntns.(south of 
Bayanavrl) 
Nura, Esil and Sansuv, 
East of Aqmola and south 
of Qarqarah. 
Between Torgay and Tob1l 
Rivers. 
Banks of Siderti and 
Olengti. 
Kenesan Han's struggle disprove another Soviet/Russian claim of the Kazak 
acceptance of the Tsarist overlordship by their own will. The above list of tribes who 
fought against Tsarist forces, under the leadership of Kenesan is included in order to 
2 Ermuhan Bekmahanov, Qazaqstan XIX Gasirdmg 20-40 Jildarmda, Almah: Sanat, 1994., p.183-184. 
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display this reality. At the same time, a map published in a Soviet era encyclopedia in 
Kazakstan is also worth examination. In this source, the Kazak territory in the North of 
the country was declared as the area that came under Russian/Tsarist control earlier than 
the nineteenth century. However, it was actually the territory of the above tribes who 
joined the Kenesan's fight. 
Kenesan Han's influence still survives among the Kazaks due to an appeal by a 
group of Kazak intellectuals to the current Kazak president Nazarbayev as honoring the 
name of Kenesan by naming the Kazak Military School in Almatl after him. At the same 
time, the present-day Kazak intellectuals prefer his name to be announced as the 
traditional Kazak hero in opposition to the heroes of Socialist revolution, Heroes of the 
W.W. II, or heroes of the "socialist labor." 
NATIVE ADMINISTRATIVE ELITE UNDER RUSSIAN RULE 
SINGGIS V ALiHANULI ABILAYHANOV (1811 - 1902) Grandson of Abilay Han and 
son of Vah Han, father of Soqan Valihanov. A graduate of the Russian Military School in 
Omsk. The Agasultan (senior sultan) of Amanqaragay Okrig for 19 years between 1834 
to 1853, and the Agasultan of Kok9etav Okrig in 1857. He provided the Russian 
academic circles with information related to the traditional Kazak life and the Kazak oral 
heritage. 
MUSA SORMANULI ( 1816-1885) The Agasultan of Bayanav1l and a graduate of the 
Russian Military School in Omsk. He worked for the tsarist administration throughout his 
life. He provided the Russian academic circles with information related to the traditional 
Kazak life and the oral Kazak heritage. He is the uncle of Soqan Valihanov through his 
sister Zeynep who married $mg1s Valihanov. His son Sadvaqas Musauh Sormanov was 
among the writers to the organ of nationalists, the Qazaq newspaper. 
QUNANBAY OSKENBAYULI (1804-1886) A son of Oskenbay, a famous notable of 
the Nayman tribe in the late eighteen century. Qunanbay was the Agasultan of Tob1qti 
sub-tribe of Nayman of Orta Jiiz, and worked in collaboration with the tsarist 
administration. Qunanbay is the father of famous nineteenth century Kazak poet-
philosopher Abay. This family's political, social influence was maintained until the 
Bolshevik revolution. Towards the end of his life, Qunanbay went to Mecca and 
afterwards gave up worldly activities. Two of his grandsons, Sakerim Qudayberdiuh 
Qunanbayev and Turagul Abayuh Qunanbayev were among the supporters of the 
nationalist Ala~ movement. 
INTELLECTUALS OF THE TSARIST TIME: 
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c;OQAN VALIHANOV(1835-1865) c;oqan Valihanov, a direct descendant of the royal 
house of the Kazak aristocracy was educated mainly in the Russian Tsarist military 
schools, and died at the age of thirty. He wrote in Russian (although he was able to read 
and probably speak Persian, German and French other than Kazak) and displayed a very 
high scholarly quality in his works which bore him a membership in the Tsarist academic 
geographic society. According to Zeki Velidi Togan, c;oqan Valihanov, 
"was the manifestation of the genuinely quality of the nineteenth century nomadic Turks 
encountering the European civilization ... His intellectual ability improved under the 
influence of the ideas of Russian liberalists and of the society of Russian-German 
orientalists. He was the worshipper of the European civilization and thus viewed Russian 
civilization as the representative of it. As the direct and legal descendant of the Kazak 
hans, he disliked the influence of the sayyids (the hocas), descendants of the prophet 
Muhammed in Central Asia. He opposed the Ka~gar hocas, the agents of the Amir of 
Bukhara and Qulca who wanted to replace the traditional local Turkic customs and rules 
with Islamic rules and laws, on the steppe... Missionary activities of the tsarist 
administration on the steppe did not alarm him due to his firm belief of the endurance of 
Turkic culture and customs among the Kazaks. According to him, the mixed religion 
(with Shamanism and Islam) of the nomadic Kazaks, who arrange their life according to 
the "yasa" (the code of laws of the steppe, created by Chingiz Han) and take their 
spiritual nourishment from old national epics, was quite different from religion of the 
Tatars and the Bukharan subjects. <;oqan believed that despite being considered as 
barbars by the Wes tern societies, the Kazak ethical quality was quite high comparing to 
those so-called civilized people. They have a rich (oral) literature. It is the Kazaks who 
preserved best their society's poetic ability and national literature among the whole 
Turko-Tatar tribes. The Kazak language is the richest comparing to all the other Turkic 
languages. "3 
c;oqan was raised to be the han of the Kazaks, yet the then current Russian 
administration did not allow him to receive further education in improving his leadership 
abilities in the Russian army due to his origin. He died seven years after his graduation 
from military school. He was sharp, brave and hot blooded personality. His high self 
esteem and superiority is turned into a legendary myth among the intellectuals of the 
Soviet period by the following anecdote: While he was in St. Petersburg, enjoying the 
fruits of the aristocratic gatherings, he was introduced to an elderly aristocrat-army 
general, the person attempted to shake c;oqan's hand by not taking off his gloves. c;oqan 
asking one moment of permission immediately put his gloves on and shook the general's 
hand. 
IBIRA Y AL TIN SARIN ( 1841-1889) The founder and the champion of Russian led 
educational facilities and much publicized tool of the pan-Russian education in the Kazak 
steppe. He was portrayed as the prophet of secular education particularly by the atheistic 
educational system and its tools during the Soviet period. Thus negligence of the 
publications in native language both during the tsarist times and later periods lead to 
inaccurate conclusions in elevating Altmsann's works. In this respect painting him as 
3 Togan, Tiirkistan, pp.543-551. 
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"not a devout Muslim and a supporter of the belief secular education,"4 is the repetition 
of the Soviet claim if not an erroneous conclusion. Altmsann actually wanted to teach the 
basics of islam to the then reading public, with his book, published in Kazan (1884), 
entitled Sarait-iil jsfam: Muszlman$lhqtmg Tutqasi ( Principles of islam: Pillars of 
Muslims).5 This kind of information is not new to the native and Turkic scholars outside 
the Soviet Union. The Bashkir scholar Zeki Velidi Togan depicts Altmsann as a devout 
Kazak nationalist and an admirer of the Central Asian and Kazak historic and literary 
heritage in the first edition of his well-known book Tiirkistan which was published in 
Egypt between 1928 and 1939 and in 1947 in istanbul. 
ABAY QUNANBAYULI (1845-1904). The most publicized Kazak poet of the 
nineteenth century. He spoke Arabic, Persian and Russian and red Russian writers such as 
Pu~kin, Lermantov, Tolstoy, Turgenyev, Dostoyevskiy. He liked Byron through 
Lermantov and was influenced oriental poets such as Sadi, Navoi and Fuzuli. Abay was 
a religious but not a fanatic person, and painted the best picture of the nomadic Kazak 
life in his powerful lyrical style. He was both a nomadic folkloric poet (aqm) and a poet-
philosopher on orientalistic traditions. 6 He was depicted as the prophet of Kazak 
literature, of all times, and his works are widely propagated among all of the Kazaks on 
earth. There are at least a couple of hundred books and thousands of articles (directly 
related to him or giving detailed citations from his works) about Abay and his works 
published in Kazakstan during the Soviet period. The most well-known Qf them was of 
course the works of Muhtar Avezov, who became the greatest promoter of the works of 
Abay and his influence in the steppe. A vezov wrote his well-known historic novel, Abay 
Joh in four volumes7 and Abay $Lgarmalarz in two volumes.8 His nephew Sakerim 
Qudayberdiuh Qunanbayev and his son Turagul Qunanbayev were among the supporters 
of the Ala~ movement through their literary, historic writings in the pages of the 
nationalist organ of Qazaq newspaper. 
THE ALAS INTELLECTUALS 
SANJAR ASFENDiYAROV(1889-1938) Political activist, historian, and medical doctor. 
A graduate of the Military Medical Academy in St. Petersburg. One of the founders of the 
Kazak pedagogical and medical institutes and the Kazak Academy of Sciences during the 
4 Olcott, ibid., p. l 06. 
5 lbiray Altmsarm, $arait-iil islam;Muszlman~z/1qtmg Tutqasz,Kazan : Kazan Universitesi Tab1ghanas1, 
1884. The book was reprinted in Juld1z, No.6., Almah, 1991, pp. 3-28. 
6 Togan, Tiirkistan, p.493. 
7 Muhtar Avezov, AbayJoh, Vol. I (1942), Vol.II (1947), Vol.III(l952) and Vol.IV (1956), Almati. 
8 Abay $1garmalar1, Muhtar Avezov, ed., Kazak Academy of Sciences, Institute of Languages and 
Literature, Almah: 1957. 
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early Soviet rule. Author of the famous books entitled The Early Account of the Kazak 
History and The Problems of Kazak History. 
JAQIP AQBAYEV(1876-1934) One of the first Kazaks graduated from the Faculty of 
Law of the St. Petersburg university. He often wrote about the traditional customs and 
principles regarding the judicial matters in the Kazak society. He was announced as the 
Chief Procurator of the Ala~ Orda government. He worked in courts of Semey and 
Sirdarya Oblast between 1919-1928. He became a victim of Stalinist execution and was 
shot in 1934. 
MUHTAR A VEZOV(1897-1961) One of the two "repentent" Ala~ fans who later became 
the classic of the Kazak literature through his voluminous books about the traditional 
Kazak life. He is famous with his work about the nineteenth century Kazak poet-
philosopher Abay Qunanbayuh. He suffered from persecution many times but survived 
and died from natural causes in 1961. 
JUSiPBEK AYMAVITOV(1889-1931) Poet, writer, dramatist, educator, and researcher 
of Kazak literature. He worked as a teacher at various Russi&11-Kazak schools. He wrote 
in Qazaq newspaper. He worked as a writer in the Kazak press organs of the early Soviet 
time. He became a victim of Stalinist execution and was shot in 1931. 
AHMET BA YTURSINOV ( 1873-1938) Another most important Kazak intellectual of 
the early twentieth century and one of the founders of the Ala~ movement. Baytursm 
became aware of the colonialist oppression of the tsarist administration in his early years 
of boyhood when his father and uncle was exiled to hard labor in Siberia for 15 years. He 
graduated from the School of Teachers in Orenburg in 1895. From this time onwards, 
Baytursm was an active participant of anti-colonial and revolutionary movements. His 
efforts on matters of education of the Kazak society is particularly noteworthy. He was 
the chief editor of the Qazaq newspaper. In a society where number of properly educated 
intellectuals are scarce, Baytursm tired to fill the gaps by assuming many responsibilities 
from time to time as correspondent, turkolog, literary man, poet, translator, and political 
activist. During 1918-1919, he was the leading man in the Ala~ movement and when the 
Kazak national political movement failed he joined the Bolsheviks hoping again to offer 
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his service to his people on the steppe. Between 1919 and until his first arrest in 1929, he 
worked as a member of Military-Revolutionary Committee, Commissar of People's 
Education in Kazakstan, a member of the All-Union Central Executive Committee. He 
became a victim of Stalinist execution and was killed in 1938. 
AHMET BiRiMJANOV(1870-1927) He went to the Altmsann school in Torgay, 
graduated from Boys Gymnasium in Orenburg and entered into the Faculty of Law of the 
Kazan University in 1891, from which he graduated in 1896 with a gold medal. He was 
elected to the First and Second Russian Imperial Duma from Torgay Province between 
1905-1906. He worked as legal prosecutor in Orenburg and Samara until 1917. He was a 
member of the Ala~ Movement. He became a victim of Stalinist execution and was killed 
in 1927. 
ALIHAN BOKEYHANOV ( 1870-1937) The most famous of Kazak-Ala~ intellectual of 
the twentieth century. He was also active as a journalist, literary-man, translator and 
economist. He graduated from the Technical College in Omsk in 1890 and graduated 
from the Faculty of Economics at the Imperial Institute of Forestry in 1894. He began to 
publish articles about Kazak social life and history of the steppe people in the late 
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. He was the Kazak deputy to the First Russian 
Duma from Semey province and one of the signatories to the famous Viborg manifesto. 
A member of the tsarist Masonic Society of Polyarnaya Zvezda since 1908. His 
awareness of Kazak problems under the Russian colonial administration as well as his 
cognizance of Kazak misery under this administration related to the land problem was 
shaped during his participation to the tsarist geographic expeditionary mission. 
Bokeyhanov was a young man in his twenties when he was included into the famous 
Sc;erbina expedition, between 1896-1901, that investigated 12 Kazak districts of Aqmola, 
Semey and Torgay. He was one of the authors of the famous book entitled Russia. 
Complete Geographic Description of Our Homeland edited by outstanding Russian 
scholars P. P. Semyenov-Tiyan~anskiy and V. i. Lamanskiy. He became a victim of 
Stalinist execution and was killed in 1937. 
HALEL DOSMUHAMMEDOV(1883-1939) A graduate of the Imperial Military-
Medical Academy. Scientist, medical doctor, folklorist, journalist, political activist and 
professor. One of the founders and leaders of the Ala~ Movement. He met Lenin in 1918 
on behalf of the Ala~ Movement asking autonomous status for the Ala~ Orda 
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Government. His activities was limited to scholarly-educational work during the Soviet 
period. He became a victim of Stalinist execution and was killed in 1939. 
SABiT DONENTA YEV(l 894-1933) Poet, journalist. He wrote articles to Qazaq 
newspaper about education. He is one of the satirists in Kazak literature following the 
poetic tradition of Abay Qunanbayuh. He became a victim of Stalinist execution and was 
killed in 1933. 
MIRJAQIP DUVLATOV(l885-1935) Poet, writer, journalist, educator, and political 
activist. His articles first appeared in Serke(St. Petersburg-1907) and in Ayqap. He is 
famous with his books Oyan Qazaq (Ufa-1909) and Baqztszz Jamal (Kazan-1910). He 
spent his years in Orenburg publishing the Qazaq newspaper. He was one of the leaders 
of "nationalist awakening of the Kazaks, the Ala~ Movement, the Ala~ Party, the Ala~ 
Orda Government and the Ala~ Orda Army. He wrote about Kazak history, literature, 
culture and political matters in the pages of the Qazaq newspaper. He became a victim of 
Stalinist execution and was killed in 5 October 1935 in the labor camp of Sosnovets near 
the White Sea by the Baltic Canal. 
ALiMHAN ERMEKOV(l 891-1970) One of the two "repentent" former Ala~ activists. A 
mathematician who graduated from the Institute of Technology in Tomsk. He wrote 
articles about education, and organizing activities of the Muslim students in Tomsk in the 
pages of the Qazaq newspaper. He suffered from political repression but lived until 1970. 
iLYAS JANSUGUROV(1894-1938) One of the founders of the contemporary written 
Kazak literature. A poet, political activist and journalist. He graduated from the Ta~kent 
Institute of Kazak-Kirg1z Teachers in 1920. He wrote in the Qazaq newspaper. A victim 
of Stalinist persecution and was killed in 1938. 
MAGJAN JUMABAYEV(1893-1938)A graduate of Madrasa Galiya in Ufa. His poems 
championed the great Turkic historic, ethnic and cultural unity which warmed the hearts 
of his fellow-brothers and alarmed those of their opponents. One of his poems entitled 
Tiirkistan describes the geographic characteristics of the region and reminds t_he historical 
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figures such as Af1rasyab, Chingiz, Amir Timur, Mirza Ulug Bek, and even ibn-i Sina in 
a prodigious style which continues to inspire those who can read it in native tongue even 
today. Magjan was a poet who also felt close association to the Ottoman Turkey and thus 
wrote his another well-known poem Alzstagz Bavzrzma- To My Brother in Faraway Land-
during the World War I, when the Ottoman Empire was in its last days of survival. One 
can also clearly see the Kazak solidarity in idil-Ural national struggle from his poem Ural 
in which he described Ural mountain as the bordering area, the western side resembling 
the night, darkness and as the nest of the blue-eyed evil and the eastern side as the golden 
steppe of the Turks. In his poems, he supported the pan-Turkic unity and claimed many 
of those cultural, historical, and literary figures of Central Asia, as the common heritage 
of the Turkic people. He became a victim of Stalinist execution and was killed in 1938. 
BEYiMBET MAYLiN(1887-1933) Biymuhammet Jarmagambetuh Maylin is one of the 
founders of the contemporary Kazak literature. A writer and a journalist. He was educated 
at the Madrasa of Ag1mbay Haj1, the Madrasa of Vazifa in Troitsk and the Madrasa 
Galiya in Ufa. He wrote a poem devoted to the Ala~ Party and other articles and news in 
the pages of the Qazaq newspaper. A victim of Stalinist persecution and was killed in 
1933. 
MUSTAFA <;::OQAY(1890-1941) Mustafa <;::oqay is another phenomenal figure, whose 
maternal ancestors belong to the royal house Khokand and his grandfather was the 
dadka(regional administrator of the tsarist times in the Kazak steppe) of the Torgay 
province. He was a political activist, journalist, historian and publicist. He graduated 
from the Faculty of Law of St. Petersburg University. He worked in the Muslim Fraction 
of the Russian State Duma before 1917. He played a leading role in the formation of 
Hokand Autonomous Government. He choose to live in exile after 1920. He published 
Ya.,s" Tiirkistan in Berlin between 1929-1939. He was trying to form the Turkestan Front 
against the Soviet Union by drafting "Turkestanese" war of prisoners in Berlin in 1941. 
He mysteriously became ill and died in December 27, 1941 in Berlin. Some sources and 
memoirs reject the causes of his death from natural results. 
~AKERiM QUDA YBERDIULI(l 858-1931) A poet, writer, translator and a historian. A 
close relative of Abay Qunanbayuh. He read the Ottoman Turkish, Arabic, Persian and 
Russian. He wrote articles about the Kazak history, culture, traditional customs and 
judiciary matters. A victim of Stalinist persecution and was killed in 1931. 
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MUHAMETJAN TINI$PAYEV(1879-1937) A political activist and the "Prime-minister 
of the Khokand Autonomous Republic" in 1917. A graduate of the St. Petersburg 
Institute of Transport. One of the engineers of the Tiirk-Sib Railway during the early 
Soviet rule in Kazakstan. He wrote articles in the Qazaq newspaper. A victim of Stalinist 
persecution and was killed in 193 7. 
NATIVE BOLSHEVIK INTELLECTUALS 
SAKEN SEYFULLiN (1894-1938) One of the founders of the Kazak-Soviet literature. A 
poet and social/political activists. One of the most publicized Kazak writer and poet 
during the Soviet times. He praised Lenin, the "Sovetstan" and the achievements of the 
Bolshevik and of Socialist system. He openly criticized those Ala$ activists as the 
"nationalists". However, he was ridiculed by the leading Ala$ intellectuals for his 
championship of the socialist regime. He became a victim of Stalinist persecution and 
died at a labor camp in 1938. 
SABiT MUQANOV ( 1900-1973) A staunch supporter of the Soviet rule. He severely 
criticized the Ala$ intellectuals during the late 1920s. A writer and one of the founders of 
the Kazak literature during the Soviet time. 
NATIVE SOVIET PARTOCRATS 
ALiBiY JANGELDiN (1884-1953) His name is very often mentioned as one of the 
native Bolshevik activists who worked to maintain the party rule in the Kazak steppe. 
Before the emergence of the Bolshevik rule, he was a native Kazak who was converted to 
the Orthodox fate and adopted the name of Stepnow (Mustafa <;oqayoglu, 
"Qazaqstannmg On Yilhg1ga," Ya~ Turlastan, Year: 2., No. 11, 1930, pp. 1-11.) In the 
Qazaq newspaper, it was claimed that Jangeldin used to label all of his opponents as the 
supporters of the old regime in 1917. The nationalist Qazaq newspaper appealed to 
Torgay Kazaks not to support Jangeldin and not to believe to his propaganda. (Reprint 
Qazaq newspaper, p.403. year 1917) He was elected as one of the members of the Kazak 
CP Central Executive Committee in 1920. 
TURAR RISQULOV{l894-1937) R1squlov "joined the Russian Communist Party as 
early as September 1917 and became one of the first native revolutionaries of Central 
Asia. By 1918, R1squlov was the chairman of the Regional Executive Committee of 
Avliye-Ata and a member of the Central Executive Committee of the Turkistan 
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Autonomous Republic."9 His fame begun to grow during the famine of 1918, following 
the 1916 revolt in the steppe region. Turar Rtsqulov held positions like, People's 
Commissar of Health, Chairman of the Central Executive Committee of the Turkestan 
ASSR, Chairman of the Turkestan Musburo of the People's Commissariat for 
Nationalities under Stalin, and leader of the Turkestani delegation to the famous Congress 
of the Peoples of the East held in Baku. His loyalty to communism did not hinder his 
passionate defense of his nation's rights even against his fellow-Bolshevik comrades. He 
remained the staunch defender of the welfare of his people. He was always in the 
forefront of struggle concerning the relations of native Muslims and Russian Bolsheviks, 
particularly in matters related to the mal-administration of the latter upon the former. He 
accused the so-called "European" Bolsheviks of physically eliminating the native cadres 
from the party administration and of drawing all the benefits of the revolution solely to 
themselves. His sharp style of criticizing the most important tool of the Bolshevik power, 
the Red Army soldiers of plundering, robbing and assassinating the natives as well as the 
then party cadres of discriminating the indigenous people, was considered later by the 
Stalinist administration as "serious mistakes of nationalist character." 
KOLBA Y TOGUSOV His name is recorded due to his work as one of the founders of the 
Socialist oriented D~ Jiiz party in Kazakstan during the 1917. He was known as an 
enthusiastic amateurish supporter of the new trends. He wrote a fourteenth page drama 
about the problem of illiteracy before the October revolution. There are also reports citing 
his association with the Ala~ intellectuals such as Mustafa <;oqay. Togusov and his 
friends began increasingly critical of the Ala~ intellectuals as the Bolsheviks began to 
gain the upper hand in Kazakstan. 
SMAGUL SADVAQASOV ( killed in 1933) He participated into the Ala~ Party 
organizational work when he was a student in Omsk. He later rose to high party rank in 
1920s. He was the President of the Kazak Rayon Committees. Smagul Sadvaqasov 
openly criticized the Stalinist policy of nationalities and its application in Kazakstan in 
the pages of an All-Union press, the Bolshevik. He also openly argued with the center-
appointed Bolshevik high-ranking party leaders in Kazakstan over the party policies 
carried out in Kazakstan. He won the title of "nationalist-diehard." He was son-in-law of 
Alihan Bokeyhanov. He died mysteriously in Moscow in 1933. 
NURSULTAL~ NAZARBAYEV(1940-) The First President of the Republic of 
Kazakstan. His professional life as a engineer of metallurgy started after he graduated 
9 Revolution in Central Asia As seen by Muslim Bolsheviiks, Society for Central Asian 
Studies Series No:3, p.6-l l. 
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from the regular Secondary School. He worked in various levels of the Komsomol and 
the Party organization after 1960. He became the President of the Council of Ministers of 
the KazakSSR in 1984. He was elected as the First President of the Republic of 
Kazakstan when the country declared its independence in 1991. 
DINMUHAMMED KUNAYEV(1912-1993) Kunayev was born in January 12, 1912 in 
Almat1 to a family of the Great Horde. In his memoirs, published in 1992, he followed the 
traditional way of Kazaks in describing his ancestors by giving seven names of his six 
forefathers. Kunayev was the son of Mengliahmet who was the son of Jumabay. son of 
Qonay, son of Aznabay, son of Nurmambet and son of Johm. His grandfather Jumabay 
went to Mecca through Turkey in 1904 and returned Kazakstan through India and 
Afghanistan in 1905. In order to pay pilgrimage to Mecca, anytime in history for a Kazak 
in Central Asia, one needs to be extremely devoted to religion, and needs considerable 
amount of wealth to take the journey. Kunayev's father seem to be a regular follower of 
Islamic religion for which he mentioned that when he was a boy, his father use to take 
him to pray. Despite serving on the very top echelon of the atheistic Soviet rule, Kunayev 
remained aware of his Muslim origin. Some ordinary Kazaks had a sympathy on him 
even after his fall from power for his respect to the spirit of Ahmed Y esevi, a twelfth 
century sufi, mystic whose mausoleum was built by the Timur, in Kazakstan. The 
mausoleum which is still considered as the "second Mecca" for the Central Asian 
Muslims, became a subject of discussion between Kunayev and Nikita Hru~9ev, when the 
latter visited Kazakstan in 1961. '0 In addition to this, Kunayev in his childhood grew up 
together with Eskendir Tm1~payev, son of Muhametjan Tm1~payev, the first Kazak 
engineer and the former Prime Minister of the Khokand Autonomous Government and 
the Ala~ Ordist. Kunayev, in his memoirs, wrote that he was inspired by Muhametjan 
Tm1~payev's professional skills and wanted to follow Tm1~payev's path. 11 
The political career of Kunayev started after his graduation from the Moscow 
Institute for Nonferrous Metals and Gold in 1936. He entered into the Komsomol 
organization while he was a student. He became a member of the Communist party in 
1939. He worked as the Deputy Chairman of the KazakSSR Council of Ministers 
between 1942-52. He became a full member of the Kazak Communist Party Central 
Committee in 1949. Kunayev was the President of the KazakSSR Academy of Sciences 
in 1952 and left the position in 1955 when he was appointed as the Chairman of the 
KazakSSR Council of Ministers. Starting from 1960s onwards, Kunayev began to climb 
the stairs towards upper political echelons of the Soviet Party and Government apparatus. 
He became a full member of the CPSU Central Committee in 1956. Six years after that, 
he was a member in the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet. Kunayev was a 
candidate member to the CPSU CC Politburo between 1966 to 1971. The latter date 
marks his elevation to the full membership status to the CPSU CC Politburo. Kunayev 
10 Dinmuhamed Kunayev,O Moyem Vremeni, Almah: RGJR "Davir, MP "Inhmaq'', 1992. p. 134-135. 
II ibid., p.15. 
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became famous with his role in evacuation and reorganization of industrial enterprises to 
areas behind the lines in Kazakstan during the W.W. II. He also mobilized and trained 
reservists. Between 1952 and 1955, he coordinated academic activities in the field of 
scientific and technical research at the Kazak Academy of Sciences. The most important 
reason for him to rise to the top of the Soviet leadership was his close association with 
Leonid Brejnev. It was established when Brejnev served as the First Secretary of the 
Kazak CP Central Committee between 1955 to 1957. He worked under Brejnev during 
the crucial years of launching the Virgin Land Campaign in Kazakstan. Kunayev died on 
22 August 1993 in Almatt at the age of 81. He was buried by a state funeral and "the 
entire Kazak leadership stresses Kunayev's "enormous contribution" to the development 
of Kazakstan's economy and "his services to the people during the difficult period of the 
Communist experiment." 12 
INTELLECTUALS OF MODERN TIMES 
ERMUHAN BEKMAHANOV(1915-1966) A Soviet era historian who wrote about the 
nationalist-reactionary struggle of Kenesan against the tsarist colonial administration. He 
received severe criticism for his work. The Soviet prohibition of Bekmahanov's work on 
Kenesan clearly reflected the Soviet sympathies for the tsarist colonial regime. 
Bekmahanov was forced to spend the rest of his life according to Soviet requirements and 
published nothing extraordinary after 1940. 
QABDES JUMADiLOV(1936) Famous writer in contemporary Kazakstan whose 
ancestral background came from Eastern Turkestan, the Xinjiang. He is highly respected 
for his outstanding ability of writing in Kazak in historic, political and social subjects. 
ABiS KEKiLBA YEV(l 939) A contemporary writer and poet. He works on the political, 
social and historic issues of the Kazak society. During the independent era, he was 
appointed as the President of the Parliament of the Republic of Kazakstan. 
MANAS QOZIBAYEV(1931) A famous historian and academic of the Kazak Academy 
of Sciences. He is the author of numerous articles and many books about the history of 
the Kazaks. The leading activist of the new trend in the present-day Kazakstan in history 
and political awakening. He is a gifted native orator, fluent in both Russian and Kazak 
languages. He works close to the current president of Kazakstan. 
12 RFE/RL Daily Report, No. 162, 25 August 1993. 
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MUHTAR MAGA ViN( 1940) Writer, a doctor of philology and a tedious researcher of 
the Kazak literary heritage. He works as the Chief Editor of the native literary journal 
Juldiz. He is the author of many books and articles, including Bes Gaszr J1rlayd1, 
Alasapiran, Qazaq Tariyhzmng Alippesi. His most important contribution is his 
leadership ability in administering the Juldiz journal. Many important materials related to 
the history and the plight of the Kazak society in the past and in the present, were 
published under his guidance. 
MEKEMTAS MIRZAHMETOV(1930) A professor of Philology by profession. He 
writes about the plight of the Kazaks both in present-day and in the past. His book 
entitled Qazaq Qalay Orzstandmldz (How the Kazaks were Russified) is particularly 
striking. He is one of the supporter of the native trend of re-evaluating the native history. 
QOYSIGARA SALGARiN(1939) A journalist and writer who wrote a dissertation about 
the Kazak philosopher Abay. His recent books and articles about the Kazak history are 
significant contribution to the new trend in Kazak social, political understanding. 
SERBAN MUR T AZA YEV( 1932) A writer, dramatist. He wrote about th.e life of Turar 
Risqulov in his famous drama Stalinge Hat, and in his well-known book entitled Qzzzl 
Jebe. He is also a supporter of the Kazak social, political and demographic plight. 
RIMGALi NURGALiYEV(1940) A writer, literary critic, a professor of philology and a 
corresponding member of the Kazak Academy of Sciences. His work as the Chief Editor 
of the institution called "Qazaq Entsiklopediyasmmg Redaktsiyas1" makes substantial 
contribution to the contemporary historic, social, political and administrative 
understanding of the Kazak society, by offering information to the public on the native 
past. 
OLJAS S0LEYMENOV(1936) A poet and writer. A mounting figure among the Kazak 
intellectuals. He worked as the head of the Kazak cinematographers society and as the 
first secretary of the Kazak Union of Writers during the Soviet times. He is the leading 
activist and president of the Nevada-Semey Anti-Nuclear Movement. He was also the 
president of the Peoples Congress Party, before he was appointed by Nazarbayev, as the 
Kazak Ambassador to Italy. 
He is a gifted personality who has incredible charisma in native and non-native 
public eye in Kazakstan. However, his fame is not limited to Kazakstan only. One of his 
earlier poems, "Adamga Tabm Jer Endi" (Oh! Earth, now you should worship mankind!) 
devoted to the Soviet achievements in space. He was later much criticized for his another 
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work entitled Az I Ya: The tale of Prince Igor, for his claim of many Russian literary 
heritage owing to the Turkic heritage derived from Central Asia and from the Turkic 
world. 
Oljas Siileymenov's support of the Russian language and his ideas about a 
possible confederation with the Russian or the Slavic world clearly publicizes the current 
dilemma of the Kazak intellectual society. When a severe criticism was directed to Oljas 
Siileymenov, in 1994, a famous native writer who prefers to write in Russian and the 
president of the present People's Congress Party, he criticized those Kazak nationalists as 
"the rural teachers isolated from the rest of the world and ignorant of the global 
chances." 13 However, earlier during the last years of the Gorbachev rule, he was reported 
as the advocate of the Kazak plight. 
13 Oljas Siileymenov,"Bizding Muratim1z Tag1 da Sol-Tavlard1 Alasartpay Dalam Asqaqtatuv,"Qazaq 
Adebiyat1, No.7, 18 February 1994, pp.6-7. 
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LIST OF THE FIRST SECRETARIES OF THE KAZAK COMMUNIST PARTY 
1920-1922 
1922-1924 
1924-1925 
1925-1933 
1933-1938 
1938-1945 
1946-1954 
1954-1955 
1955-1957 
1957-1960 
1960-1962 
1962-1964 
1964-1986 
1986-1989 
1989-1992 
Redus-Zenkovi9 
G. /\. ICorostelev 
G. A. Tsey~vili (Georgian) 
F. I.. Golo~9ekin(Russian) 
L. I. Mirzoyan(i\rmenian) 
Nikolay Aleksandrovi9 Skvortsov(Russian) 
Jumabay Sayahmetov(ICazak) 
Panteleimon ICondratevi9 Ponomarenko(Russian) 
Leonid ilyi9 Brejnev(Russian) 
Nikolay Ilyi9 Belyayev(Russian) 
Dinmuhammed l\hmetuh ICunayev(ICazak) 
M.(ismail) Yusupov(Uygur) 
D. A. ICunayev(ICazak) 
Gennady Vasilyevi9 IColbin (Russian) 
Nursultan Abi~uh Nazarbayev(ICazak) 
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